Evidence regarding the influence of campaign donations and lobbying efforts on legislative behavior is mixed. Much research—not to mention conventional wisdom—suggests that well-funded interest groups exploit their resource advantage by making campaign contributions and deploying lobbyists to gain informational advantages and influence legislation. Using contribution data, information about interest group support for legislation, and a rare data set—constituent contacts to six state legislative offices—this paper examines how interest group donations and constituent activism influence outcomes. Although the amount of money contributed by groups supporting or opposing a bill did not affect its prospects, constituent contacts had a substantial impact. Political expenditures by business firms appear primarily to sustain an entrenched class of lobbyists and consultants.
AlexanderRaquel M.MazzaStephen W.ScholzSusan. 2009. “Measuring Rates of Return for Lobbying Expenditures: An Empirical Case Study of Tax Breaks for Multinational Corporations.” Journal of Law and Politics25 (401-458.)
2.
AnsolabehereStephende FigueiredoJohn M.SnyderJames M.Jr.2003. “Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?” Journal of Economic Perspectives17 (1): 105–30.
3.
ArnoldDouglas. 1990. The Logic of Congressional Action. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
4.
Austen-SmithDavid. 1987. “Interest Groups, Campaign Contributions, and Probabilistic Voting.” Public Choice54:123–39.
5.
BaronDavid P.1989. “Service-Induced Campaign Contributions and the Electoral Equilibrium.” Quarterly Journal of Economics104:45–72.
6.
BarroRobert. 1973. “The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model.” Public Choice14:19–42.
7.
BartelsLarry. 1991. “Constituency Opinion and Congressional Policy Making: The Reagan Defense Buildup.” American Political Science Review85:457–74.
8.
BaumgartnerFrank R.BerryJeffrey M.HojnackiMarieKimballDavid C.LeechBeth L. 2009. Lobbying and Policy Changes: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
9.
BiancoWilliam. 1994. Trust: Representatives and Constituents. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
10.
BishinBenjamin G. “Constituency Influence in Congress: Does Subconstituency Matter?” Legislative Studies Quarterly25 (3): 389–415.
BronarsStephen G.LottJohn R. 1998. “Do Campaign Contributions Alter How a Politician Votes? Or, Do Donors Support Candidates Who Value the Same Things that They Do?” Journal of Law & Economics40:317–50.
13.
CnuddeCharles F.McCroneDonald J. 1966. “The Linkage between Constituency Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior: A Causal Model.” American Political Science Review60 (1): 66–72.
14.
DahlR.A.1956. A Preface to Democratic Theory. The Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
FennoRichard. 1978. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts. New York: Little, Brown.
22.
FerejohnJohn. 1986. “Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control.” Public Choice50:5–25.
23.
FiorinaMorris. 1974. Representatives, Roll Calls, and Constituencies. Lexington: D.C. Heath.
24.
FleischerRichard. 1993. “PAC Contributions and Congressional Voting on National Defense.” Legislative Studies Quarterly18 (August): 391–410.
25.
FrendreisJohn P.WatermanRichard W. 1985. “PAC Contributions and Legislative Behavior: Senate Voting on Trucking Deregulation.” Social Science Quarterly66: 401-12.
GreenTimothy, Missouri Senator. 2012. Personal interview, February24.
28.
GrossmanMatt. 2012. The Not-So-Special Interests: Interest Groups, Public Representation, and American Governance. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
29.
HallRichard L.DeardorffAlan. 2006. “Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy.” American Political Science Review100:69–84.
30.
HallRichard L.WaymanFrank W. 1990. “Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees.” American Political Science Review84:797–820.
31.
HeinzJohnLaumannEdward O.SalisburyRobert H.NelsonRobert L. 1993. The Hollow Core: Private Interests in National Policy Making. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
32.
HesseniusBarry. 2007. Hardball Lobbying for Nonprofits: Real Advocacy for Nonprofits in the New Century. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
33.
IganDenizMishraPrachiTresselThierry. 2012. “A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis.” National Bureau of Economic Review Macroeconomics Annual26 (1): 195–230.
34.
JettonRod, Former Missouri House Speaker. 2012. Personal interview, February25.
35.
KaiserRobert G.2013. Act of Congress: How America’s Essential Institution Works, and How It Doesn’t. New York: Knopf.
36.
KaiserRobert G.2007. So Damn Much Money: The Triumph of Lobbying and the Corrosion of American Government. New York: Vintage.
37.
KauJamesRubinPaul H. 1982. Congressmen, Constituents, and Contributors: Determinants of Roll Call Voting in the House of Representatives. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff.
38.
KershRogan. 2002. “Corporate Lobbyists as Political Actors: A View from the Field.” In Interest Group Politics, edited by CiglerAllan J.LoomisBurdett A., 6th ed., 225-48. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
39.
KingdonJohn. 1973. Congressmen’s Voting Decisions. New York: Harper and Row.
40.
LangbeinLaura I.LotwisMark A. 1990. “The Political Efficacy of Lobbying and Money: Gun Control.” Legislative Studies Quarterly15:414–40.
41.
MastersMarick F.1988. “Congressional Support for Unions’ Positions across Diverse Legislation.” Journal of Labor Research9 (2): 149–65.
42.
MayhewDavid. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
MillerWarren E.StokesDonald E. 1963. “Constituency Influence in Congress.” American Political Science Review57 (1): 45–56.
45.
MilyoJeffrey. 1997. “Money Walks: Why Campaign Contributions Aren’t as Corrupting as You Think.” Reason29 (3): 47–49.
46.
MooneyChristopher Z.2007. “Lobbyists and Interest Groups.” In Institutional Change in American Politics: The Case of Term Limits, edited by KurtzKarl T.CainBruceNiemiRichard G., 119-133. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
47.
National Conference of State Legislatures. 2014. “Full and Part Time Legislatures.”
48.
OlsonMancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
49.
PeltzmanSam. 1984. “Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting.” Journal of Law & Economics27 (1): 181–210.
SalisburyRobert. 1990. “The Paradox of Interest Groups in Washington: More Groups, Less Clout.” In The New American Political System, edited by KingAnthony, 203-30. Washington, DC: AEI Press.
52.
SalisburyRobert. 1992. Interests and Institutions: Substance and Structure in American Politics. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
53.
SilbermanJonathan I.DurdenGarey C. 1976. “Determining Legislative Preferences on the Minimum Wage: An Economic Approach.” Journal of Political Economy84 (2): 317–30.
SoraufFrank J.1992. Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
57.
StephensonMatthewJacksonHowell E. 2010. “Lobbyists as Imperfect Agents: Implications for Public Policy in a Pluralist System.” Harvard Journal of Legislation47:1, 1-20.
58.
StratmannThomas. 1991. “What Do Campaign Contributions Buy? Deciphering Causal Effects of Money and Votes.” Southern Economic Journal57 (3): 606–20.
59.
SwainScott. 2012. Personal interview, April25.
60.
TealmeyerBrad. 2012. Personal interview, April25.
61.
TilleySteven, Missouri House Speaker. 2012. Personal interview, February24.
62.
TullockGordon. 1972. “The Purchase of Politicians.” Western Economic Journal10:354–55.
63.
WelchWilliam P.1974. “The Economics of Campaign Funds.” Public Choice20:83–97.
64.
WelchWilliam P.1982. “Campaign Contributions and Legislative Voting: Milk Money and Dairy Price Supports.” Western Political Quarterly35:478–95.
65.
WitkoChristopher. 2006. “PACs, Issue Context, and Congressional Decisionmaking.” Political Research Quarterly59 (2): 283–95.
66.
WrightJohn R.1990. Wright, Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives. American Political Science Review / Volume 84 / Issue 02 / June1990, pp 417-438.
67.
WrightJohn R.1996. Interest Groups and Congress. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
