Digital-regional capital: Digitally enhanced bonds between Chinese internal migrants and their hometowns

Abstract

This study proposes a Bourdieusian theory of digital-regional capital to explore the mediated bond between migrants and their hometowns, addressing an under-studied issue in the context of transregional mobility while filling a gap in the spatial dimension of prior digital capital studies. Focusing on the interplay among digital capital, internal migration, and the development of rural and inland regions in China, this research conducts interviews with 48 internal migrants and 2 government representatives, examining how China’s techno-nationalism/regionalism, combined with various digital platforms, particularly WeChat’s dominant role, has co-shaped digital-regional capital. Key findings reveal that state-led and decentralized technological advancements have equipped Chinese internal migrants with crucial digital capital, enabling their engagements in online networks and economic activities. Thus, migrants can effectively convert their resources into consumption and investments that benefit their hometowns, forming digital-regional capital. However, economic, gendered, and generational disparities create unequal access to and benefits of digital-regional capital.

Introduction

Due to economic and cultural globalization, scholarship has observed an intensification of international and domestic population mobility, challenging the traditional assumption of a natural connection between individuals and specific geographic regions (Androutsopoulos and Lexander, 2021; Kochan, 2016; Marino, 2015; Paasi, 2002; Terlouw, 2024). As people migrate, their regional identities are no longer solely tied to their place of birth or long-term residence, contributing to “diversified regional backgrounds” and “mixed” personal histories that complicate fixed narratives of regional identity (Paasi, 2002: 146). This shift also conflicts with conventional regional customs and cultural norms (Liu, 2019; Martin, 2022).

Building upon Paasi’s (2002) argument that regional identities are dynamic processes of continual “re-writing” (p. 144) rather than stable or pre-given entities, Terlouw (2024), in his study of the Metropolitan Region of Amsterdam, distinguishes between two coexisting and dialectically interacting narratives of identity: thick and thin identities. Urban development initiatives tend to promote thin, cosmopolitan identities aligned with neoliberal economic integration and globalization, whereas local resistance movements cultivate thick, non-urban or village-based identities rooted in traditional community bonds and historical continuity, opposing the transformations brought about by urbanization and globalization (Terlouw, 2024). Both Paasi (2002) and Terlouw (2024) reveal that regional identities are not binary opposites but coexist in tension, interwoven with national and local politics and shaped by divergent economic imperatives. Moreover, mobile communication technologies have intensified the fluidity of these identities, acting as mediating forces that continually reshape individuals’ attachments to place and rearticulate forms of regional belonging (Liu, 2019; Martin, 2022; Terlouw, 2024).

The shift from single to polymedia environments has further expanded digital affordances, allowing migrants to sustain familial ties, participate in hometown events, and contribute economically to their countries of origin (Madianou and Miller, 2012). In host societies where migrants constitute a significant share of the labor force, such as the United Kingdom, digital interactions have become integral to everyday life, shaping community formation and belonging (Marino, 2015). While digital technologies strengthen transnational connections to home (Madianou, 2016; Madianou and Miller, 2012), these relationships are complicated by cultural, ideological, and policy factors that promote cosmopolitan, “thin” identities. For example, Norway-based Senegalese migrants sustain strong material and imagined links to their hometowns through online communication, where shared religious discourse reinforces a “thick” sense of identity and emotional attachment (Androutsopoulos and Lexander, 2021; Terlouw, 2024). Diverse digital platforms also foster engagement with global concerns such as social justice and environmental issues, producing hybrid identities that intertwine local belonging with broader cosmopolitan orientations (Terlouw, 2024).

In more rapidly developing and migration-intensive contexts—such as the Philippines, the Caribbean, Singapore, India, and China—these dynamics become even more complex. Accelerated migration has blurred the boundaries between thick and thin identities, as local cultural attachments are frequently mobilized alongside cosmopolitan discourses as instruments of regional branding and development (Chib and Aricat, 2022; Madianou, 2016; Pun, 2005; Xiong and Zhu, 2025). Within this fast-changing digital environment, the interplay between these identity forms has become increasingly fluid and situational. This leads to a central research question: in developing countries, as digital platforms evolve and societies undergo deeper processes of platformization, how are individuals’ connections to their hometowns being reshaped—are they strengthened, reconfigured, or weakened, and through what social, technological, and affective mechanisms?

To answer this question, this article develops the concept of “digital-regional capital,” to explore the relationship between migrants and their hometowns in the platformization age. It explores how the development of digital platforms may (or may not) enhance migrants’ connections to their hometowns and their digital capital (Ragnedda et al., 2020) and, in turn, generate economic benefits to their hometowns, ultimately strengthening or weakening the ties between migrants and their original communities. We propose that “digital-regional capital” is an analytically distinct and context-sensitive extension of previous Bourdieusian capital theories, building on existing understandings of digitally mediated regionally embedded networks. It addresses a notable gap—the lack of attention to spatial dimensions in theorizations of digital capital.

The empirical case selected to develop this concept is based on China, which has undergone four decades of intensive internal migration (Xiong and Zhu, 2025) alongside rapid digitalization and platformization driven by the state’s ambition to advance techno-nationalism (de Kloet et al., 2019; Luqiu and Kang, 2021; Plantin and de Seta, 2019). These developments are deeply intertwined with regionalism at both policy and discursive levels (Li and Yu, 2023; Oakes, 2000; Wang, 2015). Within this digital ecosystem, thick regional identities are often reinforced by various levels of authority through the cultivation of “pan-local” attachments and regional pride (Li and Yu, 2023; Wang and Feng, 2023). The formation of such regional identities can be traced back to the 1990s economic reforms that promoted provincial-level regionalism, restructuring city-, town-, and village-level affiliations into broader place-based hierarchies to counter external perceptions of backwardness through the promotion of unified provincial cultures (Goodman, 2002; Li and Yu, 2023; Oakes, 2000; Wang, 2015). Meanwhile, China’s digital landscape also facilitates thin or cosmopolitan forms of connectivity. Platforms such as WeChat, Douyin, and Kuaishou allow migrants and young users to forge translocal and transnational ties that transcend regional boundaries, reflecting what Lin et al. (2025) term “networked individualism” and what Lin (2025) describes as algorithmic cosmopolitanism. For instance, Kuaishou—a short-video platform known for its emphasis on local culture—simultaneously fosters thick regional identities through its algorithmic amplification of regional distinctiveness, while also enabling the circulation of thin, performative connections that link users to national and global digital publics (Li et al., 2020). The coexistence of these thick and thin ties underscores the ambivalence of China’s techno-political economy, where government-led regionalism intersects with platform-mediated cosmopolitanism.

This article first revisits Bourdieusian theories to develop the concept of “digital-regional capital” and then depicts today’s Chinese digital ecology. After outlining the cultural and political regionalism background and methodology of the research, it explains how Chinese internal migrants have developed digital capital, and how this capital is converted into regional-level “digital-regional capital” via various individual-level networks, guided by governmental geopolitical and geo-economic frameworks under China’s techno-nationalism. The associated limitations and exclusions are also discussed.

Literature review

A Bourdieusian theory of “digital-regional capital”

Social capital, defined as resources derived from social networks (Bourdieu, 2002), is categorized into bonding, bridging, and linking type (Agger and Jensen, 2015; Putnam, 2000). Bonding social capital refers to the strong connections formed with family members, close friends, and others who share similar socio-demographic traits. It offers emotional and material support while cultivating strong trust and connecting individuals to various groups. Bridging social capital arises from weak ties, involving people from varied backgrounds—such as ethnicity, education, and profession—providing valuable information and diverse viewpoints (Alencar and Tsagkroni, 2019; Putnam, 2000).

The connections between individuals and institution foster linking social capital, which helps local communities build new networks and secure external resources. It is crucial for traditional or emerging migrant communities that may be cautious or resistant to change (Agger and Jensen, 2015; Alencar and Tsagkroni, 2019). Agger and Jensen (2015) highlight that local institutional representatives play a pivotal role in cultivating trust with external actors and coordinating the flow of resources. However, Rubin (2015) argues that in authoritarian contexts, top–down forms of linking social capital often prioritize governmental achievements over citizen participation and rights, rendering the resulting benefits unstable and unreliable, as connections between individuals and institutions depend more on the discretion of local authorities than on transparent, accountable political structures.

Social capital can be converted into economic capital, facilitating the rapid transformation of social resources into monetary value and their institutionalization through property rights. Within this framework, individuals may be regarded as interchangeable components within broader social structures (Bourdieu, 2002). The cultivation and mobilization of diverse forms of social capital can promote the development of both individuals and communities (Putnam, 2000). However, as Liu-Farrer (2008) notes, the dysfunctional use of social capital within closed networks can lead to the stigmatization of entire communities, thereby constraining individual mobility and collective advancement.

As physical society becomes increasingly integrated with digital technologies, scholars have proposed new forms of “capital” to capture the transformation of social and economic relations in digital contexts. Prieur and Savage (2013) adapted Bourdieu and Wacquant’s (1992) notion of informational capital to the informationalized society, emphasizing that the ability to engage with information and cultural products through media technologies provides individuals with a competitive societal advantage. However, this concept does not centrally address the roles of social networks, income, or other resources directly generated by technology. Rojas et al. (2004) introduced techno-capital, conceptualizing it as the knowledge, skills, technological awareness, and ability to use technology to access resources. While they recognized the influence of broader social forces within the techno-field shaped by human agency, their framework remained separate from a more comprehensive model integrating information, technology, digital skills, and capital transformation. These elements were later unified under the concept of “digital capital,” defined as the accumulation of technological resources and personal digital competencies essential for managing information, communication, and problem-solving (Ragnedda, 2018; Ragnedda et al., 2020). It empowers individuals to translate offline actions into digital processes, facilitating access to various resources through online participation, thereby (re)generating various forms of capital, including employment opportunities, social ties, and specialized expertise.

Building on this integrated perspective that underscores the interconnections and transformations among social, economic, informational, techno-, and digital capital, we define “digital-regional capital” as a dialectical fusion of social and digital capital, encompassing the resources and benefits derived from region-based networks—typically centered on an individual’s place of origin—and facilitated through digital platforms and technologies. It acts as a collective form of capital for the involved individuals and communities. Putnam’s (2000) framework is useful for analyzing how individuals’ social capital can be transformed into regional-level capital that benefits the broader community. By emphasizing the collective characteristic of social capital, such as reciprocity and civic engagement, Putnam (2000) claims that personal networks contribute to creating cohesive regional networks, which in turn promote community resilience.

Ragnedda et al. (2020) further examined digital capital’s interaction with social inequalities—gender, income, age, education, and urban–rural status—focusing on its individual-level operation rather than its regional dynamics. Meanwhile, digital capitalism shapes diverse digital fields, influencing individuals’ dispositions through media algorithms, content design, institutional constraints, and relational spaces (Rao and Xie, 2024). Building on this, the following section depicts China’s highly platformized context, highlighting the state’s techno-nationalism and WeChat’s dominant role in acquaintance-based and authority-led networking in an algorithmic era.

Digital ecology of today’s China

China provides an ideal setting for examining “digital-regional capital” and the mediated connections between migrants and their hometowns. The country has undergone a process of high mediation (Chen and Lunt, 2021; Chen et al., 2018), where institutionalized communication media shapes social interactions and meaning-making (Couldry and Hepp, 2013), leading to full-scale platformization. Significantly, China’s platformization is deeply intertwined with regionalism and nationalism (Oakes, 2000), driven by both top–down state interventions and bottom–up user practices. The government promotes techno-nationalism, exercising strict data control and banning foreign applications while fostering domestic platforms such as WeChat, Douyin, and Xiaohongshu (Luqiu and Kang, 2021; Plantin and de Seta, 2019). Furthermore, major social platforms, typically WeChat, serve as the infrastructure of China’s platformization, permeating and shaping everyday life through integrating internal and external digital technologies into social, economic, and cultural infrastructures, including social networking, labor systems, new agencies, municipal services, and economic transactions (de Kloet et al., 2019; Plantin and de Seta, 2019).

For migrant individuals, these infrastructural social platforms provide access to employment, housing, and educational resources, while sustaining ties to their hometowns through mediated co-presence and interactions (Xiong and Zhu, 2025). At the regional level, local governments, businesses, and social institutions use platforms such as WeChat and Douyin to construct provincial and city-based identities, often aligning them with a broader discourse of Chineseness (Li and Yu, 2023; Wang and Feng, 2023). This digital promotion of provincial cultures leads to cultural commodification, transforming regional identity into a marketable asset within China’s globalized economy (Wang and Feng, 2023). WeChat, in particular, plays a pivotal role in shaping “digital-regional capital” through its centralized social networking structure and algorithmic design (Plantin and de Seta, 2019). Reinforced by China’s cyber-sovereignty policies, the platform’s dominance arises from its pervasive integration into daily life, enabling users to maintain acquaintance-based networks, conduct financial transactions, and interact with state and institutional actors (Xiong and Zhu, 2025).

WeChat’s affordances also align with traditional Chinese social norms, particularly mianzi (face) and renqing (favor exchange) (Chen and Lunt, 2021; Xiong and Zhu, 2025), reinforcing “digital-regional capital” as a tool for maintaining interpersonal and community bonds. Functions such as Red Packets (monetary gifts) and WeChat Groups facilitate economic and social reciprocity, particularly among migrants who use these tools to maintain relationships with their hometown networks. However, the platform also fosters digital fatigue and social obligation, compelling users to uphold frequent interactions, which can paradoxically lead to a sense of disconnection despite ongoing engagement (Xiong, 2024). These dynamics highlight the complexities of “digital-regional capital,” revealing how it operates within the highly platformized digital ecology to advance governmental geopolitical and geoeconomic aims under China’s techno-nationalism. This study, therefore, investigates how migrants build digital capital, how it transforms into “digital-regional capital,” and how its inherent limitations and exclusivity influence socioeconomic participation in hometown networks.

Background and methodology

Empirical data was gathered through in-depth interviews with 48 Chinese internal migrants in Guangdong province from December 2021 to August 2022, following ethical approval. Guangdong, a pioneer of China’s economic reforms since the 1980s, has remained a primary destination for migrants into the 2020s (Liang, 2001). In addition, two government officers from the city of origin of three migrant participants were interviewed. The authors’ personal backgrounds in Guangdong facilitated recruitment through personal connections and snowball sampling. The 48 migrants (27 women and 21 men), aged 24–63 years, had educational backgrounds ranging from middle school to postgraduate levels and worked in professions spanning low-end to high-end industries. They migrated between the 1980s and 2010s from various villages, towns, and cities across 12 provinces. Ethical standards were upheld by clearly explaining the research purpose and the authors’ roles to all participants.

Our research design was informed by specific cultural and political concepts related to diyuan (regionalism) and China’s Rural Revitalization Strategy. In traditional Chinese society, low-mobility communities were largely self-sufficient, with minimal reliance on migration. Consanguinity served as a stabilizing force within these communities (Fei, 1992). Fei (1992) suggests that diyuan (regionalism), akin to the concept of “thick ties” (Terlouw, 2024), represents the geographical connection to one’s home region. This attachment anchors relationships between individuals and their hometowns, forming the basis for contractual obligations among strangers (Fei, 1992). Chinese migrants often engage in gen (root) culture practices that reinforce regional identity and ties. For example, xungen wenzu involves seeking ancestral roots through clan reconstruction to reconnect with hometowns (Watson, 2004). The idiom yijin huanxiang (triumphant return home) encapsulates this mindset, particularly among male migrants expected to guangzong yaozu (bring honor to their ancestors) by achieving material success and social recognition that benefits their clan (Zhang, 2019; Zhang and Yang, 2022). Since the implementation of China’s Rural Revitalization Strategy, the reinforcement of “thick ties” has sustained regional networks, strengthening migrants’ connections to their hometowns (Sun et al., 2024; Zhang and Yang, 2022). This dynamic continually shapes migrants’ emotional and economic needs in new locations by fostering a sense of belonging, resettlement support, and employment opportunities (Sun et al., 2024). These backgrounds shaped the development of our interview guide.

The 48 one-on-one in-depth interviews were guided by a set of open-ended questions organized into three sections. The first section gathered demographic information from participants, alongside their perspectives on their hometown and gen (root) culture. The second section encouraged participants to illustrate their hometown-based networks facilitated by digital platforms, detailing their methods for accessing, utilizing, and assessing these networks. The final section invited participants to share how digital media impacts their motivation and engagement in economic activities related to their hometowns.

The interviews revealed that few migrant participants were part of a government-organized WeChat association from the first author’s hometown, prompting the authors to gather supplementary data from a government perspective. The first author interviewed two local government officers—one overseeing propaganda for the Rural Revitalization Strategy and another responsible for alumni and business associations in major cities. They provided insights into key projects related to external migrants, including their aims, processes, and outcomes.

The data were thematically analyzed using Braun and Clarke’s (2006) framework, focusing on migration, relationships, and digital hometown connections. Keywords such as hometowns, consumption, investment, and WeChat fellow associations informed the coding process, with themes grounded in Chinese migrant-hometown relations and Bourdieusian capital theories. This analysis produced three primary themes for presenting the findings, with all participant details anonymized for confidentiality.

Findings and discussion

Fostered digital capital

All migrant participants showed strong digital skills, forming their digital capital, which enhanced their careers, entertainment, and migration experiences. Jiuxue (51, female, Entrepreneur) expanded her business in Guangzhou in the 1990s using an analog mobile phone. Wenhe (36, male, Entrepreneur) reconnected with a former classmate via 2G mobile and QQ in his twenties, later co-founding a business in Shenzhen. Zhanhu (33, female, Marketing) played Snake on her Nokia in the 2010s, while Yuanzhu (34, female, Tailor) now shares her karaoke application performances on WeChat Moments to pass the time. Fengli (56, female) and Haoli (61, male), apartment rental brokers, relocated to Guangzhou to join a rental business coordinated with hometown contacts via WeChat. Hunhao (31, female, Lecturer) sought a potential spouse through a WeChat Public Account. Wenhe (36, male, Entrepreneur) described,

In the 1990s, I used letters and telephones to contact my relatives and closest friends. When QQ, Xiaonei, and Weibo became popular, I expanded my hometown networks through these platforms. Later, WeChat replaced them, and we began using it exclusively to stay connected.

This illustrates a trend in which migrants’ acquaintance networks have become centralized on WeChat, driven by the platform’s expansion of its userbase. This expansion provides a solid foundation for maintaining hometown connections. The cases of migrant participants using WeChat to maintain and expand their hometown networks demonstrate their increasing digital capital—specifically, their competencies in leveraging externalized technology to address challenges in communication and networking (Ragnedda, 2018).

Their increasing digital capital is fostered by the technological affordances and marketing campaigns of tech companies, alongside China’s regulatory framework. Before the WeChat era, many Tencent products emphasized users’ follower counts and incorporated networking-based games, encouraging users to expand their online contacts (Wang, 2016). When TenCent launched WeChat in 2011, it enabled early users to transfer their contacts from Tencent QQ by guiding them to search for QQ accounts and add them directly to WeChat (Chen et al., 2018). Subsequently, WeChat accounts became searchable using mobile phone numbers. This evolution was shaped by state policies. Since 2016, the Regulations on the Management of Mobile Internet Application Services have required Internet users to link their accounts on digital applications to verified personal information. This information is verified through mobile phone numbers registered with users’ IDs. These regulations facilitate serendipitous reconnections between migrants and their disconnected hometown acquaintances when using applications. Xiushui (50, male, Security) said,

Through Douyin, I can connect with contacts already in my smartphone’s contact list. Unexpectedly, I reencountered one of my past classmates when I came across a video he posted on Douyin. Ultimately, I was able to befriend him on WeChat.

The state has also enhanced migrants’ ability to establish institutional connections with their hometowns by providing official channels. Most migrant participants subscribed to WeChat Public Accounts operated by their hometown governments, which deliver local news, policies, and services. Some also joined WeChat Groups established by their hometown entities, using these groups to gather hometown information and coordinate events. A few migrant participants who are businesspeople have joined WeChat Groups for migrant business associations, administered by government officials or fellow representatives, to promote cooperation among hometown members and between migrants and local industries.

These online groups cultivate trust-based relationships, connecting individuals to each other and to institutional authorities, serving as linking social capital. For many migrant participants from hometowns that remain closed societies, their networks often include relatives and friends who hold positions as local government or institutional representatives. These close ties function as bonding social capital, providing strong inclusiveness and trust that enable efficient access to linking social capital (Agger and Jensen, 2015).

The above cases show how China’s digital ecosystem effectively bridges migrants with institutional networks in their hometowns. Like their interpersonal ties, these institutional networks are also centralized on WeChat, which collaborates closely with Chinese authorities and is integrated into regional and national governmental systems (Chen et al., 2018). Overall, WeChat serves as a central hub for interpersonal, group, and mass communication within migrants’ hometown networks, allowing them to stay consistently and instantly informed about daily events at individual and societal levels in their hometowns. Wenhe (36, male, Entrepreneur) described,

The village committee invited me to join a WeChat group comprising all villagers. Committee officers posted notices, while villagers could freely converse with one another. Through these group conversations, I inadvertently learned about upcoming weddings and ongoing family conflicts in my hometown.

Their digital capital enables them to frequently participate into hometown activities via online actions, reproducing social, economic, and other benefits. Jiwen (32, female, Housewife) installed a digital version of a hometown game, allowing her to connect with fellow locals, engage in playful interactions, and gossip about their hometown in their dialect. She also stated,

I am used to book hospital appointments for my parents via the WeChat Mini-programs operated by my hometown hospitals.

Taochen (44, male, Engineer) followed WeChat Channels operated by local businesses in his hometown, receiving news and advertisements that showcased local lifestyles, which helped him explore his business plan. Beiwei (41, female, Lecturer) utilized a School-Parents application for her son, who attended kindergarten in their hometown. This application facilitated interactions with teachers and other parents. She also utilized the Dianping application to enroll her son in local cram schools and contacted the instructors via WeChat. Muliang (27, male, Livestreaming-driven Sales) actively engaged with his hometown online, which exposes him to algorithm-driven effects:

I followed a hometown fashion shop on WeChat Public Accounts and Xiaohongshu. After viewing its posts and searching keywords, I gained numerous hometown information. As a livestreaming-driven seller, I recognized shared user data and algorithms among Chinese internet companies as the hidden force.

This indicates that, when migrants encountered hometown-related content and events curated by algorithms across cyberspaces, they were more likely to engage in a digitally mediated “ambient hometown” (Madianou, 2016). Thus, a convergent digital environment of netizen data and algorithm-driven technologies strengthens the connection between migrants and their hometowns, enriching the digital capital for all involved parties.

Digital capital converging to “digital-regional capital”

China’s political agenda acts as an invisible force that interacts with migrants’ digital capital, facilitating a digitally mediated ambient hometown. This environment encourages migrants to engage in economic activities in their hometowns—mainly consumption, business cooperation, and investment—ultimately generating profits for both migrants and their hometowns.

The most recent agenda in China was established at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party in 2017. The Congress emphasized the integration of Internet technology into economy to boost consumption. ¹ Significantly, it introduced the Rural Revitalization Strategy, aimed at stimulating economic growth in China’s rural and less developed areas. This initiative has required multiple levels of government to promote the use of digital strategies to address regional economic, social, and other disparities. ² Regional governments have leveraged digital means to facilitate the import of resources on a national scale while promoting the export of local products to bolster the local economy. Hongyi (48, female, Government Officer) confirmed,

The current task of our department is supporting the Rural Revitalization Strategy. We need to promote local agriculture, business, and industry to attract external purchases and investment.

Mozhu (30, male, Engineer) hails from a town in the city where Hongyi (48, female, Government Officer) works. He regularly peruses contents released by the propaganda department of his hometown—Hongyi’s workplace. These materials highlight the picturesque local lifestyle and favorable economic conditions.

In the ambient hometown community (Madianou, 2016), algorithmic technology enhances migrant participants’ digital capital by providing personalized content based on behavioral data analytics. This customization enables them to easily access desirable events in their hometowns, motivating their remote consumption. Jiwen (32, female, Housewife) ordered popular bubble tea for her parents after seeing posts on Xiaohongshu highlighting its prevalence in her hometown. Zhanhu (33, female, Marketing) further introduced,

I saw advertisements from the business entities in my hometown in my WeChat Moments. [. . .] I once ordered a cake via the link in an advertisement from the most famous bakery in my hometown for my mother’s birthday.

These advertisements are algorithmically targeted through WeChat’s advertising service, which allows businesses to purchase ad space in their desired audience’s WeChat Moments. ³ In China, live-streaming platforms, particularly Douyin, are heavily integrated with e-commerce. Sellers display hashtags and links at the bottom of the video screen, guiding viewers to place orders. Algorithmic recommendation technology precisely targets live-streaming programs to relevant consumer segments. Muliang (27, male, Livestreaming-driven Sales) watched a live-streamed Zhunong (Help Farmers and Agriculture) program, a key government-led initiative to implement the Rural Revitalization Strategy, ⁴ and subsequently purchased some products:

The livestream was hashtagged #Zhunong to sell locally grown fruit. Although I didn’t want the fruit, I ordered it to support local farmers. This decision was prompted by the news shared on WeChat Moments by my hometown friends, revealing that my hometown was facing a drought.

Muliang shared that his engagement with the program stemmed from algorithmic recommendation and a personal emotional attachment to his hometown. His digital capital and regional attachment also motivated him to actively follow hometown shops across multiple platforms. These shops have effectively integrated digital platforms into their business models, aligning with government guidelines aimed at merging Internet technology with the real economy to stimulate consumption. Notably, some of these shops have skillfully incorporated local traditional culture into their brand narratives and products, which captured Muliang’s interest, prompting his online purchases. Many migrant participants confirm that their digital capital allows them to remotely consume products reflecting their hometown’s culture. They noted that this type of consumption strengthens their emotional connection to their origins, revealing how gen (roots) culture, or “thick” identity (Terlouw, 2024), fosters belonging and intimacy among Chinese migrants based on regionalism.

Migrants’ digital capital also supports transregional business cooperation within hometown networks. For instance, Zhuofan (52, male), Fengli (56, female), and Haoli (61, male), who are from the same village, have been involved in the low-end apartment rental business in Guangzhou. They post rental advertisements on their WeChat Moments and engage in discussions about their business activities in WeChat Groups formed by fellow villagers from their hometown. Fengli finds WeChat Groups efficient for transregional cooperation, while Haoli sees them as a reliable tool for managing finances. With the creation of these groups, all collaboration and profit-sharing related to their business projects occur within this digital space, reducing the need for some villagers to be physically present in Guangzhou. As we can see, “digital-regional capital” emerges as a hybrid form of capital that blends traditional social capital—rooted in regional networks—with digital affordances, serving as collective capital for the involved individuals and communities. This combination effectively enables migrants to sustain hometown-based economic and social networks across geographic boundaries.

In addition, some migrant participants have been inspired to invest projects in their hometowns at the city level, influenced in part by digital initiatives spearheaded by local officials. Qinshu (57, male, Government Officer) was responsible for using WeChat Groups to establish alumni associations in major cities across China on behalf of the local government. He introduced,

Establishing alumni associations with the aim of uniting individuals from our hometown residing in different major cities proved successful. The objective was to attract investment to enhance the hometown economy. These associations effectively facilitated noteworthy projects.

Cengcen (29, female, Engineer) and Zhanhu (33, female, Marketing) met in the WeChat Group for the alumni association established by Qindong. In the group, they encountered official news, photos, and videos documenting the initiation ceremony of several investment projects. These posts attracted considerable attention, sparking discussions and numerous compliments. This highlights the pivotal roles of gen (root) culture and mianzi (face) norms in effectively persuading migrants to engage in societal-level economic investments in their hometowns (often at the city level). The desire for xungen wenzu (seeking genealogical and ancestral roots) among Chinese migrants further motivates these investments, enhancing their self-identity (Watson, 2004).

Zhanhu (33, female, Marketing) noted that the online alumni association regularly reported news highlighting investment projects between some migrants and hometown’ city-level governments or enterprises. A key issue we finally address here is how regionalism operates at different scales and how “digital-regional capital” varies across hometown connection levels. In China, the administrative geographic divisions are hierarchical-province, city, county, town, and village—each nesting smaller units (Goodman, 2002). Our migrant participants flexibly defined “hometown” as villages, towns, or counties, cities, not just provinces. However, provincial identities, tied to dialect and cuisine (Goodman, 2002), remain key to migrants’ sense of belonging, often cited alongside smaller administrative units.

Our fieldwork indicates that the operationalization of “digital-regional capital” shows significant variation across administrative hierarchies. At the provincial level, “digital-regional capital” tends to be limited to high-ranking professionals, such as C-suite executives in well-known corporations or senior national government officials. It is less relevant to the experiences of ordinary and middle-income participants. Puyang (63, male, Retired Businessman) mentioned,

Since my father was a national-level official, the provincial governor makes contacts and visits to my family when we returned to our hometown.

These practices ensure that this key figure’s capital—whether economic, social, or symbolic—remains primarily within the province. Such interactions typically involve digital platforms to a lesser extent and are often maintained through personal and institutional networks.

At the city level, municipal officials often use platforms to maintain ties with a wide range of former residents. Zhanhu (33, female, Marketing), Cengcen (29, female, Engineer) and Mozhu (30, male, Engineer) described a common strategy: local commerce or education officials task representatives with creating WeChat groups to reconnect alumni, organizing alumni or business associations to encourage investment or philanthropy for city development. In these cases, digital platforms are key to sustaining engagement with one’s city of origin.

At smaller scales—towns and villages—“digital-regional capital” operates in a more grassroots manner. Economic exchanges that involve smaller-scale capital transactions, such as assisting fellow migrants in transregional business, are commonly facilitated within hometown groups on digital platforms. These activities are usually self-organized by individuals rather than led by the government. Migrants from the same town or village use digital platforms to support each other, using trust and shared regional identity to tackle economic and social challenges between hometown and host environments.

Limitation and exclusion of “digital-regional capital”

A considerable amount of “digital-regional capital” is wasted for both migrants and their hometowns, as migrants are often misled into making unwise consumption and investment decisions. Some participants highlighted that government propaganda designed to attract migrants tends to beautify reality and exaggerate the benefits they might gain from economic engagement in their hometowns. After discussing his online purchase of hometown fruit, Muliang (27, male, Livestreaming-driven Sales) added:

The fruits didn’t taste as good as the live-streaming host described. The packaged fruits included some bad ones. I wondered if I had been deceived and decided never to buy #Zhunong products again.

The wastage is even more pronounced in the context of investment in their hometowns. Yuxiang (40, female Factory Owner) stated that she would not consider investing in her hometown:

A hometown government officer convinced my uncle, a successful businessman in Foshan, to invest in a factory with rebate promises. My uncle built the factory but faced significant debt due to poor business conditions. We have realized that these officers create WeChat Groups for business associations mainly to meet their KPIs rather than to genuinely support us.

These examples illustrate how the flawed application of social capital can tarnish the reputation of an entire network, limiting opportunities for advancement for both individuals and the community (Liu-Farrer, 2008). Specifically, the power of linking social capital diminishes when it is exploited mainly to achieve government objectives rather than to promote citizen participation and benefits (Rubin, 2015).

While it is confirmed that “digital-regional capital” can economically contribute to migrants’ hometowns, a significant portion of this capital mobilization at the societal level has proven less sustainable. This is primarily because societal-level digital-regional capital mobilization relies heavily on migrants’ linking social capital, which is established by official representatives (Agger and Jensen, 2015). As many migrants remain outside their hometowns for extended periods, most migrant participants are personally unfamiliar with these representatives. The established linking of social capital weakens when representatives change, since the ties to institutions depend on local authorities’ whims rather than stable political frameworks (Rubin, 2015). Zhanhu (33, female, Marketing) and Cengcen (29, female, Engineer) noted that the officer responsible for establishing and managing the alumni association of their high school retired a few years ago. Since that time, fewer activities have been organized via the WeChat Group of the alumni association.

Qianyu (48, Male, Entrepreneur) further asserted that the information shared through online official channels holds little value. He explained that valuable information is primarily controlled by key governmental officials. This situation suggests that if migrants lack interpersonal ties to connect with those in core positions of their hometown governments, acquiring practical investment opportunities becomes exceedingly difficult. Qianyu added (48, male, Entrepreneur),

I am one of the few members who consistently send WeChat Red Packets in various WeChat Groups created by people from my hometown. Most members simply collect the packets without ever sending any themselves.

Red packets are a traditional method for Chinese people to exchange renqing (favors) and build social networks. Qianyu explained that by sending WeChat Red Packets, he quickly activated personal relationships within the groups, connecting with the administrators—official representatives from his hometown’s institutions or government. Consequently, he was recommended to lead a hometown business association, which provided him with access to more investment opportunities. Hulin (34, male, Advertising Creative Director) highlighted,

It is normal for senior successful migrants to keep passion to economically engage with their hometown distantly since “yijin huanxian,” (triumphant return home) and “guangzong yaoz” (bring honour to ancestors) are traditionally practiced by who have achieved high social status.

Senior-generation migrants possess more “digital-regional capital” within their hometown networks than the younger generation. Due to their long-established digital capital, they do not show significant disparities in using digital devices or applications to communicate with hometown contacts and institutions. The inequity in “digital-regional capital” arises from their established agency of investing considerable time and resources in adhering to the principles of renqing (favor) and mianzi (face) to sustain hometown networks. In contrast, younger participants like Mozhu (30, male, Engineer) expressed frustration with these traditional practices:

The practices of relationships based on traditional norms feel burdensome to me. They offer little immediate value and often seem like a waste of time.

Most female migrant participants are less inclined to leverage “digital-regional capital” within their hometown networks to generate profits, particularly economic benefits. Zhanhu (33, female, Marketing) affirmed,

The core positions of the WeChat alumni and business association are male seniors. They dominate the online and offline events. The topics are generally not relevant to me, so I usually remain silent – unless they send t Red Packets. When I grab one, I customarily respond with a sticker saying “Thanks, bos.”

She noted that some female peers occasionally participate in gatherings or significant events but often take on marginal roles. In other words, most female migrants had less ownership and lower status of the digital domain that facilitate formal social exchanges with their hometowns.

Overall, the inequality and limitation of benefits acquired from “digital-regional capital” largely depend on the individuals’ relational scales, relationship practical agency, and generational and gendered positions. Higher earners, seniors, and males tend to possess greater “digital-regional capital” within their hometown networks, primarily aiming to facilitate profitable opportunities.

Concluding thoughts

This study examines whether the evolution of digital platforms and the broader process of platformization have strengthened or weakened individuals’ ties to their hometowns, as well as the mechanisms driving these changes. Through a case study of Chinese internal migrants, we argue that “digital-regional capital”—the resources derived from region-centered networks facilitated through digital engagement—plays a crucial role in reinforcing connections to one’s place of origin, acting as collective capital to benefit involved individuals and communities. This form of capital is shaped by migrant individuals’ agency in transforming digital and social capital but hardly isolated from state-led nationalist/regionalist culture, policies, and digital infrastructuralization.

Migrants use digital tools to transform traditional regional ties into flexible, interactive networks that expand the spatial and temporal boundaries of regionalism. Simultaneously, state actors systematically strengthen migrant-hometown ties through multiple pathways: promoting regionalist cultural narratives (e.g. root culture), implementing political mechanisms (e.g. real-name registration systems and the Rural Revitalization Strategy), and promoting governmental use of digital platforms for civic engagement.

Under the state-dominated digital infrastructuralization, the convergence of digital capital into “digital-regional capital” is further enhanced by platform affordances and algorithm-driven technologies. Social platforms function as centralized and multifaceted infrastructure in China’s highly platformized society, which integrate a wide range of internal and external technologies and services (de Kloet et al., 2019; Plantin and de Seta, 2019), such as WeChat and Douyin. These platforms facilitate seamless emotional, economic, and other interactions between migrants and their hometowns, effectively bridging distances through ambient connectivity. Personalized, region-specific content actively cultivates and sustains “digital-regional capital,” making it dynamic rather than static. Cultural factors, particularly gen (root) culture, further reinforce regional attachments, as migrants engage with hometown-specific goods, digital networks, and investment initiatives to maintain their identity and sense of belonging.

These state interventions demonstrate that collective “digital-regional capital” is a bottom-up resource generated by migrants but a governance tool to address regional disparities and support local development. On the societal level, the operation of “digital-regional capital” varies across administrative levels: provincial ties are more symbolic and institutionally mediated, city-level engagement often involve local authorities and educational institutions, and town- and village-level interactions rely more on grassroots digital networks for economic and social support. It is worth noting that the risks of misinformation and unstable institutional relationships pose challenges to the sustainability of “digital-regional capital,” underscoring the need for careful management to ensure equitable outcomes in digitally mediated regional networks.

On the individual level, since China’s techno-nationalism has fostered development of the key social platforms as an infrastructure, normalizing the use of various platforms in daily life, migrant, regardless of their socioeconomic status, possess sufficient digital capital to engage in transregional connections, consumption, and investments that contribute to their hometowns, addressing varied and personalized demands. This enables digital-regional capital to be applied across diverse socioeconomic backgrounds. However, individual access to and benefit from “digital-regional capital” are unequal, with wealthier, senior and male migrants often possessing greater resources to leverage these networks, reinforcing preexisting social hierarchies rather than democratizing regional connections.

Although the concept of “digital-regional capital” is developed based on data from internal migrants in Mainland China, its applicability extends to other societies where digital platforms mediate regional identities and economic–social ties among migrants. In particular, “digital-regional capital” offers a nuanced framework for understanding how digital affordances enable migrants to maintain and transform their connections to place, even in contexts where physical return may be limited. This framework contributes to media and communication studies through bridging a gap in the spatial dimension of “digital capital” (Ragnedda, 2018) with discussions of regionalism identity, demonstrating how digital networks function as mechanisms of both inclusion and exclusion in relation to one’s hometown. It also highlights how the affordances of different digital platforms shape these dynamics, whether through government-led initiatives or self-organized migrant networks.

Beyond China, “digital-regional capital” can be a lens for studying migrant networks in highly regionalized or federalized societies, such as India, Brazil, Russia, and Canada, where strong subnational politics and identities coexist with national narratives (Harbers et al., 2021). In addition, it can inform analyses of postcolonial migration patterns, such as the role of digital networks in maintaining regional ties among diasporic communities from the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, and Africa. Future research could apply this framework to examine how different platform ecologies, regulatory regimes, and migration histories shape the formation of “digital-regional capital” in various contexts, advancing scholarly debates on digital capital, regionalism, and platformized belonging in an era of increasing population mobility.

Building on Bourdieu’s theory of capital, future inquiry could explore how “digital-regional capital” interacts with other forms of capital—such as cultural, symbolic, and state-mediated capital—in shaping mobility, power, and regional belonging in the digital age. Specifically, how do platform affordances transform the ways individuals accumulate and convert different types of capital across regional and transnational scales? How does the digitalization of regional identity reinforce or challenge existing hierarchies of prestige and legitimacy, particularly in contexts where state control, economic inequality, and cultural gatekeeping intersect? Further inquiry should also consider the exclusions and challenges surrounding the cultivation of digital-regional capital among migrants who disengage from their communities of origin and instead embrace thin, cosmopolitan identities that are future-oriented and informed by feminist, queer, and pan-local movements promoting plural and global perspectives (Song, 2022). Moreover, while the concept of digital-regional capital has been developed from social platform ecologies in the pre-artificial intelligence (AI) era, the growing integration of AI into content curation and algorithmic visibility is likely to reshape its production, distribution, and sustainability—potentially amplifying new forms of exclusion and regional inequality.