This article investigates the effects of separation of ownership and control because of vote differentiation on listed family firms’ investment performance. The authors study the question of whether family-controlled firms have better investment performance than nonfamily firms and whether this investment performance is negatively affected by a separation of ownership and control because of vote differentiation. Marginal q is used as a performance measure. The empirical analysis shows that family control has a positive impact on investment performance when ownership and control are aligned, whereas separation of ownership and control in terms of vote-differentiated shares reduce investment performance.
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