Theorists offer many predictions about how Americans will respond to significant cyberattacks but systematic evaluations of American public opinion regarding these issues remain rare. We present results from a conjoint experiment and find that the public supports retaliation-in-kind against cyberattacks but is willing to escalate as the economic damage and human casualties of a hypothetical attack mount. Respondents support harsher retaliation after attacks carried out by terrorist groups or state agencies rather than those conducted by individuals or civilian hackers. Finally, the dynamics of the public's judgment regarding responses to a domestic or an international cyber attack are broadly similar.
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