This article examines whether the collective reputation of the regions of Bordeaux, Burgundy, Champagne and the Rhône Valley benefits all wine producers in these areas. The analysis is based on a sample of 559 French companies for the period 2014-2023. The results demonstrate higher economic margins for firms from Burgundy and Champagne, suggesting that these firms are able to charge higher prices due to a superior collective reputation. This outcome is consistent across a range of firm sizes and ownership structures, including private firms and cooperatives. While firms from Burgundy have higher returns on assets, the cooperatives from Champagne exhibit the most significant outperformance. Conversely, lower economic margins are observed for firms from Bordeaux, indicating that enhanced individual reputation may offer greater benefits for firms in this region.
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