Much research from recent years has shown that individuals with welfare chauvinist attitudes are more likely to support far-right populist parties. At the same time, we know that the general conditions in a country, such as immigration, are also related to support for the far right. However, how both relationships work together has not been scrutinized systematically, yet. This article contributes to filling this gap by studying to what extent changes in the general context in which citizens are embedded affects how much welfare chauvinist attitudes matter for support of far-right populist parties. To study this question, we merge individual-level data from the European Social Survey with aggregate data on socio-economic variables and migration on the country level. Based on multi-level regression and a systematic interpretation of interaction effects, we find that high immigration significantly amplifies the effect of welfare chauvinist attitudes, whereas the generosity of the welfare state does not affect the relationship. These results contribute to our understanding of the conditions under which people with welfare chauvinist attitudes support far-right populist parties.
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