Abstract
This study investigates the heterogeneous impacts of housing wealth on political outcomes in OECD countries, with a particular focus on how different forms of homeownership interact with house price-to-income ratios. The analysis explores the relationship between these factors and their influence on electoral democracy. The findings reveal that as house price-to-income ratios rise, electoral democracy tends to decline in contexts with a higher proportion of outright homeowners, while it is strengthened in contexts with a growing proportion of mortgaged homeowners. By examining the dual role of housing assets, this study underscores their potential to both stabilize and destabilize democratic processes, depending on the type of ownership. This research highlights the crucial connection between economic conditions and political stability, calling for informed policy interventions to preserve and enhance democratic institutions.
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