Fabio Franchino provides an insightful and critical examination of the findings of my book Veto Power, as well as the volume by Finke et al., Reforming the European Union. Here I respond to some of the issues raised by Franchino. First, I discuss Franchino's replication of my main empirical results, and then I discuss my treatment of intergovernmentalism.
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