Our study explores how managerial compensations are associated with both R&D investment and operating efficiency, which are pillars of competitive advantage for Taiwanese listed companies. Additionally, it investigates how firm size and corporate risk moderate this relationship. Our study’s findings validate these two hypotheses, revealing a positive correlation between managerial compensation and both R&D investment and operating efficiency. Moreover, we observe that firm size enhances this connection, while corporate risk acts as a weakening factor. These results indicate that managerial compensation in Taiwanese companies is crafted with consideration for both immediate financial performance and enduring contributions to company development. The study contributes contemporary evidence on the interplay between factors fostering long-term competitive advantages and the structures of managerial compensation.
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