Abstract
Do political institutions moderate the effect of environmental stress on social conflict? We posit that while the frequency of social conflict in developing agrarian states can increase during drought, democratic competition reduces conflict and can facilitate cooperation, reversing this effect. This hypothesis is tested on a sample of all districts in India over a period from 2001 to 2014. The dependent variable captures the number of crimes perpetrated against scheduled castes—so-called “untouchables”—and scheduled tribes—India’s Indigenous groups—during a given district-year. When the effect of drought is moderated using a local electoral competition index, findings show that although droughts increase the frequency of social conflicts where political institutions are weak, they reduce it where political institutions are strong. The results are robust to alternative operationalization choices. Our findings, thus, have relevance both to scholars of the climate–conflict nexus and to policymakers working to address climate change’s effects.
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