Empathy machines

Abstract

A major claim about virtual reality (VR) is that it can foster empathy through digital simulations. This article argues, however, that technologies intended to foster empathy merely presume to acknowledge the experience of another, but fail to do so in any meaningful way. With empathy, the experiential grounds upon which ethical and moral arguments are made require an essential transmissibility, and that which cannot be expressed in seemingly ‘universal’ terms cannot be acknowledged. This article makes its arguments through a discussion of VR as an ‘empathy machine’, and contextualizes empathy in digital media by suggesting it repeats not a psychological construct, but a concept derived from late 19th-century German aesthetic theory and its conceptualization of Einfühlung. It proposes radical compassion as an alternative to empathy, and suggests that empathy is a limiting and problematic concept that effaces another’s experience unless it can be made sensible.