This article analyses the extent to which governmental positions on European integration originate from domestic politics. In contrast to previous studies, I apply a longitudinal research design that allows for an empirical analysis of the domestic dynamics that govern position formation. I use advanced statistical measurement techniques to compare national positions across time. Member states’ economic characteristics define a corridor for governmental positions. However, the political dynamics of the domestic arena determine the final position governments adopt at any particular Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). In particular, when formulating the national position, the short-term trend in public opinion limits governmental discretion. This effect is especially strong if the government announced ratification by referendum and in countries with a system of strong parliamentary scrutiny.
Achen, Christopher H. ( 2006) ‘Evaluating Political Decision Making Models’ , in Robert Thomson (ed.) The European Union Decides. The Empirical Relevance of Policy Making Models , pp. 264-98. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2.
Aspinwall, Mark D. ( 2007) ‘Government Preferences on European Integration: An Empirical Test of Five Theories’, British Journal of Political Science37(2): 89-114.
3.
Bailey, Michael A. ( 2007) ‘Comparable Preference Estimates across Time and Institutions for the Court, Congress, and Presidency’, American Journal of Political Science51(3): 433-48.
4.
Benedetto, Giacomo ( 2006) ‘The United Kingdom: Position Taking and the Protection of Red Lines’, in Thomas König and Simon Hug (eds) Policy-making Processes and the European Constitution: A Comparative Study in Member States and Accession Countries, pp. 234-42. London/ New York: Routledge.
5.
Bräuninger, Thomas, Tanja Cornelius, Thomas König and Thomas Schuster ( 2001) ‘The Dynamics of European Integration. A Constitutional Analysis of the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference’, in Gerald Schneider and Mark D. Aspinwall (eds) The Rules of Integration. Institutionalist Approaches to the Study of Europe, pp. 46-68. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
6.
Brinegar, Adam P. and Seth K. Jolly ( 2005) ‘Location, Location, Location: National Contextual Factors and Public Support for European Integration’, European Union Politics6(2): 155-80.
7.
Clinton, Joshua, Simon Jackman and Douglas Rivers ( 2004) ‘The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data’ , American Political Science Review98(2): 355-70.
8.
Crum, Ben ( 2007) ‘Party Stances in the Referendums on the EU Constitution: Causes and Consequences of Competition and Collusion’, European Union Politics8(1): 61-82.
9.
Dai, Xinyuan ( 2005) ‘Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism’ , International Organization59(2): 363-98.
10.
De Vries, CatherineE. ( 2007) ‘Sleeping Giant: Fact or Fairytale? How European Integration Affects National Elections’, European Union Politics8(3): 363-85.
11.
Finke, Daniel ( 2009) European Integration and Its Limits: Intergovernmental conflicts and Their Domestic Origins. London: ECPR Press [Monograph Series], forthcoming.
12.
Finke, Daniel and Thomas König ( 2009) ‘Why Risk Popular Ratification Failure? A Comparative Analysis of the Choice of the Ratification Instrument in the 25 Member States of the EU’, Constitutional Political Economy20(3): 341-63.
13.
Føllesdal, Andreas and Simon Hix ( 2006) ‘Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcik’, Journal of Common Market Studies44(3): 533-62.
14.
Franklin, Mark N., Cees van der Eijk and Erik Oppenhuis ( 1996) Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
15.
Gabel, Matthew ( 1998) ‘Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical Test of Five Theories’, Journal of Politics60(2): 333-54.
16.
Gallagher, Michael, Michael Laver and Peter Mair ( 2001) Representative Government in Modern Europe. Columbus, OH: McGraw-Hill.
17.
Hooghe, Liesbeth and Gary Marks ( 2005) ‘Calculation, Community and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration’, European Union Politics6(4): 419-43.
18.
Huber, John D. and Charles R. Shipan ( 2002) Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
19.
Hug, Simon and Thomas König ( 2002) ‘In View of Ratification: Governmental Preferences and Domestic Constraints at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference’ , International Organization56(2): 447-76.
20.
Hug, Simon and Tobias Schulz ( 2007) ‘Referendums in the EU’s Constitution Building Process’, Review of International Organizations2(2): 177-218.
21.
Johnson, Valen E. and James H. Albert ( 1999) Ordinal Data Modeling. New York: Springer.
22.
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, et al. (2006) Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors and Governments in Central and Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD 1990-2003. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
23.
Koenig-Archibugi, Mathias ( 2004) ‘Explaining Government Preferences for Institutional Change in EU Foreign and Security Policy’, International Organization58(1): 137-74.
24.
König, Thomas ( 2008) ‘Why Do Member States Empower the European Parliament?’ , Journal of European Public Policy15(2): 167-88.
25.
König, Thomas and Thomas Bräuninger ( 2004) ‘Accession and Reform of the European Union. A Game-Theoretical Analysis of Eastern Enlargement and the Constitutional Reform’, European Union Politics5(4): 419-39.
26.
König, Thomas and Daniel Finke ( 2007) ‘Reforming the Equilibrium? Veto Players and Policy Change in the European Constitution-building Process’, Review of International Organizations2(2): 153-76.
27.
König, Thomas and Simon Hug ( 2006a) ‘Introduction’, in Thomas König and Simon Hug (eds) Policy-making Processes and the European Constitution: A Comparative Study in Member States and Accession Countries, pp. 1-8. London/ New York: Routledge.
28.
König, Thomas and Simon Hug ( 2006b) Policy-making Processes and the European Constitution: A Comparative Study in Member States and Accession Countries. London/New York: Routledge.
29.
König, Thomas and Brooke Luetgert ( 2003) ‘The Treaty of Nice. Intergovernmental Conferences, Domestic Constraints and the Reform of European Institutions’, paper presented at the First ECPR General Conference, 18-21 July, Marburg.
30.
Laursen, Finn ( 2002) Amsterdam Treaty: National Preference Formation, Interstate Bargaining and Outcome. Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark.
31.
Laursen, Finn ( 2005) The Treaty of Nice. Actor Preferences, Bargaining and Institutional Choice. Leiden: Brill .
32.
Laver, Michael and Kenneth Shepsle ( 1996) Making and Breaking Governments. Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
33.
Lupia, Arthur and Mathew D. McCubbins ( 1998) The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know?Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
34.
Mahncke, Daniel ( 1997) ‘Reform of the CFSP: From Maastricht to Amsterdam’ , in Jörg Monar and Wolfgang Wessels (eds) The European Union after the Treaty of Amsterdam, pp.82-101. London: Continuum.
35.
Manow, Philip and Doring, Holger ( 2008) ‘Electoral and Mechanical Causes of Divided Government in theEuropean Union’, Comparative Political Studies41(10): 1349-70.
36.
Marks, Gary and Marco R. Steenbergen ( 2004) European Integration and Political Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
37.
Marks, Gary, Liesbeth Hooghe, Marco R. Steenbergen and Ryan Bakker ( 2007) ‘Crossvalidating Data on Party Positioning on European Integration’, Electoral Studies26(1): 23-38.
38.
Martin, Andrew D. and Kevin M. Quinn ( 2002) ‘Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999’, Political Analysis10(2): 134-53.
39.
Martin, Lanny W. and George Vanberg ( 2004) ‘Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and Parliamentary Scrutiny’, American Journal of Political Science48(1): 13-27.
40.
Martin, Lanny W. and Georg Vanberg ( 2005) ‘Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review’ , American Political Science Review99(1): 93-106.
41.
Mattila, Mikko and Tapio Raunio ( 2006) ‘Cautious Voters - Supportive Parties. Opinion Congruence between Voters and Parties on the EU Dimension’, European Union Politics7(4): 427-49.
42.
Monar, Jörg ( 2006) ‘Justice and Home Affairs’, Journal of Common Market Studies44(1): 101-17.
43.
Monar, Jörg ( 2008) ‘Justice and Home Affairs’, Journal of Common Market Studies46(1): 109-26.
44.
Moravcsik, Andrew ( 1998) The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose & State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
45.
Moravcsik, Andrew ( 2006) ‘What Can We Learn from the Collapse of the European Constitutional Project?’, Politische Vierteljahresschrift47(2): 219-41.
46.
Moravcsik, Andrew and Kalypso Nicolaïdis ( 1999) ‘Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence and Institutions’, Journal of Common Market Studies37(1): 59-85.
47.
Müller, Wolfgang C. and Kaare Strom (eds) (2000) Coalition Governments in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
48.
Padoan, Pier Carlo ( 1997) ‘The Reforms in Major Policy Areas. EU Employment and Social Policy after Amsterdam: Too Little or Too Much?’, in Jörg Monar and Wolfgang Wessels (eds) The European Union after the Treaty of Amsterdam, pp. 176-91. London: Continuum .
49.
Ray, Leonard ( 2003) ‘Reconsidering the Link between Incumbent Support and Pro-EU Opinion’, European Union Politics4(3): 259-79.
50.
Risse, Thomas and Mareike Kleine ( 2008) ‘Assessing the Legitimacy of the EU’s Treaty Revision Methods’, Journal of Common Market Studies45(1): 69-80.
51.
Rittberger, Berthold ( 2005) Building Europe’s Parliament: Democratic Representation Beyond the Nation State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
52.
Rivers, Douglas ( 2003) ‘Identification of Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models’, URL (consulted May 2009): http://jackman.stanford.edu/ideal/MeasurementConference/abstracts/river03.pdf .
53.
Schmitt, Hermann and Jacques J. A. Thomassen ( 2000) ‘Dynamic Representation: The Case of European Integration’ , European Union Politics1(3): 318-39.
54.
Slapin, Jonathan B. ( 2006) ‘Who Is Powerful? Examining Preferences and Testing Sources of Bargaining Strength at European Intergovernmental Conferences’ , European Union Politics7(1): 51-76.
55.
Steenbergen, Marco R., Erica E. Edwards and Catherine E. de Vries ( 2007) ‘Who’s Cueing Whom? Mass-Elite Linkages and the Future of European Integration’, European Union Politics8(1): 13-35.
56.
Stoiber, Michael ( 2003) Die nationale Vorbereitung auf EU-Regierungskonferenzen. Interministerielle Koordination und kollektive Entscheidung. Frankfurt/Main : Campus.
57.
Thies, Michael F. ( 2001) ‘Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Governments’, American Journal of Political Science45(3): 580-98.
58.
Thurner, Paul and Franz Urban Pappi ( 2006) ‘Domestic and International Politics during EU Intergovernmental Conferences. Bridging the Gap between Negotiation Theory and Practice’ , Negotiation Journal22(2): 167-85.
59.
Thurner, Paul W., Franz U. Pappi and Michael Stoiber ( 2002) ‘EU Intergovernmental Conferences: A Quantitative Analytical Reconstruction and Data-Handbook of Domestic Preference Formation, Transnational Networks and Dynamics of Compromise during the Amsterdam Treaty Negotiations’, Arbeitspapiere Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung No. 60; URL (accessed Aug. 2007): http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/publications/wp/wp-60.pdf.
60.
Treib, Oliver ( 2005) ‘Party Politics, National Interests and the Constitutional Treaty: Cleavage Structures in the Negotiations on the Future of EU Social Policy’, paper presented at the 3rd ECPR General Conference, Budapest, Hungary, 8-10 September.
61.
Tsebelis, George and Sven Oliver Proksch ( 2007) ‘The Art of Political Manipulation in theEuropean Convention’, Journal of Common Market Studies45(1): 157-86.
62.
Uebersax, John ( 1991) Latent Class Agreement Analysis with Ordered Rating Categories . Santa Monica: Rand Cooperation .
63.
Wüst, Andreas and Hermann Schmitt ( 2007) ‘Comparing the Views of Parties and Voters in the 1999 Election to the European Parliament’, in Wouter van der Brug and Cees van der Eijk (eds) Elections & Domestic Politics. Lessons from the Past and Scenarios for the Future, pp. 73-99. Paris: Notre Dame.
64.
Yataganas, Xenophon A. ( 2001) ‘The Treaty of Nice: The Sharing of Power and the Institutional Balance in the European Union - A Continental Perspective’ , European Law Journal7(3): 242-91.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
