This article explores the differences in student performance outcomes when school officials are either elected or appointed to their posts. If appointed officials are insulated by at least one level of bureaucracy, they might be more inclined to implement unpopular policies to impact student performance. Findings indicate that there are no differences in student performance when the school superintendent or the school board is appointed rather than elected. It is found that there is a slight positive difference in outcomes when the superintendent is elected as opposed to when the school board is elected.
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