Scholars are increasingly investigating the effectiveness of removing militant groups’ leaders; to date, their findings have been mixed. Rather than seeking consistent evidence, this article explains why some militant organizations demonstrate resilience to leadership targeting while others do not. The author argues that organizational context, especially the initial endowment set, determines the extent of institutionalization and ease of leadership succession. Organizations formed by appealing to shared identity and norms are less likely to implement institutionalized systems, instead depending heavily on charismatic leaders; conversely, groups with access to economic resources develop highly structured functions, leading to the routinization of leadership succession. Analysis of 153 militant organizations between 1970 and 2008 shows that organizations based on economic endowment show high resilience to this strategy. Groups that employ negative strategies against local communities as the product of their initial economic endowment are much less likely to be affected by forced leadership removal.
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