This article addresses the interaction between ordinary knowing and policy science
knowledge and the implications of this interaction for knowledge utilization. The role of
ordinary knowing is assessed from two perspectives. First, the significance of evolu tionary epistemologies is discussed. Second, communication and persuasion theory as
they are related to ordinary knowledge are explicated. The implications of these two
perspectives are then assessed.
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