Previous research has uncovered only ambiguous evidence of the mechanisms that support or inhibit democratic trajectories in the aftermath of civil war. Here I suggest that one specific form of transnational aid during a civil war may have reverberating consequences after the fighting stops. Specifically, when a state emerges to control the executive after a conflict with the help of a previous interstate enemy, the leadership is vulnerable to political attacks on their patriotism and judgment. As such, open democracy becomes a less attractive option for these executives. I investigate this proposition using difference-in-difference matching estimation, as well as several alternative specifications. The findings strongly suggest the presence of disincentives to democratize for those executives that received help from external rivals. This research provides a new set of tools for identifying the causes and potential remedies to deficient democracy after civil wars.
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