Abstract
How do city residents assign credit to city officials for good policy outcomes? And, do credit claims by city officials influence how citizens perceive their performance in office? To address these questions, this article turns to matters of public safety in Mexico City, where a substantial reduction in crime coincided with constitutional amendments, triggering intense debate over credit allocation for improving crime between the City government and borough mayors despite the former having sole structural authority over policing. I find that partisanship significantly shapes whether city residents credit the city government or boroughs for crime reduction, while knowledge about how the city is governed does not. Moreover, my findings indicate that borough mayors' credit claims do not enhance perceptions of their performance in office but instead diminish the City government's reputation. These findings underscore that delivering public goods does not guarantee political benefit, nor do deceptive credit claims.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
