The moderating role of interest in politics and news consumption in the relationship between political ideology and beliefs about science and scientists in the United States

Abstract

In the United States, an ideological and partisan divide in beliefs about science is well documented. In this study, we further examine this partisan divide and how this relationship is conditioned on levels of political interest and news consumption. Analyzing data from three nationally representative U.S. surveys, we replicate past research and find ideological divisions in evaluations of, and beliefs about, science and scientists. We then show that greater interest in politics and news consumption is more strongly related to positive beliefs about science and scientists among liberals than among moderates and conservatives.

Keywords

ideology and science political polarization politicization of science science beliefs news use

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