Abstract
This work aims to account for the complexity of pride, while also trying to clear some ambiguities that in our view result from unwarranted assumptions about its two facets—“authentic” versus “hubristic” pride. We propose a model of pride in terms of its cognitive and motivational components; distinguish two kinds of pride proper: pride1, referring to achievement-based pride and pride2, concerning one’s stable qualities and dispositions; and identify the goals they are likely to elicit. We also argue that for pride to be felt, it is insufficient and even unnecessary that one’s self-evaluations should concern socially valued accomplishments. We suggest that hubris is distinguishable from both kinds of pride proper because, unlike the latter, it is qualified by the goal of superiority over others, and we consider its implications in terms of social attitudes. We also discuss whether hubris is a form of “false” pride.
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