Elected versus Appointed County Commission Executives: Race,Political Favors and Support Facilities

Abstract

In this paper we explore how blacks influence expenditure and employment decisions of county commission executives. We also explore whether or not this influence varies when county commission executives are elected verses appointed to their positions. The desire to earn votes could mean that elected officials treat voting populations, including blacks, in a manner that is distinctly different from their appointed counterparts. We find that in areas where there is more discretion, elected officials tend to have higher per capita expenditures. However, there does not appear to be any difference in employment practices. We find that having a larger black population is positively related with discretionary spending and employment.

Keywords

Government expenditures Representative democracy Public input

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