This article investigates the influence of family involvement on firm performance in an emerging market economy. Using a panel of 217 Polish companies from 1997 to 2005, the authors find an inverted U-shaped relationship between the share of family ownership and firm performance. The data also reveal that firms with family CEOs are likely to outperform their counterparts that have nonfamily CEOs. The results take into account the endogeneity of family ownership and are robust to a number of specification checks.
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