Lay skepticism toward empirically supported scientific research has increased significantly in recent years. Given that part of the social contract of science is the betterment of society, it is critical for the scientific community to identify factors underlying public dismissal versus support of scientific evidence. The current study explores how individual differences in political ideology influence acceptance of factual and nonfactual information, with differences in truth-seeking values as a potential mediating variable. Participants rated their agreement with true and untrue (i.e., nonempirically supported) statements and completed self-report assessments of political ideology and personal endorsement of values associated with promoting truth. More politically, liberal individuals reported greater agreement with both scientific facts and untrue statements. Furthermore, endorsement of truth-seeking values mediated the relation between liberal ideology and agreement with facts (but not nonfactual statements). Results suggest that interventions to increase individuals’ acceptance of facts may benefit from stimulating greater support for truth-seeking values and behavior.
AllcottH.GentzkowM. (2017).
Social media and fake news in the 2016 election. Journal of Economic Perspectives,
31, 211–236. doi:10.3386/w23089
2.
BaileyJ. M. (2019).
How to ruin sex research. Archives of Sexual Behavior,
48, 1007–1011. doi:10.1007/s10508-019-1420-y
3.
BrandtM. J.ReynaC.ChambersJ. R.CrawfordJ. T.WetherellG. (2014).
The ideological-conflict hypothesis: Intolerance among both liberals and conservatives. Current Directions in Psychological Sciences,
23, 27–34.
4.
CiscarJ.IglesiasA.FeyenL.SzaboL.RegemorterV.AmelungB., . . . SoriaA. (2011).
Physical and economic consequences of climate change in Europe. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America,
108, 2678–2683. doi:10.1073/pnas.1011612108
5.
ClobertM.SaroglouV. (2015).
Religion, paranormal beliefs, and distrust in science: Comparing east versus west. Archive for the Psychology of Religion,
37, 185–199. doi:10.1163/15736121-12341302
6.
CrawfordJ. T. (2014).
Ideological symmetries and asymmetries in political intolerance and prejudice toward political activist groups. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
55, 284–298.
7.
CrowsonH. (2009).
Are all conservatives alike? A study of the psychological correlates of cultural and economic conservatism. The Journal of Psychology,
143, 449–463. doi:10.3200/JRL.143.5.449-463
8.
FergusonC. J. (2009).
An effect size primer: A guide for clinicians and researchers. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice,
40(5), 532–538.
9.
FestingerL. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance.
Palo Alto, CA:
Stanford University Press.
10.
GauchatG. (2012).
Politicization of science in the public sphere: A study of public trust in the United States. American Sociological Review,
77, 167–187. doi:10.1177/0003122412438225
11.
GauchatG. (2015).
The political context of science in the United States: Public acceptance of evidence-based policy and science funding. Social Forces,
94, 723–746.
12.
GeherG.GambacortaD. (2010).
Evolution is not relevant to sex differences in humans because I want it that way! Evidence for the politicization of human evolutionary psychology. EvoS Journal: The Journal of the Evolutionary Studies Consortium,
2, 32–47.
13.
GrahamJ.HaidtJ.NosekB. A. (2009).
Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
96, 1029–1046. doi:10.1037/a0015141
HamiltonL. C. (2015).
Conservative and liberal views of science, does trust depend on topic? (Regional Issue Brief No. 45). Durham, NH: University of New Hampshire.
16.
HayesA. F. (2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A regression-based approach.
New York, NY:
The Guilford Press.
17.
HogeD.PetrilloG.SmithE. (1982).
Transmission of religious and social values from parents to teenage children. Journal of Marriage and Family,
44, 569–580. doi:10.2307/351580
18.
JostJ. T. (2006).
The end of the end of ideology. American Psychologist,
61(7), 651–670. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.61.7.651
19.
KuhnT. S. (1977).
Objectivity, value judgment, and theory choice. In T. S. Kuhn (Ed.). The essential tension: selected studies in scientific tradition and change (pp. 320–339). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
20.
LeoneL.ChirumboloA.DesimoniM. (2012).
The impact of the HEXACO personality model in predicting socio-political attitudes: The moderating role of interest in politics. Personality and Individual Differences,
52, 416–421. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2011.10.049
21.
McCrightA. (2011).
Political orientation moderates Americans’ beliefs and concern about climate change. Climatic Change,
104, 243–253. doi:10.1007/s10584-010-9946-y
22.
MunroG. D. (2010).
The scientific impotence excuse: Discounting belief‐threatening scientific abstracts. Journal of Applied Social Psychology,
40, 579–600.
23.
NilssonA.ErlandssonA.VästfjällD. (2019).
The complex relation between receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit and political ideology. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
45, 1440–1454. doi:10.1177/0146167219830415
24.
Pfattheicher, S., & Schindler, S. (2016). Misperceiving Bullshit as Profound Is Associated with Favorable Views of Cruz, Rubio, Trump and Conservatism. PLoS ONE, 11, e0153419.
25.
PopperK. R. (1972). Objective knowledge (Vol.
360).
Oxford, England:
Oxford University Press.
26.
Prentice, D. A., & Miller, D. T. (1992). When small effects are impressive. Psychological Bulletin, 112, 160–164.
27.
Rabinowitz, M., Latella, L., Stern, C., & Jost, JT. (2016) Beliefs about Childhood Vaccination in the United States: Political Ideology, False Consensus, and the Illusion of Uniqueness. PLoS ONE, 11, e0158382.
28.
RoccasS.SagivL.SchwartzS. H.KnafoA. (2002).
The big five personality factors and personal values. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
28, 789–801. doi:10.1177/0146167202289008
29.
RodriguezC. G.MoskowitzJ. P.SalemR. M.DittoP. H. (2017).
Partisan selective exposure: The role of party, ideology and ideological extremity over time. Translational Issues in Psychological Science,
3, 254–271. doi:10.1037/tps0000121
30.
SalviC.CristoforiI.GrafmanJ.BeemanM. (2016).
Rapid communication: The politics of insight. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology,
69, 1064–1072. doi:10.1080/17470218.2015.1136338
31.
SchwartzS.CoteJ.ArnettJ. (2005).
Identity and agency in emerging adulthood: Two developmental routes in the individualization process. Youth & Society,
37, 201–229. doi:10.1177/0044118X05275965
32.
ShearmanS.LevineT. (2006).
Dogmatism updated: A scale revision and validation. Communication Quarterly,
54, 275–291.
33.
SternC.WestT. V.JostJ. T.RuleN. O. (2013).
The politics of gaydar: Ideological differences in the use of gendered cues in categorizing sexual orientation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
104, 520–541. doi:10.1037/a0031187
Van LeeuwenF.ParkJ. (2009).
Perceptions of social dangers, moral foundations, and political orientation. Personality and Individual Differences,
47, 169–173. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2009.02.017
37.
WinegardB.ClarkC.HastyC. R.BaumeisterR. (2018). Equalitarianism: A source of liberal bias. SSRN Electronic Journal. Advance online publication. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3175680
