This article examines reassurances by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development that administrative cooperation between tax officials, professionals and taxpayers is consistent with equal treatment under democratic rules. They are found to be unconvincing on the grounds that they overlook the flexibility of language and the construction of interpretative consensus within groups of highly trained experts. They also seem to overstate the likelihood that a court will intervene to clarify the ‘correct’ reading of a given provision. Nevertheless, the UK courts courts are starting to develop the existing tools of administrative law into an effective system of oversight of tax interpretation. They have not yet managed to forge this into a fully logical approach that balances efficient administration and constructive relationships against the competing values of consistency and democratic accountability. The article reviews the difficulties underlying this position and suggests some ways forward.
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