Scientism proposes science to be an all-powerful human enterprise, able to answer not only all practical but also philosophical or moral questions. We are taking a psychological approach to scientism, studying uncritical trust in science and uncritical trust in scientists as a part of a unique attitudinal tendency. Our novel measure assesses both kinds of trust through short Thurstone scales allowing us to establish a clear threshold for endorsing scientism, thus effectively delineating it from science enthusiasm, which previous instruments were unable to do. We built and refined a novel scale through five stages in which we consulted relevant literature, experts, and laypeople. We demonstrated that uncritical trust in science and scientists are interrelated, yet distinct constructs. As expected, these two subscales positively correlated with dogmatism, scientific knowledge, and overclaiming, but not with knowledge overestimation. The results suggest the new instrument is reliable, valid, and suitable for the lay public.
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