Members of Congress take more than 2,000 trips sponsored by private organizations and interest groups every congress. Using a new data set of gift travel from 2007 to 2019 and interviews with former members of Congress, current and former congressional staffers, and staffers from interest groups that fund trips, we attempt to answer two core questions about this increasingly frequent behavior. Why do members take privately sponsored trips and what types of groups are driving this behavior? We argue that members of Congress take trips because they believe it makes them more effective legislators by exposing them to real-world consequences of their policy decisions and forcing them to build relationships with their fellow members. Trip sponsors, alternatively, seek to persuade and build relationships with members of Congress that ultimately shape their legislative coalitions. We find that trip-taking is associated with greater legislative effectiveness, in particular for Democrats, and that the provision of policy-specific information is a valuable benefit from taking these trips.
AlduncinAlexanderParkerDavid C. W.TheriaultSean M.2017. “Leaving on a Jet Plane: Polarization, Foreign Travel, and Comity in Congress.” Congress & the Presidency44 (2): 179–200.
2.
AlduncinAlexanderKellySean Q.ParkerDavid C. W.TheriaultSean M.2014. “Foreign Junkets or Learning to Legislate? Generational Changes in the International Travel Patterns of House Members, 1977-2012.” The Forum12 (3): 563–77.
3.
AnsolabehereStephenSnowbergErik C.SnyderJames M.2005. “Unrepresentative Information: The Case of Newspaper Reporting on Campaign Finance.” Public Opinion Quarterly69 (2): 213–31.
4.
BaumgartnerFrankJeffreyR.BerryM.HojnackiMarieKimballDavid C.LeechBeth L.2009. Lobbying and Policy Change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
5.
BaumgartnerFrank R.JonesBryan D.2015. The Politics of Information. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
6.
BawnKathleenCohenMartinKarolDavidMasketSethNoelHansZallerJohn. 2012. “A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands, and Nominations in American Politics.” Perspectives on Politics10 (3): 571–97.
7.
BellAndrewJonesKelvyn. 2015. “Explaining Fixed Effects: Random Effects Modeling of Time-Series Cross-sectional and Panel Data.” Political Science Research and Methods3 (1): 133–53.
8.
Bloch RubinRuth. 2017. Building the Bloc: Intraparty Organization in the U.S. Congress. New York: Cambridge University Press.
9.
BrockClare.2021. “Partisan Polarization and Corporate Lobbying: Information, Demand, and Conflict.” Interest Groups and Advocacy. doi:10.1057/s41309-021-00112-5.
10.
BrownLaura K.TrouttElizabeth. 2004. “Funding Relations between Nonprofits and Government: A Positive Example.” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly33 (1): 5–27.
11.
BrunellThomas L.2005. “The Relationship between Political Parties and Interest Groups: Explaining Patterns of PAC Contributions to Candidates for Congress.” Political Research Quarterly58 (4): 681–88.
12.
CasasAndreuDennyMatthew J.WilkersonJohn. 2020. “More Effective than We Thought: Accounting for Legislative Hitchhikers Reveals a More Inclusive and Productive Lawmaking Process.” American Journal of Political Science64 (1): 5–18.
13.
ChavezMarkStephensLauraGalaskiewiczJoseph. 2004. “Does Government Funding Suppress Nonprofits’ Political Activity?” American Sociological Review69 (2): 292–316.
14.
ClarkTom S.LinzerDrew A.2015. “Should I Use Fixed or Random Effects?” Political Science Research and Methods3 (2): 399–408.
15.
ClarkeAndrew J.2020. “Party Sub-brands and American Party Factions.” American Journal of Political Science64:452–70.
16.
CraigAlison W.2020. The Collaborative Congress. Working Manuscript.
17.
CurryJames M.2015. Legislating in the Dark. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
18.
CurryJames M.LeeFrances E.2019. “Non-party Government: Bipartisan Lawmaking and Party Power in Congress.” Perspectives on Politics17 (1): 47–65.
19.
CurryJames M.RobertsJason. 2020. “Personal Relationships and Legislative Negotiation in the U.S. Congress.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August, Washington, DC.
20.
FaganE. J.McGeeZachary A.2020. “Problem Solving and the Demand for Expert Information in Congress.” Legislative Studies Quarterly. doi:10.1111/lsq.12323.
21.
FaganE. J.McGeeZachary A.ThomasHerschel F.III.. 2021. “The Power of the Party: Conflict Expansion and the Agenda Diversity of Interest Groups.” Political Research Quarterly74 (1): 90–102.
22.
FennoRichard F.1978. Home Style. New York: Pearson.
23.
FouirnaiesAlexander. 2017. “When Are Agenda Setters Valuable?” American Journal of Political Science62 (1): 176–91.
24.
GrierKevin B.MungerMichael C.RobertsBrian E.1994. “The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978-1986.” American Political Science Review88 (4): 911–26.
25.
GrossmannMattHopkinsDavid A.2016. Asymmetric Politics: Ideological Republicans and Group Interest Democrats. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
26.
HallRichard L.DeardorffAlan V.2006. “Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy.” American Political Science Review100 (1): 69–84.
27.
HallRichard L.WaymanFrank W.1990. “Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees.” American Political Science Review84 (3): 797–820.
28.
KallaJoshua L.BroockmanDavid E.2016. “Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials: A Randomized Field Experiment.” American Journal of Political Science60 (3): 545–58.
KingGaryRobertsMargaret E.2015. “How Robust Standard Errors Expose Methodological Problems They Do Not Fix, and What to Do About It.” Political Analysis23 (2): 159–79.
32.
KingdonJohn W.1995. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. 2nd ed.New York: Longman.
33.
LangbeinLaura I.1986. “Money and Access: Some Empirical Evidence.” Journal of Politics48 (4): 1052–62.
34.
LewallenJonathanTheriaultSean M.JonesBryan D.2016. “Congressional Dysfunction: An Information Processing Perspective.” Regulation and Governance10 (2): 179–90.
35.
LowensteinDaniel Hays. 1989. “On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil Is Deeply Rooted.” Hofstra Law Review18 (301): 2.
36.
LowensteinDaniel Hays. 1995. “Campaign Contributions and Corruption: Comments on Strauss and Cain.” University of Chicago Legal Forum1995:7.
37.
LuJiahuan. 2015. “Which Nonprofit Gets More Government Funding?” Nonprofit Management and Leadership25 (3): 297–312.
38.
MaskellJack. 2007. Acceptance of Gifts by Members and Employees of the House of Representatives Under New Ethics Rules of the 110th Congress. Report RL34377. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
39.
McGeeZachary A.Theriault .Sean M.2020. “Partisanship in Congressional Travels Abroad.” November. Presented at Workshop on Domestic Polarization and U.S. Foreign Policy.
40.
McKayAmy Melissa. 2018. “Fundraising for Favors? Linking Lobbyist-Hosted Fundraisers to Legislative Benefits.” Political Research Quarterly71 (4): 869–80.
41.
McKayAmy Melissa. 2019. “Buying Amendments? Lobbyists’ Campaign Contributions and Microlegislation in the Creation of the Affordable Care Act.” Legislative Studies Quarterly45 (2): 327–60.
42.
MearsAshley. 2020. Very Important People: Status and Beauty in the Global Party Circuit. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
43.
MilyoJeffreyPrimoDavidGrosecloseTimothy. 2000. “Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective.” Business and Politics2 (1): 75–88.
44.
ParkerDavid C. W.2014. Battle for the Big Sky. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
45.
PersilyNathanielLammieKelli. 2004. “Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review153 (1): 119–80.
46.
PorterH. Owen. 1974. “Legislative Experts and Outsiders: The Two-Step Flow of Communication.” Journal of Politics36 (3): 703–30.
47.
PowellEleanor NeffGrimmerJustin. 2016. “Money in Exile: Campaign Contributions and Committee Access.” American Journal of Political Science78 (4): 974–88.
48.
RosensonBeth A.2009. “Congressional Frequent Flyers: Demand- and Supply-Side Explanations for Privately Sponsored Travel.” Legislative Studies Quarterly34 (2): 245–71.
StratmannThomas. 1991. “What Do Campaign Contributions Buy? Deciphering Causal Effects of Money and Votes.” Southern Economic Journal57 (3): 606–20.
51.
StratmannThomas. 1998. “The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?” Journal of Law and Economics41 (1): 85–113.
52.
TheriaultSean M.2008. Party Polarization in Congress. New York: Cambridge University Press.
53.
TheriaultSean M.2013. The Gingrich Senators. New York: Oxford University Press.
54.
ThompsonDennis F.2005. “Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns Safe for Democracy.” George Washington Law Review73 (5–6): 1036–69.
55.
VoldenCraigWisemanAlan E.2014. Legislative Effectiveness in the United States Congress. New York: Cambridge University Press.
56.
VoldenCraigWisemanAlan E.2018. “Legislative Effectiveness in the United States Senate.” Journal of Politics80 (2): 731–35.
57.
WelchW. P.1982. “Campaign Contributions and Legislative Voting: Milk Money and Dairy Price Supports.” Western Political Quarterly35 (4): 478–95.
58.
WrightJohn R.1990. “Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives.” American Political Science Review84 (2): 417–38.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
