Sage Journals: Discover world-class research

Abstract

The Labour Party’s response to the Ukraine-Russia war offers some important insights into its internationalism and patriotism. Both aspects experienced considerable strain during Corbyn’s leadership, with the Party perceived as weak on international affairs and unpatriotic. The Starmer leadership, first in opposition and now in government, has drawn on earlier notions and previous leaders and luminaries, emphasising a more traditional view of British patriotism and Britain’s world role. In the speeches, briefings and outputs of leading Party figures such Starmer, Lammy and Healey, the Party has emphasised its ‘ironclad’ support for Ukrainian sovereignty, territorial integrity and resisting Russian aggression. As such, the conflict has opened up possibilities to return to earlier understandings of internationalism and patriotism, stressing that Britain will be secure at home and comfortable playing a leading role in Europe and, more widely, on the global stage.

Keywords

Labour Party Ukraine-Russia war defence internationalism patriotism security

Introduction

The study of the Labour Party’s view of international politics has, at least for much of its history, not enjoyed the same attention as domestic concerns. Indeed, for Howe (2000: 123), the major canons of Labour thinking often said little about international relations. When international affairs arose, this was often in relation to the European question, defence, colonialism and decolonisation, or changes in the global economy. For critics, Labour’s approach was incoherent, unformulated and importantly undistinctive. From without, this has changed somewhat in recent decades, with academic enquiry resulting in the publication of important monographs, including Vickers’ (2003, 2011) two volumes on Labour and the World, Callaghan’s (2007) The Labour Party and Foreign Policy: A History, as well as edited collections by Corthorn and Davis (2008) and Daddow and Gaskarth (2011).

Given the fractious state of world politics and the return of a Labour government in July 2024, it is worth reconsidering Labour’s view of international politics. The Starmer government faces a very different global picture from New Labour in 1997, and as Young (1997: 154) noted, ‘shifts abroad can impact on stability at home’. In addition to the return of state-on-state war on Europe’s border are the systemic and global economic changes since the last Labour government. In the post-Cold War world of the 1990s, it was considered that there was one great power in the international system – the United States of America – and, at least for some, the future was one of liberalism, democracy and capitalism. Today, American power is not as secure and America’s global competitors are non-democratic states, primarily China. Donald Trump’s return to the White House adds an additional complication. Trump and those around him have leaned into isolationist rhetoric and will likely build on the protectionist measures introduced in his first term. Moreover, questions remain over their commitment to NATO and European security, in part because of their isolationist politics, but also the wider concern in American elite circles regarding the rise of China. Nor is the economic picture as favourable. New Labour came to power during a period recently termed ‘The Great Stability’ (see Engelen et al., 2011), in which advanced industrialised democracies enjoyed a prolonged period of growth and stability. Interestingly, Starmer (2024e) referred to it as the period of ‘Great Moderation’, a ‘twilight of naivety’, sharing a similar view as the French President, Emmanuel Macron, who termed the present as ‘the end of the post-Cold War peace dividend’.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which formally began in February 2022, has led to considerable change in European politics, re-orientating security and defence policies across European capitals. For much of the post-Cold War era European democracies scaled back their defence commitments. Now we see a renewed emphasis on reindustrialising domestic economies and rearming and re-equipping armed forces. To that end, this period may be seen as something of a ‘critical juncture’ – ‘changes that originate in certain historical moments have long-term and transformative impact’ (Soifer, 2012: 1572) – and the ‘loosening of the constraints of the structure to allow for agency or contingency to shape divergence from the past, or divergence across cases’ (Soifer, 2009: 2).

For our purposes, we can see the importance of Russia’s ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine in relation to Labour’s internationalism and patriotism. In recent years, both aspects have caused the Party electoral and political problems. Therefore, Russia’s invasion of a country bordering on NATO and in which Britain has growing political and economic interests (see Lanoszka and Rogers, 2022) shines a spotlight on these traditions. Second, the Ukraine–Russia war provides the Party with an opportunity to reframe or return to the Party’s mainstream understandings of internationalism and patriotism post-Corbyn. Therefore, Labour’s response to the war in Ukraine reveals important aspects of its view and understanding of international politics. Labour spent the first 2 years of the war in opposition. Yet, as Vickers (2011: 216) notes, ‘for extensive periods in the twentieth century Labour’s foreign policy has developed while in opposition than in power’. In turn, this allows us to see how the Party’s approach has developed through opposition and into government.

To consider this question, this article outlines Labour’s understandings of ‘internationalism’ and ‘patriotism’. Both elements of Labour’s thinking presented clear problems for the Starmer leadership. First, the Corbyn leadership challenged the prevailing view of internationalism within the Party. While Corbyn was an internationalist, his understanding differed significantly from the much of the Party and previous leaders. As for patriotism, in one sense, all Labour leaders are challenged by ideas of belonging, identity and nationhood, which are popularly thought to sit more neatly within conservatism and the Conservative Party. Yet, it is a particularly acute issue for Starmer. By 2019, Corbyn was regularly challenged and seen to be ‘unpatriotic’. According to John Healey, the current Defence Secretary, the hardest doors to knock on during the 2019 general election ‘were those with Help for Heroes or British Legion stickers in the window’ (quoted in The Guardian, 2024). Mattinson’s (2020) study on the 2019 UK general election revealed how Labour appeared out of touch with many traditional Labour voters, much of the electorate and widely perceived as ‘unpatriotic’.

This article builds on the existing literature, using the speeches, briefings and outputs of leading Party figures, primarily Starmer, Lammy and Healey. From there, it is possible to trace how the Party’s position has developed and make wider judgements on the direction of the Party. First, the article addresses Labour’s internationalism, followed by a section on Labour’s patriotism. Given the focus of this article and the sheer breadth and depth of the Labour Party and international affairs, it is impossible to offer a complete history. Instead, events are incorporated into the discussion on internationalism and patriotism, helping to lay the groundwork for the contemporary discussion and analysis of Labour’s response to the Ukraine–Russia war. Therefore, the third section – responding to the Ukraine-Russia war – opens with Starmer becoming Party leader, then Prime Minister and through to the end of 2024. As we will see, changes in international politics have opened opportunities for the Party’s return to earlier notions of internationalism and patriotism. Consequently, the Starmer leadership pursues a different understanding of Britain and its world role when compared to the Corbyn leadership, despite both claiming internationalism and patriotism. Let us turn our attention to Labour’s internationalism.

Labour’s internationalism

The traditional emphasis of UK foreign policy has been one of power politics, an approach most clearly aligned with the Conservative Party. Douglas Hurd, a former Conservative Foreign Secretary stated: ‘British foreign policy exists to protect and promote British interests. Despite all the changes in the world that underlying truth has not changed’ (quoted by Buller and Harrison, 2000: 77). Therefore, a recurring question and criticism of the Labour Party centres on the influence of socialist values and the distinctiveness of its foreign policy, especially when compared to the Conservative and Liberal parties (see Gordon, 1969; Windrich, 1952).

Howe considered that alongside internationalism, Labour hoped to resolve disputes peacefully, anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism and the advancement of universal standards, such as human rights. In short, ‘there should be principles in foreign policy – as opposed to the “realist” stance that national interest was all’ (Howe, 2000: 120–123, 145). Young (1997: 137) identified seven ‘socialist’ principles – working class solidarity, an aversion to power politics, a deep commitment to disarmament, opposition to imperialism, establishing strong international institutions, dislike of cooperation with capitalist powers and a readiness to establish democratic control of external policymaking – but argued that they had rarely held much sway over Labour’s thinking. Spear suggested internationalism reflected the Party’s basic philosophy; conflict is a result of removable conditions, something aided by international organisations which can help reduce, if not eradicate poverty and inequality. She continued, noting that Labour prioritised the role of international organisations, multilateralism, and idealism (Spear, 1992: 190). Peter Hain (2016: 99), a former Labour Cabinet Minister, echoed these principles, citing multilateralism, transparency and accountability of power.

As Oliver notes, despite the competing interpretations and underpinnings of internationalism, there is something called ‘internationalism’. Yet, what is at the core of internationalism is debated, stemming from the ideological influences of liberalism and Marxism. For Oliver, it relies on responding to international problems with international solutions, ‘driven by the argument that the security of any one actor impacts on the security of others’. Importantly, ‘it rests upon the foundational notion that fundamentally rational people can co-operate in resolving common problems in international affairs’, through diplomacy, international law and institutional structures (Oliver, 2018: 173). Howe (2000: 120) also noted that internationalism has a Marxist lineage, that ‘the workers have no country’.

Vickers’ (2003, 2011) two volumes offer a detailed account of Labour throughout the 20th and into the 21st century. For Vickers (2003: 5, 9-21, 193), Labour’s internationalism is influenced by ideals of progress and change, drawing on ‘radical liberal thinking’ and ‘a Christian-socialist, Nonconformist streak among party members’. She argues that six principles are at the heart of Labour’s approach, although how they have and should be interpreted and prioritised and which are achievable has caused division. First, states share common interests and values. Therefore, change can be secured through international institutions which can mitigate anarchy. Second, belief in the existence of an international community. Third, foreign policy should reflect democratic values and universal moral norms. For instance, public opinion and a wider view that internal behaviour is reflected in external behaviour. As such, foreign policy has an ethical dimension. Fourth, unilateralism should be rejected, and multilateralism should be promoted, underpinned by accepting collective security. Fifth, anti-militarism, emphasising arms control, disarmament, regulating the arms industry and suspicion of using force. Finally, a sense of working class and socialist solidarity. Consequently, Labour has pursued a more liberal conception of international politics and, therefore, different when compared to conventional realpolitik. However, some principles have featured more than others and not all have been universally accepted, lacking ‘any socialist ideology as such’.

When reading the Party’s history, we can see the influence of these different tradition and principles, but also how they have led to some contradictions and tensions. Callaghan (2008) notes that early Labour Party thinking was shaped by a desire to avoid war, a position conditioned by World War One (WW1), resulting in staunch support for the League of Nations. In addition, WW1 taught the Party that the wider world ‘was a potentially dangerous place that could not be ignored’ and opting was not an option (Thorpe, 2008 [2007]: 6). Moreover, Labour criticised the allies and the Versailles Treaty due to its punitive measures and the dislocation of trade. The first Labour government in 1924 committed to open diplomacy, international disarmament, and the ending of the arms trade. Winkler (1994) observed a shared agreement on the importance of international organisations within Labour politics in the 1920s. However, splits emerged between figures like Ramsay MacDonald, who thought resolution could be reached without arms, and others such as Arthur Henderson, who felt that the backing of force would always be necessary (cited by Howe, 2000: 128–129).

During the 1930s, the Party grappled with economic downturn, the rise of Fascism and Nazism in Europe and the practices, policies and ideology of the Soviet Union. Yet, the Party believed that if it were in government, then it could carry ‘the moral leadership of the world’ (quoted by Vickers, 2000: 36). Party Conference in 1933 voted in favour of pacifism and if there was to be a European war, the calling of a general strike. However, pacifism moved off the agenda in 1935 when George Lansbury resigned as leader. By 1939, in parliament following the German invasion of Poland, it was Arthur Greenwood who was encouraged to ‘speak for England’.

In the second half of the 20th century its thinking about the world was influenced by the belief that World War Two (WW2) was a ‘good war’. Ernie Bevin, Labour’s post-war Foreign Secretary, affirmed that his government rejected the view ‘that we have ceased to be a great power, or the contention that we have ceased to play that role . . . we have an historic role to play’ (quoted by McCourt, 2011: 32). A combination of being a victorious power and the uniqueness of Britain’s world role vindicated the view that ‘it could be legitimate to use force to overthrow a regime that was deemed morally and politically repulsive’ (Thorpe, 2007: 12). Consequently, the wartime experience and the defeat of Nazism and Fascism resulted in the Party seeing ‘the country as potentially a powerful force for good in the world’ reinforcing ‘its belief in the moral character of Britain and how it could be a beacon of hope for others’ (Hassan and Shaw, 2020 [2019]: 16).

From there, the Korean War led to sharp divisions within the Labour Party. First, the financial burden of military involvement impacted social spending at home. Second, concerns existed about America, great power politics, communism and imperialism. Third, Attlee committed British troops despite an irregular vote on the UN security council and therefore, without full UN authorisation (see Phythian, 2008: 219–220). All three factors played out through growing ideological splits within the Party and as we moved through the 20th century, Britain’s declining great power status. Yet, Harold Wilson’s wished for Britain to keep its global and imperial role. This came to a head over defence spending, capabilities and positioning of military personnel across the globe – West Germany, the Middle East, and the Far East – a considerable financial commitment at a time when the British economy experienced balance of payments deficits and limited growth. Denis Healey as Defence Secretary defended his decision to close Britain’s base at Aden and commented on the ‘natural limitations which the facts impose on our foreign policy and military capability’ (quoted by Sargeant, 2022).

Some accused the Labour Party in the 1980s of wanting to ‘get off the 20th century’ due to its commitment to a ‘siege economy’, nuclear disarmament and withdrawal from the European Community. Yet, few, if any, in the Labour Party in the 1980s wanted to pull up the drawbridge and retreat from what they saw as Britain’s world role. The important debate over unilateralism and multilateralism overshadows other aspects of the Party’s approach. For instance, a motion to withdraw from NATO was defeated by substantial majority at the 1980 Party Conference. Moreover, support for unilateralism did not equate to retreating from world affairs. The money saved on nuclear weapons was to be spent on conventional forces, and Labour accepted that Britain’s arms industry would continue to play a key role within the economy, albeit with certain controls. Elsewhere, figures such as Michael Foot and Peter Shore supported the Conservative government’s policy of retaking the Falkland Islands. Foot viewed the Argentinian Junta as ‘fascistic’, and Shore considered the Falklanders as British and the Argentinian invasion as an attack on British sovereignty. Later, Neil Kinnock supported the use of force during the first Gulf War, although justified his position through the framework of the United Nations. According to Thorpe, ‘even if Labour had wanted to ignore the wider world, it would have found that the wider world would not necessarily ignore it’. Of course, Labour politicians did not want to ignore the wider world, as their values and ideas were transferable, and ‘Politics were not about Britain alone, but the whole of humanity’ (Thorpe, 2008 [2007]: 2).

This took on a new meaning under New Labour. For Brivati, Blair utilised internationalism as an inspiration for spreading democracy, liberalism and capitalism. Importantly, the international community had a responsibility beyond state interests, and liberal values were to be prioritised, sometimes through force. Brivati (2004 [2003]: 230) termed this a ‘forward policy of moral and political leadership . . . remaking the world in the image of liberal democracy and capitalism’. As such, the Party had developed a foreign policy that was no longer ‘case-by-case’, although others suggest that there was considerable continuity with previous governments (McCourt, 2011). Regardless, Robin Cook (1997), the then Foreign Secretary, claimed that ‘our foreign policy must have an ethical dimension’. Arguably, the ‘ethical’ turn was seen in protecting and promoting human rights, and concerns over the arms trade. Yet, there is little agreement on the nature, feasibility and successes of New Labour’s ‘ethical’ turn (see Daddow and Gaskarth, 2011; Little and Wickham-Jones, 2000). Interestingly, Cook, popularly conceived as proclaiming a left-wing foreign policy, would later disassociate himself strongly with the phrase. He affirmed he was a ‘realist with principles’ and as Foreign Secretary was willing to accept the use of military action and intervention to protect human rights (see Schreiner, 2008; Wickham-Jones, 2000: 2, 29). Tellingly, when reflecting on Kosovo, he said:

We cannot expect to retain our position as a permanent member of that council [United Nations Security Council] – and the respect that goes with it – and as a major member of the North Atlantic alliance if we are not willing to take part in actions when mounting such actions is deemed necessary. (Cook, 1999 quoted in Schreiner, 2008: 206)

Post-New Labour, the Party distanced itself from the Iraq War, the wider war on terror, and from the first Trump Presidency, having previously lionised President Obama. As leader, Ed Miliband argued that the Iraq War was wrong and later advised his Party to vote against military strikes in Syria in 2013 after President al-Assad had used chemical weapons on his own people. Miliband defended his decision on the basis that he was not prepared to risk the lives of British troops, doubts over the utility of strikes in removing al-Assad, and no clear exit strategy or plan for Syria in the event of al-Assad’s fall. Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership represented a far greater challenge to both aspects of Labour’s thinking and more broadly, Britain’s world role. This was exemplified in 2015 when in a Commons debate on extending military strikes into Syria against ISIS, Corbyn opened the debate by arguing that the political case was weak, and there was no moral justification. The then Shadow Foreign Secretary, Hilary Benn, closed, reminding his Party that they faced ‘fascists’ and to recall the role that they had played in standing up to and defeating fascism (House of Commons, 2015).

As mentioned, Miliband rejected military strikes in Syria. However, we can observe differences between him and Corbyn. After all, Miliband accepted NATO, the nuclear deterrent and American political leadership, Corbyn, at least on a personal level, did not. He was critical of NATO, which he saw as expansionist, opposed nuclear weapons due to the existential threat they posed to civilisation, rejected what he understood to be American imperialism and the American model of capitalism, and was unenthusiastic about European integration. Consequently, it was evident from the outset that Corbyn ‘dissented not only from specific policies previously endorsed by the Party but was challenging the whole fabric of thinking on international questions’ (Hassan and Shaw, 2020 [2019]: 241). Moreover, rather than taking inspiration from either America, Europe, or both, as Blair claimed, Corbyn’s inspiration appeared to stem from socialist regimes in Latin America. Garnett and Johnson (2021) continue, noting four themes underpinning his view of foreign policy, although they were not applied universally nor consistently: anti-Western imperialism, pacifism, anti-capitalism and the tradition of dissent. However, this came at a cost. Perceptions of being weak on defence and security, especially after the Salisbury poisonings in 2018, close associations with ‘Stop the War’ and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), along with terrorist groups such as the Irish Republican Army, led many to doubt his patriotic credentials.

We will bring this discussion up to the present, shortly. For the time being, we can draw several conclusions regarding internationalism and the Labour Party. First, it is important to reiterate that the way these terms are understood within and across the Party differs greatly. ‘The Labour party has tended to encompass a wider spectrum of political opinions than the Conservative party’ (Vickers, 2000: 34). Not only has this potentially constrained the Party leadership but pulled it in different directions. As with many issues within the Party, there is no simple Left-Centre-Right distinction in which attitudes and approaches to Labour’s and, by extension, Britain’s world role can be neatly packaged. Brivati (2004 [2003]: 231) notes the ‘terms New and Old Left, or New and Old Right do not catch the way in which the Party split and reconfigured itself around these issues’. Oliver reinforced this point when writing on Labour’s defence policy. Understandings of internationalism ‘are common between individuals and groups within Labour that have different interpretations of domestic matters’ or put another way, ‘individuals joined the party for primarily domestic reasons and then discovered their differences on foreign policy with others who generally agreed with them on home matters’ (Oliver, 2018: 172).

Second, and building on the first point, internationalism is a contested term. While Hain (2016: 99) argued that ‘Britain’s left has been synonymous with internationalism’ and the recently formed Labour International Group argue ‘it is high time that Labour’s “internationalism” is again made a reality’, it is problematic to think that any one group has the only claim on internationalism. In his seminal study, Michael Freeden (1996) affirmed that ideologies are particular configurations of concepts, ranging from core, adjacent and peripheral. Hickson and Miles (2018) in their study of Labour’s social democratic Eurosceptics adopted this approach. They outlined how the contested nature of core concepts such as sovereignty, internationalism and federalism impacted views of European integration and, for the social democratic Eurosceptics, underpinned their opposition to membership. They continue: ‘There is no right or wrong definition of concepts such as sovereignty since they are capable of different meanings’ (Hickson and Miles, 2018: 867). The same can be seen within Labour’s approach to international politics. Figures from different traditions claim their actions to be rooted in either or both internationalism and patriotism but support different actions and policy positions.

Third, Thorpe comments on how the contested nature of internationalism has had practical implications for Labour administrations who have had to make policy, often at short notice and with limited information. While critics within and without the Party have advocated for a ‘socialist foreign policy’, such as the famous Keep Left pamphlet in 1947, what this meant in practice is very difficult to define. Young (1997: 137–138) outlined the prospect of a socialist party’s international outlook, lamenting the fleeting influence of radicalism over Labour in opposition. Here, Thorpe (2008 [2007]: 13) takes a more sympathetic view arguing that the difficulties in defining and implementing a ‘socialist’ agenda makes it hard to blame Labour ministers for pursuing ‘more pragmatic approaches when they needed to respond urgently to the challenges of the post-war world’.

Fourth, Labour governments, like all governments, face pressure from other governments, international organisations, existing commitments, events and earlier decisions (Vickers, 2011: 14). In that sense, policy is reactive, responding to events rather than initiating policies. This has implications for the party in government, namely that general principles guide it as a framework, only able to shape issues in a handful of areas (Spear, 1992: 199). James Callaghan, the former Labour Prime Minister, encapsulated this dilemma.

Foreign policy is a mixture of the old and new. We may initiate but we also inherit; we may vote at the ballot box for changes in policy and personalities, but on acquiring office governments inherit an international situation on which the footprints of the past are heavily marked. (Callaghan, 1987: 296)

Fifth, there is an ongoing dialogue and tension between Labour’s idealists and realists, or as Howe (2000: 120) explained, ‘ethical appeals and the demands of Realpolitik’. Within Labour’s ranks are those more closely aligned with a value-laden view of world politics, and those more closely aligned with power politics and the national interest. The former tend to emphasise the role of values, rights and international institutions, whereas the latter accept the realities of great power politics, the centrality of power and the use of force to impose order and advance state interests. Clearly, it is difficult to package politicians and political parties into watertight compartments, especially when analysing the complexities of international politics. Nor are they treated as mutually exclusive by Labour figures, evident within positions and justifications throughout Labour’s history and in the Party’s response to the Ukraine-Russia war. Yet, in using these two poles, we can observe certain sympathies, values and the direction of travel.

Finally, and in sum, since the Party’s inception, questions have been asked on the extent to which this forms a distinctive, coherent and ‘socialist’ foreign policy. Critics within and without the Party continue to bemoan the supposed inability or unwillingness to pursue a ‘socialist’ foreign policy or reluctance to give up Britain’s ‘traditional’ world role. However, the British Labour Party is an ‘internationalist’ party. Underpinning its internationalism is a belief that its values, especially those of equality and social justice, apply globally, not just in Britain. This is combined with a broader understanding of the capacity of Britain to act on the international stage, as a force for ‘good’. Therefore, Britain has and must play a world role. Yet, what this means in practice is contested due to the various interpretations of internationalism, ordering of priorities, the different traditions and influences on the Party, and the tension between values and power. Moreover, Labour’s approach is made not in isolation but shaped and influenced by the wider environment. We will return to these ideas but now, let us consider Labour’s patriotism.

Labour’s patriotism

The second aspect of Labour’s makeup is ‘patriotism’, an under-appreciated aspect of its thinking and identity. Popular socialist texts such as Robert Blatchford’s Britain for the British and Merrie England, Tom Johnston’s Our Scots Noble Families, the writings of George Orwell exemplified in The Lion and the Unicorn or the wartime broadcasts of J.B. Priestley have all, in different ways, sought to show the blend of class and nation. Indeed, this powerful strand of thinking generated a view of Britain’s world role and a social patriotism that could deliver social services, wealth taxes, dividend controls and nationalisation of industries in the name of the British people, further securing British liberties and democracy.

However, the Party and broader Labour movement consists of competing approaches, ranging from traditional British patriots to those who see patriotism and national loyalty as little more than expressions of false consciousness. Helpfully, Hassan and Shaw (2020 [2019]: 31–44) identified four ‘narratives’ – traditional patriotism, radical patriotism, liberal internationalism and socialist internationalism – each stressing important dimensions of Labour’s thinking. The advantage of ‘narratives’ is that they tend to simplify often complex and messy realities. Traditional patriotism, infected with ‘labourism’ emphasises the benign nature of the British state, permitting the possibility of social transformation. Britain is ‘exceptional’, due to its institutions, freedom, moderation and sense of fair play. The dual effect has been to see the state as ‘fit for the purpose of domestic social reform’ and ‘in believing in its value overseas’ (2019: 33). Therefore, for Labour’s traditional patriots, rhetorical appeals to nationhood, belonging and electoral imperatives, went beyond instrumental reasons. Yet, it differed from the Conservative conception, as it rarely reached the ‘drum and bugle’ fervour of ‘my country, right or wrong’. Instead, we see in Beech and Hickson’s (2007: 88) account of Evan Durbin – a key Labour thinker who combined democratic socialism with patriotism – something applicable to much of the Labour movement: patriotism in large part ‘based on reasoned argument rather than romanticism’ though not without romanticism and exaggeration. For critics, adherents of this view have accepted the parameters sets by its Conservative and Liberal predecessors, rather than constructing an alternative or socialist narrative.

Radical patriotism centred on the belief of an ‘alternative England’, one not so much built on traditional institutions – although there remains a deep respect for the ‘British way of life’ – but the search for working class emancipation, representing the day-to-day challenges faced by ordinary people. It finds its expression in the Peasants Revolt, Levellers, Chartists and Tolpuddle Martyrs. In many ways, this aspect of Labour patriotism stretches further back into English history and takes its inspiration from the bottom-up experiences of ordinary people, rather than elite-level institutions. Liberal internationalists, disliked what they saw as the blind loyalty and flag-waving of traditional patriotists, including the militarism. Instead, they favoured reason and morality, emphasised the role of international bodies and were highly critical of the use of force to resolve disputes. The liberal influence on the Party has encouraged ideas of self-determination, international justice, the League of Nations, then the United Nations and the international criminal court. Finally, socialist internationalism, which like its liberal counterpoint, was equally as critical of patriotism and national loyalty. Yet, the attempt to construct a nation and a sense of national loyalty, especially among the working class, was a species of false consciousness, designed to maintain class relations and the material interests of the bourgeoisie.

As with the various principles that underpin Labour’s internationalism, these views and interpretations of patriotism have all shaped Labour’s view of Britain. However, a consequence of the competing approaches is the long-standing criticism that the Party is unpatriotic. Therefore, criticism of Corbyn belies the ongoing dialogue, often troublesome, within the Party over community, identity and belonging. For Stafford (2021), it is ‘revisionist history’ that ‘Labour was regarded as irreproachable “patriotic” by all and sundry until Jeremy Corbyn came along’. Indeed, Taylor (1990) traced these problems back to the close of the 19th century. He emphasised how the Left was sceptical of mass political behaviour, concerned about manipulation, false consciousness and the ‘irrational political forces’ inspiring patriotism.

However, the 1930s, with the threat and then outbreak of war made patriotism acceptable. Attlee presented the Party as a ‘national party’ and, in foreign policy rejected ‘ideological abstractions’ in favour of the ‘national interest’, which he declared did not vary regardless of the party in government (Barber, 1976: 26 quoted by Spear, 1992: 187). As Jackson (2016: 9) writes, what stands out about the towering figures of ‘Labour’s golden age’, such as Attlee, Herbert Morrison, Hugh Dalton and Ernest Bevin is ‘an instinctively Whiggish view of British patriotism and culture’. What separated Britain and made it so unique was its constitution, and the spread of individual liberty and democratic self-government, underpinned by social order. For Wallace (1991), this amounted to an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ view of Britain and British national identity, noting other important Labour figures such as Hugh Gaitskell and Michael Foot.

Subsequent Labour leaders have also sought to emphasise their patriotism. Harold Wilson emphasised meritocracy and technological development. Indeed, ‘he would never deny Britain the role of a world power’ (Crossman, 1975: 540 quoted by Pearce, 2002: 323). Callaghan embodied ‘conservative Labour’ (see Hickson and Miles, 2020), and Tony Blair embraced ‘Cool Britannia’. Brown muted a new civic British patriotism and then, during the Scottish Independence Referendum, 2014, centred on the concept of risk sharing and resource pooling across the union. Miliband toyed with ‘One Nation Labour’ early in his leadership, but this was downplayed by 2015. Corbyn did try to counter the ‘unpatriotic’ charge, emphasising internationalism and universal values, as well as a greater concern for domestic economic and social well-being. As for Britain’s armed forces, he said he was proud of their contribution in West Africa during the Ebola crisis and the Royal Navy for aiding refugees in the Mediterranean. He was less sure footed on Britain’s armed forces as a fighting force.

Various developments undercut Labour’s constitutional patriotism from the 1960s onwards. Jackson identified four key reasons. First, the rise of critical perspectives – feminism, the New Left, and anti-colonialism – challenged Britain’s political settlement. Second, the rise of nationalism across the British state suggested a multinational polity, to which we might add an increasingly multicultural society. Third, relative economic decline compared to Western European and other defeated states in WW2, made it harder to defend Britain’s ‘exceptional’ political and economic system. Economically, we might add the alleged decline of the nation-state through the forces of globalisation, further undermining confidence in Britain. Fourth, the destabilising impact of Thatcherism, which through the existing machinery of the state brought about significant social, political and economic reform, undermining the planks of social democracy. Therefore, the British left could ‘no longer regard British parliamentary institutions and constitutional history as an unambiguous source of national pride’ (Jackson, 2016: 10). In turn, these social, cultural and political shifts altered attitudes within the parliamentary Labour Party and the wider membership, which for some, became increasingly middle class, university educated and socially liberal, detached from the origins of the Party (see Embery, 2020).

Beech writes that those influenced by the New Left saw patriotism as ‘an emotional hangover from Britain’s imperial past’, favouring a far more significant role for international institutions over the nation-state. Other traditions also have a critical view of patriotism. The ‘self-styled “progressives”’ deem patriotism a ‘proclivity of the conservative mind’, sharing the New Left’s emphasis on international organisations. In sum, the Party has downplayed its patriotism in recent years; ‘an unuttered sentiment, conspicuous by its absence’ (Beech, 2016: 127). Others have picked up this theme. For instance, Miles (2023) regretted the hollowing out of Labour’s patriotic centre. Elsewhere, Peter Shore’s biographers emphasised that the Party had a clear patriotic tradition, embodied in figures like Shore, yet it had been watered down over the past 30 years, if not rejected. For the sake of the Party, this needed to be rediscovered (Hickson et al., 2020).

While it is important to trace the social and political changes, you cannot underestimate the impact of the Corbyn leadership. A sympathetic take suggests that he tried to pursue a vision that presented a more morally acceptable view of Britain and its still global role. Nevertheless, this struggled to cut through, and Corbyn’s leadership ‘scrambled the public’s perception of the Labour Party and what it stood for’ (Hayhurst, 2021: 356). The Conservative Party and sections of the press regularly reminded the electorate of Corbyn’s sympathies for the Provisional IRA and Hezbollah, and appearances on Russia Today and Iranian Press TV. Arguably, it was the Salisbury poisonings in March 2018 during which he belatedly criticised Russian actions and his general inconsistencies over British foreign policy. For instance, he argued that Britain was wrong to protect Kuwaiti sovereignty in the first Gulf War, having previously been critical of Saddam Hussain’s regime. Mattinson (2020: 154) records that voters perceived Corbyn to ‘talk the country down, not up’ and often seemed ‘to stick up for people who are the enemies of Britain rather than our friends’. Lord Ashcroft’s (2020) focus groups shared this view, in which members felt that he wanted ‘to disarm the country’, was ‘anti-Royal’ and ‘refused to sing the national anthem’. Therefore, for one commentator writing at the start of the new decade, the challenge was clear: ‘to stop the party looking as though it hates its own country’ (Shrimsley, 2020).

The Starmer leadership has been much more comfortable displaying its patriotism. Goes (2021) writes that Starmer’s patriotic turn has three elements. First, something old in which he delves into a tradition of extolling how Labour is a national party. He affirmed that Labour must embrace patriotism, commenting: ‘In the Labour Party we should be proud of being patriotic’ (quoted by Rayson, 2020: 231), telling voters that ‘we love this country as you do’ (Starmer, 2020). He criticised Boris Johnson’s appointment of Claire Fox to the House of Lords, describing her as a ‘Warrington bomb apologist’ and how as Director of Public Prosecutions he had spent 5 years with security and intelligence forces to bring terrorists to justice in Northern Ireland. Second, something borrowed and blue, using conservative patriotic iconography. Here, Starmer’s Labour has co-opted the Union Flag and sung the national anthem at Party Conference. Third, something new, looking ahead to a transformed Britain, emphasising a renewed Britain under a Labour government, one based on stronger social institutions, economic growth and public service (see Starmer, 2024b).

In one sense, we can observe a deep-seated patriotism within the Labour Party, one rooted in Britain’s history and celebrating Britain’s institutions. This was a prevalent feature in most post-war Labour leaders and luminaries, combining a traditional sense of Britain with social reform. As time went on, those less at ease with traditional patriotism tended to temper it with liberalism, emphasising values, progress and in international affairs, international bodies. Others, if it was uttered, mentioned it in passing, rather than a central feature of their politics. Corbyn presented the biggest break in Labour’s patriotism. He moved beyond the liberal critique of modernising Britain socially, politically and economically – something particularly evident under New Labour – and challenged long-held principles and positions with a radicalism that had often found itself on the fringes of the Labour movement.

Having set out Labour’s internationalism and patriotism, we can now turn our attention to the Ukraine–Russia war. Here, we can observe how leading figures in the Party have reframed the Party’s internationalism and patriotism, shifting the Party away from the anti-militarism, anti-capitalism, pacifism (for Corbyn, at least) and the general mistrust and criticism of American leadership. Instead, Starmer and those around him have drawn on past figures, notably Attlee and Bevin, accentuating domestic security, and presenting a muscular and patriotic, but also value-laden view of Britain and its global role.

Responding to the Ukraine–Russia war

Tellingly, Brivati wrote that the image of Britain held by the Party’s social democrats in the 1970s ‘was of a decaying and backward state and society in need of reform by the adoption of a model for modernisation’. However, their view of Britain’s international role entailed Britain having the capabilities of playing a leading role in world affairs (Brivati, 2004 [2003]: 232). Arguably, the same can be said of today’s Labour Party, with leading figures such as Starmer, David Lammy, now Foreign Secretary and John Healey, now Defence Secretary, all lamenting what they see as the varied problems and consequences of 14 years of Conservative and Conservative-led governments. Healey (2021) encapsulated this view writing that the ‘threats are greater now than for decades and growing’, but a decade of decline under the Conservatives had weakened British influence and defence. For Starmer (2024a), the Conservative Party had lost its ‘Churchillian bulldog spirit’.

Early in the conflict, the commentator John Rentoul (2022) suggested that Starmer will be dogged with the ‘Kinnock problem’. Despite his, the Shadow Cabinet and the wider PLP’s firm stance towards Russian aggression, and the attempt from the outset of his leadership to promote his patriotic credentials, Starmer had served in Corbyn’s Shadow Cabinet and asked voters to make him Prime Minister. Kinnock was criticised for being weak and untrustworthy on defence, at one time arguing that Britain should give up its nuclear deterrent, only then to change his mind. Yet, the public have for the most part warmed to the Party’s stance on defence and security. Labour, having gradually become more trusted on defence and security since the start of 2022, overtook the Conservatives in the run-up to the 2024 general election, although have since slipped backwards as the government’s popularity has declined (see Independent, 2024b; YouGov, 2024).

Moreover, they have created a clear dividing line with the previous Corbyn leadership. Starmer stated at NATO headquarters that Corbyn had been ‘wrong’ about the defence alliance. As Rose (2022: 9–10) noted, the marginalising of Corbyn and his left-wing supporters by the Starmer leadership means there are no clear and vocal pro-Russian or anti-American factions within the Party. In addition, Starmer has appointed ‘reliable’ individuals with ‘conservative’ views on foreign policy and defence from the centre or right of the Party (see Young, 1997: 137–138). For instance, Lord Coaker, Maria Eagle, Luke Pollard and Alistair Cairns at the Ministry of Defence and Anneliese Dodds, Stephen Doughty, Catherine West, Lord Collins, Baroness Chapmam and Hamish Falconer at the Foreign Office.

Shortly after becoming leader, Starmer pledged that ‘never again will Labour go into an election not being trusted on national security’ (quoted by Healey, 2023b). In the weeks leading up to the Russian invasion, he affirmed Labour’s support for NATO, reminding readers that the post-war Labour government was central to its creation. Attlee and Bevin understood that ‘the best way to preserve peace is to show that you are prepared to stand up to aggression’. From there, he criticised the Stop the War coalition, of being ‘at best . . . naïve’ and ‘at worst . . . showing solidarity with the aggressor’ at the very time when our allies need solidarity and practical assistance. ‘The kneejerk reflex, “Britain, Canada, the United States, France – wrong; their enemies, right”, is unthinking conservatism at its worst’. He closed by claiming that there is no moral equivalence between NATO and Russia (Starmer, 2022). He returned to the post-war Labour government, emphasising how Attlee and his government were ‘hard-headed and patriotic’ (Starmer, 2024e). Moreover, the 11 Labour MPs and 3 peers who signed a Stop the War statement about Ukraine, blaming NATO and the UK government for the crisis, and resisting arming Ukraine, withdrew their names, after being threatened with expulsion. In addition, Starmer scrapped the 2022 annual Young Labour Conference after it criticised NATO ‘aggression’ on Twitter.

Starmer maintained this line throughout his time as leader of the opposition. He, alongside Healey, visited British troops stationed on NATO exercises in Estonia in December 2023, reiterating the Party’s commitment to NATO, to Ukraine and resisting Russian aggression. In the run-up to the 2024 general election, Starmer doubled down on the Party’s commitments to defence and security. On a visit to Barrow-in-Furness, the site of the shipyard building Britain’s new Dreadnaught-class submarine, he claimed to feel the ‘weight of history here’, ‘generations of families who have worked to defend our country, and the scale of decisions taken by past political leaders’ (Starmer, 2024a). He continued in this vein in a speech titled Country First, Party Second: the world ‘is perhaps more dangerous and volatile’ than at any time since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Therefore, the ‘foundation of any good government is economic security, border security, national security’ (Starmer, 2024b). This was repeated in a second speech at the Fusilier Museum, Bury, in which Starmer was joined by ex-service personnel who were now standing as Labour candidates in the general election. Starmer affirmed that a Labour government would always put national security first and make Britain’s armed forces ‘fit to fight’. With ‘the rumble of war rolling across our continent’, it was necessary to increase industrial capacity as an integral part of security (Starmer, 2024c).

Indeed, the connection between security, industry, and economic growth has featured heavily within Labour’s thinking, justified on the changes in the international system and social patriotism. John Healey, prior to Russia’s invasion, declared the importance of domestic industrial capacity and strength. Labour ‘as the Party of working people and trade unions’ sees ‘spending on defence as a force for good in the country’. Above all, it ‘strengthens our UK economy’, our ‘sovereignty and security’ and reduces ‘the risks of relying on foreign supply chains’. (quoted by Mc Loughlin, 2022). From without, the Labour supporting journalist Paul Mason argued that Russia’s invasion offered an opportunity for a ‘Labour Zeitenwende’, a recasting of thinking about security and defence around Russia’s threat and a commitment to spend 3% of gross domestic product (GDP) on defence by the end of the decade. In turn, a ‘belligerent left’ could fuse higher defence spending with redistributive policies. ‘Like Attlee’s generation, we need proudly and unequivocally to associate the Labour brand with rearming Britain’ (Mason, 2022, 2023).

Labour’s manifesto committed to a ‘defence industrial strategy aligning our security and economic priorities’, a strong defence sector, prioritising UK businesses for defence investment, advancing export opportunities in line with international law (Labour Party, 2024). Here, the Party has linked re-equipping domestic industry and productive capacity within the defence sector – shipbuilding, armaments, procurement – and economic growth and job creation. Starmer (2024a) affirmed that this was about ‘British investment, supporting skilled British jobs and supporting British communities … delivering much-needed growth here on our shores’. Healey echoed these sentiments, considering it a ‘national endeavour’, reinforcing the strength of our ‘national security’ and ‘economic growth’, with supply chains reaching across the United Kingdom, as well as learning the lessons from Ukraine. For instance, the importance of innovation and an industrial base that can deter adversaries (see Healey, 2024b; The Mail, 2024).

Elsewhere, Healey has been forthright in condemning Russian aggression, arguing that if Putin wins in Ukraine, he will not stop in Ukraine. ‘The defence of the UK starts in the Ukraine’, with Ukrainians ‘fighting to defend the values we hold dear as well’. Moreover, he has taken a muscular view of Britain’s capacity to act. No longer could we see conflict as something that happens elsewhere. Instead, ‘we must prepare our country – and in particular we must prepare our armed forces – to be able to deter those threats and if necessary to take them on and defeat them’ (Express, 2024). In addition, he questioned the patriotism of the Conservative Party, and it was time to restore Britain’s ‘strength and reputation’, making Britain ‘secure at home and strong abroad’ (Healey, 2024a). Beyond Ukraine, both Starmer and Healey have set out to build on existing commitments, prioritising AUKUS due to shared economic, political and military interests, and dedicating to making it work (Starmer, 2024a; Labour Party, 2024: 120; Lammy and Healey, 2023b).

The Labour Party Manifesto, 2024 Change, encapsulated the themes and ideas set during Labour’s period in opposition in a chapter titled ‘Britain Reconnected’. On Ukraine, the UK’s commitment – military, financial, diplomatic and political support – was steadfast. Moreover, the Party would support efforts to hold Putin’s Russia to account, via a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression. Importantly, Britain would help provide Ukraine with a clear path to NATO membership and look to strengthen multilateral institutions and uphold international law. As for Britain under Labour, it will ‘once again be strong on the world stage, confident in the pursuit of our national interest. Our commitment to NATO as the cornerstone of European and global security is unshakeable’.

Starmer reinforced this message shortly after becoming Prime Minister at the NATO summit in Washington: ‘Britain is back, confident, wanting to play our part on the world stage’, ready to face the generational threat of Russia (Sky News, 2024; Starmer, 2024d). In a wide-ranging speech, he noted the combination of values and interests at the heart of NATO, quoting Bevin that it represented ‘our collective moral and material force’. The Conference had reaffirmed ‘unshakeable support’ for Ukraine, in the pursuit of ‘Ukraine’s ultimate victory’. The alternative was an afront to our values and Russia must face justice for the crimes it had committed.

In November, a parliamentary question revealed the different views of international politics between Corbyn and Starmer. Starmer updated the House of recent meetings with the G20 and COP29. Corbyn questioned the Prime Minister on wars in Sudan, Congo and the need for a ceasefire in Gaza. Regarding Ukraine, Corbyn stated that Russia’s invasion was wrong, but hoped the Prime Minister would set out paths to ending the conflict. America, Britain, and France had recently permitted Ukraine to attack Russian territory with their long-range missiles, not just that which Russia had claimed since 2022 or Crimea since 2014. For Corbyn, this would only exacerbate the conflict, but Starmer’s response was unequivocal. Russia was in breach of the UN charter. He continued:

This is Russian aggression against a sovereign country in Europe – the sort of aggression I did not think I would see again in my lifetime – and we must ensure that Putin does not win this war. That is why I have been so clear in standing with Ukraine for as long as it takes and providing it with whatever resources it needs. (House of Commons, 2024)

Yet, by December 2024, there was a small, albeit important and discernible change in the government’s rhetoric. Rather than outright Ukrainian victory and defeating Russia – a position Starmer (2024e) had pursued at the G20 meeting in Brazil 1 month earlier – the government’s approach was now to put ‘Ukraine in the strongest possible position for negotiations so that they can secure a just and lasting peace on their terms that guarantees their security, independence–and right to choose their future’. This entailed NATO standing with Ukraine and ensuring that the Ukrainians had the necessary capabilities, training and funding.

However, Starmer qualified his approach, wishing to avoid anything that resembled reducing support for Ukraine. Instead, Britain ‘must double down and increase our support for Ukraine and to put Ukraine in the best possible, position whether there’s negotiations or not’ (Daily Record, 2024; The Telegraph: Despatch, 2024). The quickest way for the war to end was for Russia to leave Ukraine. Starmer’s wariness about a peace settlement suggests some concern about its implications for Ukraine, European security and the fillip it provides to other states seeking to redraw boundaries and challenge the global order. Moreover, the change has been driven by external events, rather than from within the Labour government, as there is little evidence of waning support for Ukraine. After all, opposition towards the United Kingdom’s stance to Russian aggression, specifically within the Labour Party and generally, across British politics, remains on the fringes. Indeed, former Corbyn allies now accepted the transfer of weaponry to Ukraine (see The Guardian, 2023). First, the return of Donald Trump to the White House, who had expressed during the Presidential campaign a quick end to the conflict. This is a marked contrast to the outgoing Biden administration. The Democrats had supported Ukraine with considerable amounts of military hardware, diplomatic backing and financial aid. Second, events on the ground, in which Ukraine continued to lose ground. In turn, this fed the view among leading Republicans, particularly those close to Trump, that Ukraine was fighting a war that it could not win.

Thus far, we have seen how Starmer and Healey have forcefully criticised Russian aggression. They have emphasised the militaristic dimensions of the conflict, although their criticism of Russia also centres on rights, values and justice. Lammy’s response has at times, been the reverse, stressing rights, democracy and international organisations, then forms of hard power. In part, this reflects his background as a son of Commonwealth immigrants and a practicing Christian. However, he too accepts power politics, insisting he was a ‘progressive realist’, which values reflect ‘essential self-interest’ and professed that Britain ‘must adapt to the world as it is, not as liberals wish it to be’. For Cowley (2024), this placed Lammy in the tradition of Attlee and Bevin: ‘clear-eyed, practical, pragmatic social democrats whose foreign policy was rooted in patriotism and the economic and social interests of the British people’.

At the Progressive Britain conference, 2022, Lammy, a self-declared Atlanticist (2023b), informed the audience that it was his job to ensure that Labour can ‘restore Britain’s reputation and influence on the global stage’ through a ‘progressive foreign policy . . . designed to improve lives – and spread our values – at home and abroad’. In turn, this entailed standing unshakeably with NATO allies, against dictatorship and imperialism, in favour of freedom and offering all the assistance Ukraine requires. Echoing Starmer, there was no place for ‘false equivalence between Putin’s aggression and NATO’s desire for peace through collective security and common defence’ (Lammy, 2022a). He continued in this vein at Labour Party Conference, 2022, centring on restoring the ‘moral compass to Britain’s foreign policy’ and ‘soft power’ to defend values in a divided world. A Labour government would be a ‘voice for peace, development and freedom across the globe’ (Lammy, 2022b).

In February 2023, Lammy and Healey (2023a) wrote of how proud they were of the United Kingdom in providing vital military assistance, including the Challenger 2 tanks and training Ukrainian forces. Moreover, Labour has an ‘unshakeable commitment to UK national security, our NATO allies, and Ukraine’. Recognising the foreseeable threat posed by Russian aggression, Labour’s highest priority will be ‘security in Europe, the North Atlantic, and the Arctic’. In March 2023, Lammy continued to flesh out his view of international politics and the war in Ukraine. Labour’s role, he argued, was to ‘reconnect us with the rest of the world’ and justified his view on the basis that ‘We should care because we have a responsibility to care’. As for Ukraine, he desired a continuity in approach, and it had ‘concentrated minds because it underlies the way that foreign policy is domestic policy’ (Lammy, 2023).

Starmer, Healey and Lammy all profess a clear belief in Britain’s capacity to act, within Europe but also on the global stage. Starmer and Healey have appeared more at ease throughout the conflict in stressing the traditional power politics dimensions, such as armaments, militarism and deterrence. Lammy, at least initially, focused on imperialism, authoritarianism, sanctions, ‘dirty money’ and Russian oligarchs (House of Commons, 2022), but as the conflict has progressed and since becoming Foreign Secretary, has also been forthright in accepting that unwarranted aggression must be resisted with force (Lammy, 2024). In practice, and despite different inspirations, emphases and details, the three men share the same end point, namely Britain has a global role, optimised by its ‘ironclad’ support for Ukraine, European security, NATO and maintaining the special relationship with America.

Conclusion

Within British politics, we can observe a broad elite consensus towards supporting Ukrainian sovereignty, territorial integrity and resisting Russian aggression. The bulk of the Labour Party and wider Labour movement has mostly accepted the Party leadership’s approach on the matter. This is not to say the entirety of the British left supports the Labour leadership’s approach (Beckett, 2022; Mc Loughlin, 2022), nor are there no subtle differences among the Party leadership. Yet, this is quite an achievement, especially when you consider the broad coalition of the Labour Party in which it is ‘notoriously difficult for it to reach a consensus on foreign policy’ (Schreiner, 2008: 208). In turn, the general level of intra- and inter-party unity has given the Starmer leadership room for manoeuvre, space to continue to emphasise his ‘ironclad’ support for Ukraine, largely free from elite-level and public criticism.

Critics of Labour’s approach to international affairs under Starmer offer a range of arguments, although they generally fit into Labour’s approach being either insufficiently socialist, capitulating to conservative or establishment ideas, or an unwillingness to accept British decline. Yet, they have received shortchange from Starmer and those around him. Britain, he said, ‘belongs on the world stage’ and while Britain and NATO do not seek conflict, ‘the best way to avoid it is to prepare for it’ (Starmer, 2024e). Elsewhere, the leadership have evoked the legacies of Attlee and Bevin, sharing their belief that the British state can act in a muscular but also benevolent fashion on the world stage and deliver social reform at home. They have celebrated the commitment of Britain’s armed forces, co-opted the Union Flag and stressed economic security at home.

In addition, Starmer has confronted the challenge left by the Corbyn leadership, namely that the Party was unpatriotic and weak and international matters. The war in Ukraine has opened new possibilities for the Labour leadership, re-emphasising the Party’s mainstream and traditional patriotism at home and abroad, and re-committing the Party to upholding a global role. That said, this has not been without problems, such as refusing to set a specific date on increasing defence spending to 2.5% of GDP (or higher), financial savings at the Ministry of Defence and the decommissioning of military assets and the government’s handling of the Chagos Islands. Still, what stands out about Labour’s criticism of the Conservative government was not the substance of the policy: equipping Ukraine to resist an aggressor and the protection and maintenance of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. Instead, criticism focused on detail or implementation, for instance, accepting too few Ukrainian families in the United Kingdom, weak economic and political sanctions on Russian oligarchs and those close to the Putin regime and accusing the government of being too slow or sending too few military assets. Here, there is a historical overlap with WW2. Hayhurst (2021: 353) writes that ‘whenever Labour MPs criticised Churchill’s war policy it was for being too timid or too passive, too slow to open the Second Front too reluctant to democratise the army and allow our own “Rommels” to rise to the top’.

Whilst we see continuinty between Conservative and Labour governments, it is important to focus on the justification. After all, parties can pursue the same policy but for distinct reasons. Therefore, it is important to be clear on both the means and the ends. As such, critics fail to appreciate the nuances of Labour’s internationalism and its underlying principles. The Starmer government is firmly rooted in Labour’s internationalism. On one hand, he accepts the responsibilities of being a leading power in the international system, and shares with many other contemporary and historical Labour figures, that peace is maintained through the threat and, at times, using force. Here, Labour’s ‘ironclad’ commitment to Ukraine since the invasion in 2022, has prioritised Ukrainian sovereignty, territorial integrity and removal of Russian forces from Ukrainian territory. For Labour, Russia is the aggressor, not NATO, the European Union or America. Consequently, they have condemened Russia’s actions, militarilly, economically, legally and morally and here,we can observe the influence of other principles and values, particularly aspects of liberalism. For instance, an emphasis on multilateralism, international organisations such as the United Nations and NATO, justice regarding defending what they see as an innocent party, pursuing the aggressor through international institutions, and the pursuit of peace.

Looking ahead, it is feasible that international politics will play a defining role for a Labour government. For instance, Ukraine and European security, the Indo-Pacific and upholding the liberal, rules-based order. Regarding Ukraine, the fallout from the invasion continues to unfold – politically, economically and socially – and at the time of writing (late-2024) the conflict is ongoing. The new Trump presidency has signalled its intention to negotiate a settlement and end the conflict. However, there is no certainty that this will be successful, either in the short-term of bringing an end to the fighting or long-term in preventing Russian aggression towards Ukraine and its covert and unconventional attacks on Europe. Indeed, there remains a very real prospect that the war could spill over; in Europe, along NATOs eastern flank where British battalions have been stationed, or further still, in the Indo-Pacific.

Much depends on the content of a settlement between Ukraine and Russia and the objectives of the Trump presidency, both for Ukraine and European security. Russia is unlikely to return its captured territory, including Crimea, and remove its forces. Therefore, the Labour government will have to reset its aims. In part, this has already begun, with a discernible change in emphasis, away from outright victory towards strengthening the Ukrainian position in the event of peace talks. Yet, Starmer’s qualified support for this policy suggests that it is not his preferred outcome. Regardless, Ukraine will demand security guarantees. Therefore, even if fighting ceases, the Labour government will still have to grapple with Ukrainian security, whether in relation to diplomatic support, financial aid, training Ukrainian troops, supplying weaponry or should Ukraine accede into NATO, the deployment of British armed forces as a deterrent against further Russian aggression.

To close, it is worth remembering that the Party initially criticised aspects of the Conservative government’s ‘tilt’ towards the Indo-Pacific and the idea of ‘Global Britain’, rejected as an ‘empty slogan’. However, the Party’s response to the Ukraine–Russia war and other international challenges, suggests a leadership at ease with Britain playing its traditional role in world politics. ‘Under my leadership, Britain will never be absent from the world table . . . In this moment, when global challenges are affecting us at home, I take the view, more than ever, that British leadership matters’ (quoted by The Telegraph, 2024). Therefore, we might conclude that the criticism of ‘Global Britain’ is in the details, not the enduring assumption of Labour Prime Minister’s that Britain has a unique and distinctive role on the global stage.

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Jasper Miles

References

Ashcroft

(2020) Diagnosis of Defeat: Labour’s Turn to Smell the Coffee. London: Lord Ashcroft Polls.

Barber

(1976) Who Makes British Foreign Policy?. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Beckett

(2022) Pacifists are being elbowed out of British politics just when we need them most. The Guardian, 3 March. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/03/pacifists-british-politics-anti-war-putin-ukraine-crisis (accessed 22 June 2023)

Beech

(2016) Internationalism. In: Hickson

(ed.) Rebuilding Social Democracy: Core Principles for the Centre Left. Bristol: Policy Press, pp.127–140.

Beech

Hickson

(2007) Labour’s Thinkers: The Intellectual Roots of Labour From Tawney to Gordon Brown. London: I.B. Tauris.

Brivati

(2004 [2003]) Internationalism. In: Plant

Beech

Hickson

(eds) The Struggle for Labour’s Soul. London: Routledge, pp.229–244.

Buller

Harrison

(2000) New Labour as a ‘good international citizen’: Normative theory and UK foreign policy. In: Little

Wickham-Jones

(eds) New Labour’s Foreign Policy: A New Moral Crusade. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp.77–89.

Callaghan

(1987) Time and Chance. London: Collins.

Callaghan

(2007) The Labour Party and Foreign Policy: A History. London: Routledge.

10.

Callaghan

(2008) The foreign policy of the Attlee government, 1945–50. In: Corthorn

Davis

(eds) The British Labour Party and the Wider World: Domestic Politics, International and Foreign Policy. London: I.B. Tauris, pp.110–126.

11.

Cook

(1997) British Foreign Policy Speech, 12 May. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/1997/may/12/indonesia.ethicalforeignpolicy

12.

Cook

(1999) Kosovo (Official Report), 18 January, vol. 323, col. 576.

13.

Corthorn

Davis

(2008) The British Labour Party and the Wider World: Domestic Politics, Internationalism and Foreign Policy. London: I.B. Tauris.

14.

Cowley

(2024) The Lammy doctrine. New Statesman, 26 June. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/03/pacifists-british-politics-anti-war-putin-ukraine-crisis (accessed 30 December 2024).

15.

Crossman

(1975) The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1. London: Hamish Hamilton/Jonathan Cape.

16.

Daddow

Gaskarth

(2011) British Foreign Policy: The New Labour Years. Hampshire: Palgrave.

17.

Daily Record (2024) Keir Starmer says UK must stand with Ukraine but refuses to support killing of Russian general. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=smfhIKD7mUs (accessed 20 December 2024).

18.

Embery

(2020) Despised: Why the Modern Left Loathes the Working Class. London: Polity Press.

19.

Engelen

Erturk

Froud

Johal

Leaver

Moran

Nilsson

Williams

(2011) After the Great Complacence: Financial crisis and the politics of reform. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

20.

Express (2024) Britain is too weak to fight Russia warns labour defence chief John Healey. Express, 2 March. Available at: https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/1873050/Britain-too-weak-to-fight-Russia (accessed 1 July 2024).

21.

Freeden

(1996) Ideologies and Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

22.

Garnett

Johnson

(2021) Jeremy Corbyn’s foreign policy. In: Crines

(ed.) Corbynism in Perspective: The Labour Party Under Jeremy Corbyn. Newcastle upon Tyne: Agenda Publishing, pp.205–234.

23.

Goes

(2021) Wrapped up in the Union Jack: Starmer’s patriotic turn. Renewal: Journal of Social Democracy 29(1): 49–59.

24.

Gordon

(1969) Conflict and Consensus in Labour’s Foreign Policy, 1914–1965. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

25.

Hain

(2016) No such place as ‘abroad’: A foreign policy for progressives. In: Nandy

Lucas

Bowers

(eds) The Alternative: Towards a New Progressive Politics. London: Biteback, pp.99–115.

26.

Hassan

Shaw

(2019) The People’s Flag and the Union Jack: An Alternative History of Britain and the Labour Party. London: Biteback.

27.

Hayhurst

(2021) Labour and the Patriot Game. The Political Quarterly 92(2): 352–359.

28.

Healey

(2021) Labour’s pledges on national security and Armed Forces. Yorkshire Post, 29 September. Available at: https://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/news/opinion/columnists/labours-pledges-on-national-security-and-armed-forces-john-healey-3399563 (accessed 22 June 2023).

29.

Healey

(2023a) Speech to RUSI, 7 February. Available at: https://labourlist.org/2023/02/healey-britain-needs-a-national-strategy-which-is-relentlessly-pragmatic/ (accessed 22 June 2023)

30.

Healey

(2023b) John Healey comment. The Times, 27 December.

31.

Healey

(2024a) Labour’s triple lick will keep Britain safe while supporting good jobs across the UK. Sun, 2 June. Available at: https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/28262648/labours-triple-lock-keep-britain-safe-john-healey/ (accessed 30 December 2024).

32.

Healey

(2024b) Defence secretary at the London defence conference, 2 December. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/defence-secretary-at-the-london-defence-conference (accessed 30 December 2024).

33.

Hickson

Miles

(2018) Social democratic Euroscepticism: Labour’s neglected tradition. British Journal of Politics and International Relations 20(4): 864–879.

34.

Hickson

Miles

(2020) James Cllaghan: An Underrated Prime Minister. London: Biteback

35.

Hickson

Miles

Taylor

(2020) Peter Shore: Labour’s Forgotten Patriot. London: Biteback.

36.

House of Commons (2015) Col. 340-348 & 483-486, 2 December. Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Comons/2015-12-02/debates/15120254000002/ISILInSyria (accessed 11 February 2025).

37.

House of Commons (2022) 709, no. 122 (Lammy, ‘The Twisted Lies of Imperialism’), 22 February. Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2022-02-23/debates/8073B01E-6C2E-4416-9CC0-A109AD8A8E58/CounteringRussianAggressionAndTacklingIllicitFinance (accessed 11 February 2025).

38.

House of Commons (2024) 757, col. 385, 21 November. Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2024-11-21/debates/09F25950-9236-4DA3-92DE-CC3BCABA2BC3/G20AndCOP29Summits (accessed 11 February 2025).

39.

Howe

(2000) Labour and international affairs. In: Tanner

Thane

Tiratsoo

(eds) Labour’s First Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.119–150.

40.

Independent (2024a) UK’s nuclear deterrent ‘bedrock’ of Labour’s plan to keep Britain safe – Starmer. Independent, 11 April. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/labour-barrowinfurness-rishi-sunak-john-healey-aukus-b2527431.html (accessed 30 December 2024).

41.

Independent (2024b) Labour overtakes Tories on defence as Poll shows damage of D-Day blunder. Independent, 13 June. Available at: https://inews.co.uk/news/politics/labour-trusted-more-national-security-damage-d-day-blunder-3109481 (accessed 26 June 2024).

42.

Jackson

(2016) Labour and the nation. Fabian Review, Autumn, pp.8–11.

43.

Labour Party (2024) Change. London: Labour Party.

44.

Lammy

(2022a) Britain at its best is a beating heart of progress. In: Speech to the annual progressive Britain conference, Liverpool, 14 May.

45.

Lammy

(2022b) A United Kingdom that looks outwards instead of inwards. In: Speech to the labour party conference, Liverpool, 27 September.

46.

Lammy

(2023a) What is labour’s foreign policy? Speech to Chatham House, 24 January. Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/members-event/what-labours-foreign-policy (accessed 22 June 2023).

47.

Lammy

(2023b) In Conversation With David Lammy MP. London: Mile End Institute, Queen Mary, University of London. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XKUwFatGc5g (accessed 22 June 2023).

48.

Lammy

(2024) Putin only responds to strength. We must stand as strong as the Ukrainian people: UK Statement at the UN Security Council, 18 November. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/putin-only-responds-to-strength-we-must-stand-as-strong-as-the-ukrainian-people-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council (accessed 30 December 2024).

49.

Lammy

Healey

(2023a) A labour-led Britain will stand with the EU and NATO to defend Ukraine. Foreign Policy, 17 February.

50.

Lammy

Healey

(2023b) UK Labour Party’s Foreign and Defence Priorities: A Conversation with David Lammy and John Healey, Wilson Centre, 22 September. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=38_QN7sNg9o (accessed 11 February 2025).

51.

Lanoszka

Rogers

(2022) ‘Global Britain’ and the Black Sea region. Council on Geostrategy, Policy Paper no. SBIPP 07, March, pp.1–33.

52.

Little

Wickham-Jones

(2000) New Labour’s Foreign Policy: A New Moral Crusade? Manchester: Manchester University Press.

53.

Mason

(2022) Paul Mason’s diary: My bid to become a labour MP and why we must not let Ukraine fade into the background. New Statesman, 8 June. Available at: https://www.newstatesman.com/diary/2022/06/paul-masons-diary-my-bid-to-become-a-labour-mp-and-why-we-must-not-let-ukraine-fade-into-the-background (accessed 30 December 2024).

54.

Mason

(2023) As war ranges in Ukraine, rearming the UK must be a proud part of labour’s brand. LabourList, 27 February. Available at: https://labourlist.org/2023/02/as-war-rages-in-ukraine-rearming-the-uk-must-be-a-proud-part-of-labours-brand/

55.

Mattinson

(2020) Beyond the Red Wall: Why Labour Lost, How the Conservatives Won and What Will Happen Next? London: Biteback.

56.

McCourt

(2011) The new labour governments and Britain’s role in the world. In: Daddow

Gaskarth

(eds) British Foreign Policy: The New Labour Years. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.31–47.

57.

Mc Loughlin

(2022) Ukraine, the British left, and the military-industrial complex. Available at: https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/117596/1/politicsandpolicy_2022_10_24_ukraine_the_british_left_and_the_military_industrial_complex.pdf (accessed 30 December 2024).

58.

Miles

(2023) The EU referendum and British politics. In: Beech

Lee

(eds) Conservative Governments in the Age of Brexit. Cham: Springer, pp.65–86.

59.

Oliver

(2018) Defence. In: Beech

Hickson

Plant

(eds) The Struggle for Labour’s Soul: Understanding the Labour Party’s Political Thought, 2nd edn. London: Routledge, pp.172–186.

60.

Pearce

(2002) Denis Healey: A Life in Our Times. London: Little, Brown and Company.

61.

Phythian

(2008) From Clinton to Bush: New Labour, the USA and the Iraq War. In: Corthorn P, and Davis, The British Labour Party and the Wider World: Domestic Politics, Internationalism and Foreign Policy, London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 209–226

62.

Rayson

(2020) The Fall of the Red Wall: ‘The Labour Party No Longer Represents People Like Us’ (Vellum). Chicago, IL: Independently Published.

63.

Rentoul

(2022) War in Ukraine has already influenced British politics. Independent, 27 February. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/war-ukraine-russia-british-politics-b2023920.html (accessed 30 June 2023)

64.

Rose

(2022) Ukraine offers Britain a new role in international affairs. Political Insight 13: 8–10.

65.

Sargeant

(2022) Labour should not shun the Indo-Pacific. LabourList Available at: https://labourlist.org/2022/06/labour-should-not-shun-the-indo-pacific/ (accessed 22 June 2023).

66.

Schreiner

(2008) Humanitarian Intervention, the Labour Party and the Press: the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. In Corthorn P and Davis J, The British Labour Party and the Wider World: Domestic Politics, Internationalism and Foreign Policy, London: I.B Tauris, pp. 190-208

67.

Shrimsley

(2020) Labour needs a Tony Blair for the twenties. Financial Times, 6 January.

68.

Sky News (2024) Sir Keir Starmer says Britain ‘is back’ on the world stage and pledges support for Ukraine. Sky News, 12 July. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JB4JkA_dybY (accessed 20 December 2024).

69.

Soifer

(2009) What is a critical juncture? Permissive and productive conditions in historical causation. In: Paper presented at APSA, Toronto, ON, Canada, 3 September.

70.

Soifer

(2012) The causal logic of critical junctures. Comparative Political Studies 45(12): 1572–1597.

71.

Spear

(1992) The Labour Party and foreign policy. In: Smith

Spear

(eds) The Changing Labour Party. London: Routledge, pp.185–200.

72.

Stafford

(2021) The patriotism problem. Renewal: Journal of Social Democracy 29: 5–10.

73.

Starmer

(2020) Speech to the conference (Labour Connected), 22 September. Available at: https://www.laboursoutheast.org.uk/news/2020/09/22/keir-starmers-speech-at-labour-connected/ (accessed 30 June 2023).

74.

Starmer

(2022) Under my leadership, Labour’s commitment to NATO is unshakeable. The Guardian, 10 February. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/feb/10/labour-nato-british-left-ukraine-keir-starmer (accessed 30 June 2023).

75.

Starmer

(2024a) My Commitment to the UK’s nuclear deterrent is… Unshakeable. Absolute. Total. Daily Mail. 11 April. Available at: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-13299023/KEIR-STARMER-commitment-UKs-nuclear-deterrent-Unshakeable-Absolute-Total.html (accessed 30 December 2024).

76.

Starmer

(2024b) Country first, party second. The Labour Party, 27 May. Available at: https://labour.org.uk/updates/press-releases/keir-starmer-speech-country-first-party-second/ (accessed 30 December 2024).

77.

Starmer

(2024c) Speech at the fusiliers Museum. Bury, 3 June. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qy1cb-XsQyk (accessed 30 December 2024).

78.

Starmer

(2024d) PM’s remarks at the NATO summit press conference in Washington D.C, 11 July. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-remarks-at-the-nato-summit-press-conference-11-july-2024 (accessed 20 December 2024).

79.

Starmer

(2024e) Speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet, London, 2 December. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-at-lord-mayors-banquet-2-december-2024 (accessed 20 December 2024).

80.

Taylor

(1990) Patriotism, history and the left in Twentieth-Century Britain. The Historical Journal 33(4): 971–987.

81.

The Guardian (2023) Labour left breaks with Jeremy Corbyn over sending weapons to Ukraine. The Guardian, 26 February. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2023/feb/26/labour-left-breaks-with-jeremy-corbyn-over-sending-weapons-to-ukraine (accessed 30 June 2024).

82.

The Guardian (2024) John Healey: Frontbench veteran uniquely equipped to ready labour for office. The Guardian, 22 March. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2024/mar/22/john-healey-frontbench-veteran-uniquely-equipped-to-ready-labour-for-office (accessed 30 December 2024).

83.

The Mail (2024) Sir Keir Starmer makes nuclear pledge on visit to BAE in Barrow. The Mail, 12 April. https://www.nwemail.co.uk/news/24249990.labour-leader-sir-keir-starmer-makes-nuclear-pledge-visit-bae/ (30 December 2024).

84.

The Telegraph: Despatch (2024) Keir Starmer: Putin’s ‘strategic mistakes’ leave NATO stronger. The Telegraph: Despatch, 17 December. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JIooKBBhY0s (accessed 20 December 2024).

85.

The Telegraph (2024) In full – G20: Keir Starmer speech to ‘shore up support for Ukraine’. The Telegraph, 19 November. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kHlqRQ3Xsiw (accessed 29 December 2024).

86.

Thorpe

(2008 [2007]) Introduction. In: Corthorn

Davis

(eds) The British Labour Party and the Wider World: Domestic Politics, Internationalism and Foreign Policy. London: I.B. Tauris, pp.1–24.

87.

Vickers

(2000) Labour’s search for a Third Way in foreign policy. In: Little

Wickham-Hones

(eds) New Labour Foreign Policy: A New Moral Crusade? Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp.33–48.

88.

Vickers

(2003) Labour and the World, Volume One: The Evolution of Labour’s Foreign Policy, 1900–1951. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

89.

Vickers

(2011) Labour and the World, Volume Two: Labour’s Foreign Policy Since 1951. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

90.

Wickham-Jones

(2000) Labour’s trajectory in foreign affairs: The moral crusade of a pivotal power. In: Little

Wickham-Hones

(eds) New Labour Foreign Policy: A New Moral Crusade? Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp.3–32.

91.

Wallace

(1991) Foreign Policy and national identity in the United Kingdom, International Affairs, 67(1), pp. 65–80.

92.

Windrich

(1952) British Labour’s Foreign Policy. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

93.

Winkler

(1994) Paths Not Taken: British Labour and International Policy in the 1920s. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press.

94.

YouGov (2024) Monthly Tracker – Which political party would be the best at handling defence and security? Available at: https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/trackers/defence-and-security (accessed 29 December 2024).

95.

Young

(1997) Foreign, defence and European affairs. In: Brivati

Bale

(eds) New Labour in Power: Precedents and Prospects. London: Routledge, pp.137–155.

Reframing internationalism and patriotism: The Labour Party and the Ukraine–Russia war

Abstract

Keywords

Introduction

Labour’s internationalism

Labour’s patriotism

Responding to the Ukraine–Russia war

Conclusion

Footnotes

Funding

ORCID iD

References