This article analyses the effectiveness of anti-terrorism policies implemented by the Spanish government to counteract ETA terrorist attacks. The aim is to investigate what the best policy is for counteracting terrorist groups: proactive political/ retaliatory deterrence policies or reactive political/retaliatory deterrence policies. Counting models are used and the results show that proactive political policies are the most effective.
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