Creative compliance and behaviour in response to mandatory changes in accounting policy: three cases from pre-Dearing Britain

Abstract

This paper employs three British case studies to examine the nature of creative compliance and the way in which it may be implicated in preparers' and standard-setters' behaviour in the face of proposed and adopted mandatory changes in accounting policy. The period before the implementation of the Dearing reforms is chosen because standardisation was then a relatively new phenomenon and enforcement powers limited, so that there is an opportunity to observe relatively unsophisticated and unconstrained behaviour. It is suggested that the scope for creative compliance, sometimes quite subtle and elusive in character, may play a part in explaining preparers' and standard-setters' behaviour and that as parties come better to appreciate the scope for creative compliance, their behaviour and lobbying position may change. It is argued that "political" models of the lobbying process need to incorporate both the scope for creative compliance and the way in which the parties concerned come to appreciate and manipulate it.