Abstract
Well-resourced interest groups often have the upper hand in legislative processes. They can invest in professional lobbying, build personal relationships with lawmakers, and supply sophisticated technical and political information during policy deliberations. Nonetheless, interest groups that lack capacity to intensively lobby can seek influence in other ways, for example, by giving testimony or submitting position letters intermittently. We argue that legislators have incentives to pay attention to intermittent advocacy because it provides constituency perspectives that might not otherwise be available to legislators. Intermittent advocacy can be especially informative when done in conjunction with other groups. We leverage a unique opportunity to observe both professional lobbying and position letters on bills introduced in the California State Legislature, focusing on bills that address the impacts of climate change—an issue mobilizing a range of organized interests and posing great risks to modern society. We develop an index of interest group diversity and show that letters of support from a diverse set of small, less politically active groups increase the likelihood that a bill passes committee. Our findings illuminate how advocacy tactics differ by organization type and demonstrate that groups that lack capacity to intensively lobby can influence legislative outcomes.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
