Mutual veto and power-sharing

Abstract

We address the incidence and correlates of mutual veto institutions by examining a global dataset on power-sharing provisions. Our data show that mutual veto provisions are relatively rare and found mostly in diverse societies that are more highly developed than the world average. We find that mutual veto arrangements must be (a) enforceable, (b) inclusive to pacify all potential spoilers and (c) compatible with the interests and incentives of those groups to which they would apply. Mutual veto provisions often fail to meet one or more of these conditions. They are difficult to enforce, as conflict-prone societies often have ineffectual political institutions and weak administrative capacity. It is difficult to make them incentive-compatible, as incumbent power-holders will not benefit from them. Finally, they are often not credible, as the dominant political coalition would find it in its interest to punish any actual exercise of a veto. These conditions jointly explain the near absence of effective mutual veto regimes outside relatively prosperous polities with well-established political institutions.