Hawks,Zealots and Hypocrites,but Not Free Riders: The Logics of Cooperation in Llano Del Beal

Abstract

This article will study the mobilization of the residents of Llano del Beal (Cartagena, Spain), between 1987 and 1991, to defend their ‘quality of life,’ an objective that was in conflict with the interests of the region’s mining industry. The analysis, supported by qualitative data obtained from interviews and documents, rests on Olson’s paradigm of collective action (1971 [1965]). I argue that this paradigm has found itself subject to what could be described as a ‘dictatorship of the prisoner’s dilemma’, and attempt to show how a variety of ‘logics’ (‘zealots,’ ‘hypocrites,’ ‘hawks’) led the action in Llano del Beal, thus avoiding the many dilemmas of collective action. This article is the result of efforts to bring to light the way that these logics facilitated the emergence of social norms which, along with an exceptional leadership process, allowed the residents to achieve their goals. The conclusions of this empirical investigation serve to outline some reflections on the usefulness of its theoretical framework.

Keywords

collective action game theory leadership social dilemmas social norms

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