Abstract
The priority dispute between Raymond Damadian and Paul Lauterbur over the `invention' of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) has attracted the attention of social and natural scientists for more than 30 years. In this paper, I have used this priority dispute to analyze the complex socio-epistemic processes through which a claim for an invention is made and strengthened. I argue that a tension exists because techno-scientific practices are embedded within a particular disciplinary regime of authorship: even though techno-scientific practices occur through distributed cognition and are contingent upon particular socio-epistemic contexts, a claim for an invention requires assigning authorship to a particular person, company, or institution in order to clearly define the origin and the novelty of that particular techno-scientific event. Nevertheless, the outcomes of socio-epistemic practices for making and strengthening priority claims are shifting, open-ended, and contingent upon particular socio-epistemic contexts.
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