This article explores economic consequences of impact fees on local economic development and job growth. The authors focus on the implied contractual relationship between local governments and the development community in shaping patterns of economic growth in the community. Pooled time series cross-section analyses are employed to estimate economic consequences of impact fees in 66 Florida counties from 1991 to 2001. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that impact fees increase development costs and impede economic development, the authors report that implementation of impact fee systems enhances economic performance and lead to job growth.
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