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Abstract

This article explores some of the moral language of oppression, especially as it rests on a distinction between harms and wrongs. Authentic instances of oppression are always wrongful, but might not be harmful in certain cases. The analytic challenge is to determine when an allegation of oppression is true or merits public attention as opposed to when allegations of oppression are not socially compelling. Because the language of oppression frequently looks to rights, those controversies that surround rights legislation or its creation also affect and complicate our understanding of oppression. An especially difficult question is how much burden would be "reasonable" for X to bear if creating a right for Y imposes a burden on X—such as having to pay additional taxes to make public transportation accessible. This article suggests that moral theory cannot provide an answer. Rather, this question can only be answered according to the potential that exists for a social consensus that such and such a burden ought to be borne. When that consensus occurs, however, then so has moral progress occurred. Consequently, rather than connoting a heightened capacity for ethical reflection and analysis, moral progress is better understood as a politically based sensibility that moves from socioeconomic narcissism and class isolationism toward social inclusion and tolerating social difference.

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When Harms Become Wrongs

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