We model the transition from a chaotic status quo to a more orderly political regime as a two-stage game involving two warring factions and the citizens. The warring factions move first and decide the form of government by (1) inviting an external arbitrator, (2) choosing the people as arbitrator, i.e. democratizing or (3) maintaining the status quo. We analyze the conditions under which democracy is likely to emerge as the outcome of the game. We show that citizens prefer democracy because it generates a sociopolitical order that protects them against ‘banditry’ and expropriation. Because the citizens’ actions generate positive externalities, incentives for democratization are generated in part by the fact that protection against expropriation under democracy also indirectly benefits the warring factions.
Banks S. Arthur
and Thomas C. Muller, eds. (1998) Political Handbook of the World: 1998. Binghamton, NY: CSA Publications Binghamton University.
2.
Barak, Oren
(2001) ‘Lebanon: From Collapse to Resuscitation’, Working Paper, Harvard University.
3.
Collier, Paul
(2000) ‘Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity’, Journal of Conflict Resolution44: 839-853.
4.
Collier, Paul
, Anke Hoeffer and Mans Sodermom (2001) ‘On the Duration of Civil War’, Paper presented at the World Bank Workshop on Civil Wars and Post-Conflict Transitions, 18-20 May.
5.
Doyle Michael
, and Nicholas Sambanis (2000) ‘Peace building: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis’, American Political Science Review94(4): 179-201.
6.
Fearon, James
(2001) ‘Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?’, Paper presented at the World Bank Workshop on Civil Wars and Post-Conflict Transitions, 18-20 May.
7.
Gibb, Tom
and Frank Smyth (1990) ‘Is Peace Possible in El Salvador?’, Report, Washington, D.C.: Washington Conference on Latin America.
8.
Greif, Avner
(1998) ‘Self-Enforcing Political Systems and Economic Growth: Late Medieval Genoa’, in Robert Bates and Avner Greif (eds) Analytical Narratives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
9.
Grossman, Herschel
and Minseong, Kim (1995) ‘Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security Claims to Property’, Journal of Political Economy103 (Dec.): 1275-1288.
10.
Guichard, Jean-Pierre
(2000) De Gaulle face aux crises: 1940-1968. Paris: Cherche Midi.
11.
Hirshleifer, Jack
(1995) ‘Anarchy and Its Breakdown’, Journal of Political Economy103 (Feb.): 26-52.
12.
Huntington, Samuel
(1968) Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
13.
Jaggers, Keith
and Ted Robert Gurr (1999) ‘Polity 98 Project Regime Characteristics, 1800-1998’ [http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/polity].
14.
Konrad, Kai
and Stergios Skaperdas (1999) ‘The Market for Protection and the Origin of the State’, Working Paper, Center for Economic Policy Research, University of California, Irvine.
15.
Licklider, Roy
(1998) ‘Civil War Data 2.1’[http://rci.rutgers.edu/%7Elicklide].
16.
Lijphart, Arend
(1977) Democracy in Plural Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press.
17.
Manin, Bernard
(1997) The Principles of Representative Democracy. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
18.
Nickerson David
and Leonard Wantchekon (2001) ‘Opposing Interventions Facilitate Post Civil War Democratization’, Working Paper, Yale University.
19.
Montgomery, Tommie Sue
(1995) Revolution in El Salvador: From Civil Strife to Civil Peace. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
20.
Norton, Richard
(1997) ‘Lebanon: with Friend like These’, Current History1 (Jan.): 6-12.
21.
O’Donnell, Guillermo
and Philippe Schmitter (1986) ‘Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies’, in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
22.
Olson, Mancur
(1993) ‘Democracy, Dictatorship and Development’, American Political Science Review87 (Sept.): 567-576.
23.
Paige, Jeffery M.
(1997) Coffee and Power: Revolution and the Rise of Democracy in Central America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
24.
Przeworski, Adam
(1996) ‘Why Do Democracies Survive in Affluent Countries?’, Working Paper, New York University.
25.
Reno, William
(1998) Warlord Politics and African States. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner.
26.
Rustow, A. Dankwart
(1970) ‘Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model’, Comparative Politics2 (Apr.): 337-363.
27.
Sena, Eken
, Paul Cashin, Nuri Erbas, Jose Martelino and Adnan Mazarei (1995) Economic Dislocation and Recovery in Lebanon. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
28.
Sartori, Giovanni
(1965) Democratic Theory. Based on the author’s translation of Democrazia e definizione, 2nd edn.New York: Praeger.
29.
Shumpeter, Joseph A.
(1942) Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper & Brothers.
30.
Skaperdas Stergios
(1992) ‘Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights’, The American Economic Review82(4): 720-739.
31.
Torres-Rivas, Edelberto
(2001) ‘Civil War and Insurrection in El Salvador’, in Michael, Doyle, Ina Johnstone and Robert Orr (eds) Keeping the Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
32.
Walter, Barbara F.
(1997) ‘The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement’, International Organization51: 335-364.
33.
Walter, Barbara F.
(2002) Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
34.
Wantchekon, Leonard
and Mario Simon (1999) ‘Democracy as an Arbitration Mechanism’, Working Paper, Yale University.
35.
Wood, Elisabeth
(2000) Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transitions in South Africa and El Salvador. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
