Abstract
This article analyses to what extent and why national parliaments have created oversight institutions to adapt to European integration. Employing data from 22 member states from 1984–2006, the analysis suggests that government-supporting parliamentary groups create oversight institutions to enhance policy participation as integration becomes more important. Moreover, parliamentarians improve their access to information about government policy if governing parties are internally divided over European integration. Finally, oversight institutions that constrain the government’s discretion to act in European Union affairs exist in Eurosceptic countries, where they help parliamentarians to enhance electoral security.
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