How U.S. Voters Elect Prosecutors: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment

Abstract

Do U.S. voters care about the policy positions of a candidate when choosing prosecutors? Conventional wisdom suggests the public favors punitiveness and that prosecutorial elections are apolitical. I argue that voters do care about the policy positions of prosecutors, but different information environments induce different voting behaviors. Using a conjoint experiment across four information settings, I show how policy congruence plays an important role in shaping voter’s decisions when candidates’ policy information is available. When policy information is sparse, voters take cues to infer candidates’ political leanings even in nonpartisan or low-information electoral environments. Contrary to the dominant view that the public favors punitiveness, my results suggest that the public is not unequivocally harsh. These findings speak to the possible benefits that society can reap from increasing the level of information available in prosecutorial elections. The findings also call into question the prevalent view that elections ought to compel prosecutors to adopt tough-on-crime stances that result in a highly incarcerated populace.