Vexatious voice: The politics of downward accountability and subnational governance reform in Afghanistan

Abstract

This article analyzes events surrounding a strike by Afghanistan’s provincial councils in 2015. It argues, first, that the events reflected competition between patronage networks in the country’s main institutions of representative government and their successful opposition to the president’s attempts to curb corruption – illustrating the difficulties of introducing even modest governance reforms in neopatrimonial states. Second, the evidence suggests that government should not establish district councils until it has sufficient resources to do so and until provincial councils can be properly regulated. However, third, in order to establish legally the position of executive prime minister and allow the president to fulfil his side of the election bargain a loya jirga – whose membership should include district councillors – will need to approve a change to the constitution. Fourth, donors will support district council establishment for this reason, but also because it facilitates ‘concrete’ measurement of progress and ‘democratic’ display and is therefore good for (donor) home consumption, though not necessarily for poverty or inequality reduction. Fifth, donor behaviour is seen as integral to neoliberal design, whose real interests are served best by state acquiescence rather than state sovereignty or sustainable and equitable development and should therefore be resisted.