The paper expounds a non-cooperative game that can be interpreted as a model of the system of kula that was described by Bronislaw Malinowski in his Argonauts of the Western Pacific. The game of kula is an infinite-horizon game with an arbitrary, but fixed, number n of players. It generates pure norms of direct reciprocity, pure norms of indirect reciprocity, and mixed norms whereby a player who deviates is punished both by the individual who has been harmed and by a third party.
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