Civil-military relations and terrorism are both extensively studied subjects. Their relationship has, however, yet to be examined. We maintain that public conflict between the civilian and the military leadership in a country and declining civil control over the armed forces may often precipitate a rise in domestic terror events. Civil-military conflict and reduced civilian control can lead to agency slack by the armed forces and ineffective counterterror policies. These phenomena are also associated with policies that exclude groups in society and generate grievances, leading some to turn to terror. In zero inflated negative binomial analyses of domestic terror events and two distinct indicators of civil-military tension, we find support for our contention. Terror incidents increase both when civil-military conflict rises and when civilian control decreases. Our results add to understanding of both the domestic consequences of civil-military tension and the types of influences that impact domestic terror.
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