Abstract
Decentralisation is frequently justified in terms of representation and participation, with its advocates emphasising the capacity of regional institutions to remedy the democratic deficiencies of the centre. Yet empirical examinations of the democratic performance of regional governing systems are scarce, and there is no analysis that systematically compares the operation of different tiers within the same state. This article responds to this significant lacuna. Drawing upon the tools of cross-national comparison, it develops an analytical framework that evaluates the effects of regional and national institutions on the dispersal of electoral payoffs. This framework is applied to the United Kingdom, to compare the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales with Westminster. Through this analysis, the article provides important empirical insights regarding the difference wrought by decentralisation and, in turn, contributes to a burgeoning body of literature that offers a more critical assessment of the relationship between decentralisation and such democratic goods.
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