Sage Journals: Discover world-class research

Abstract

Military organizations globally exhibit remarkable similarities despite their diverse historical and strategic contexts, a phenomenon of institutional isomorphism that has led to the widespread adoption of western military models across different regions. This phenomenon is particularly pronounced in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, where (broadly) western military structures, doctrines, and technologies are adopted with insufficient adaptation to local contexts. This article first examines the theoretical underpinnings of military isomorphism, analysing how the coercive, mimetic, and normative mechanisms identified by DiMaggio and Powell drive organizational convergence in military institutions. Second, we advocate for context-specific security approaches, drawing on contingency theory, Fourth Generation Warfare concepts, and strategic culture theory to develop an alternative framework centred on threat-centric focus, local cultural aculturation, resource-appropriate forces, and indigenous innovation. Third, through a counterfactual thought experiment called the ‘Desert Porcupine’, we illustrate how these principles might combine to produce fundamentally different security architectures for small Gulf states when freed from isomorphic constraints. The value of this exploration lies less in prescribing policy alternatives, as in expanding the conceptual space within which security architectures might be imagined, suggesting that genuine security enhancement requires approaches tailored to the specific geopolitical, social, and demographic contexts of states.

Keywords

military isomorphism Gulf security defense innovation institutional mimicry security studies

Introduction

Military organizations globally have long emulated successful models, adopting structures, doctrines, and technologies from perceived exemplars (Brooks, 2007; Farrell, 2005; Farrell & Terriff, 2002; Porter, 2009). This process, known as ‘military isomorphism’, has been particularly pronounced in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states where western, and particularly US, military models have been extensively imported (Barany, 2021; Parker & Bakir, 2024; Pretorius, 2008; Roberts, 2023; Rossiter, 2014, 2020). While learning from others’ experiences is in many ways sensible and rational, the widespread adoption of foreign security frameworks invites reflection on their alignment with local contexts, capabilities, and strategic needs.

Indeed, if one returns to first principles, there is no inherent reason why military organizational approaches that crystallized in Europe and North America centuries ago should necessarily be optimal for the distinctive geographic, demographic, and strategic environment of the Gulf. Yet the creation and ongoing development of Gulf military forces has proceeded largely along western organizational lines (Porter, 2009). This observation is not a critique so much as an invitation to intellectual curiosity: what alternative security architectures might be theoretically available if we momentarily suspend the assumption that contemporary western models represent universal best practices?

This article examines the phenomenon of military isomorphism in the Gulf region and explores potential alternative approaches to security architectures. We first analyse the theoretical underpinnings and practical manifestations of military isomorphism, drawing on neo-institutional theory to identify the coercive, mimetic, and normative mechanisms driving organizational convergence. Second, we advocate for context-specific security approaches, developing an alternative framework rooted in contingency theory, Fourth Generation Warfare concepts, and strategic culture theory. Third, through a counterfactual thought experiment called the ‘Desert Porcupine’, we demonstrate how these principles might combine to produce fundamentally different security architectures for small Gulf states when freed from isomorphic constraints. This structure allows us to examine both the powerful forces shaping institutional convergence and the theoretical space for alternatives.

Our intention is less to suggest that current approaches have failed or that Western models are necessarily inappropriate, but rather to broaden the conceptual space within which security architectures might be imagined. By denaturalizing what has come to seem inevitable and exploring alternative possibilities, we aim to contribute to a richer understanding of military development that acknowledges both the powerful forces driving institutional convergence and the potential value of organizational diversity in security affairs. Finally, it is important to note that the six Gulf monarchies contain a great many similar elements as well as differences (Roberts, 2017). It is legitimate to group them together in certain key ways, as long as they are rightly differentiated when more granular detail is analysed.

Theory & Practice of Military Isomorphism

The concept of military isomorphism describes the tendency of military organizations globally to adopt increasingly similar structures, processes, and behaviours despite varying historical, cultural, and geopolitical contexts (Pretorius, 2008). Rooted in neo-institutional theory, the influential work of Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell discussed the mechanisms by which contemporary institutions end up looking remarkably homogenized over time (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Greenwood & Meyer, 2008). Applied to military contexts, this flavour of institutional isomorphism helps explain the global convergence of, for example, key artefacts of military institutions (such as doctrines, structures, and practices) on a western template. This phenomenon is particularly evident in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, where western military models have been adopted with varying degrees of success and appropriateness (Barany, 2021; Cordesman, 2020; Roberts, 2020, 2021; Rossiter, 2020). As discussed below, DiMaggio and Powell’s framework identifies three primary mechanisms of institutional isomorphism that are relevant to military organizations.

Coercive Isomorphism: External Pressures and Structural Dependencies

Coercive isomorphism occurs through formal and informal pressures exerted on militaries by actors upon whom they are dependent in the relevant area. In the military sphere, these pressures manifest through international security alliances, defence treaties, and arms supplier relationships (Adamsky, 2010; Alley, 2021; Benson, 2012; Kegley & Raymond, 1982; Kier, 1995; Snyder, 1997). The nature of these relationships creates structural dependencies that shape and influence military development, often guiding it along particular organizational paths.

For GCC states specifically, security arrangements with western powers create significant de facto coercive isomorphic pressure to adopt compatible military structures, doctrines, and equipment (Parker & Bakir, 2024; Saleh, 2020). This dependency relationship began during the colonial era but intensified dramatically following the oil boom and subsequent US security engagement in the region (Gause, 2010; Peterson, 1986; Roberts, 2020; Rossiter, 2014). The 1990–1991 Gulf War represented a watershed moment. The US-led cinematic trouncing of Iraqi forces in 1991, potentially saving the other Gulf monarchies and liberating Kuwait, precipitated a vast expansion of US engagement on the Peninsula. The Gulf monarchies were eager to facilitate such relations. Not only had the US demonstrated a flawless, stunning military victory flaunting its latest eye-catching technologies, such as hyper accurate missiles, but the vulnerabilities of the monarchies had recently been starkly revealed with the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The ensuing decades saw a proliferation of defence cooperation agreements, status of forces agreements, and formal alliances that institutionalized a range of dependencies in the monarchies on the US, its allies, and their equipment (Roberts, 2023). The point is, therefore, that ‘coercive’ elements need not actually be that coercive, but rather often represent mutually beneficial arrangements eagerly embraced by local leaders for their perceived security advantages.

Procurement dimensions of these relationships further create particularly powerful isomorphic pressures. Indeed, it must be remembered that buying, say, an F-18 fast jet is far more than buying the plane itself; rather, it inherently buries the buyer into the logistical, educational, and doctrinal systems and ethos of the seller (Roberts). In this sense, military procurement is a non-negotiable driver of profound isomorphism that extends far beyond the hardware itself. Indeed, the GCC states’ historic reliance on western arms suppliers creates technological dependencies that necessitate adoption of compatible organizational structures and operational concepts. Initial procurement decisions create technological lock-in effects that extend through multiple upgrade cycles and shape future acquisitions (Hughes, 1986, 2004; Winner, 1980). For example, switching from ‘western’ fast-jet platforms to Russian or Chinese ones is constrained by far more than geopolitical and economic elements. Rather, numerous structural impediments constrain such transitions, including educational and training mismatches, language barriers, and the technical challenges inherent in migrating between distinct ecosystems of knowledge, supply chains, and specialized engineering expertise (Roberts, 2025). All of these difficulties can be overcome, as Hungary showed with its pivot from the Soviet to the NATO ecosystem from the 1990s onwards, but it is not a simple switch.

The coercive dimension of military isomorphism extends beyond formal alliance structures into the operational realm. Joseph Soeters expanded this category when he referred to the concept of ‘experiential isomorphism’, whereby militaries with joint expeditionary experience in coalition warfare inevitably drives a convergence in practice (Soeters, 2008; Wachholtz & Soeters, 2022). Joint exercises, combined command arrangements, and multilateral military operations create powerful pressures for organizational compatibility. The participation of GCC forces in operations like the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan or the international coalition against ISIS required adoption of NATO-compatible command structures, communications protocols, and operational procedures. These operational necessities drive organizational adaptation toward western models regardless of their appropriateness for broader domestic or regional security challenges. Certainly, these logistical and other operational systems and modus operandi may be suitably apropos for domestic and regional security challenges, but they may also not be ideal – as explored in the third section when an alternative set of paradigms is presented.

Foreign military presence within GCC states creates additional coercive pressures through direct demonstration effects and advising relationships. The extensive US military footprint in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE exposes host nation forces to US military organizational models, creating implicit standards for ‘professional’ military organization (Farrell, 2005; Farrell & Terriff, 2002). Military advisory missions, whether formal or informal, further transmit western organizational concepts directly into GCC military structures, often without critical evaluation of their contextual appropriateness.

The coercive dimension extends beyond operational requirements into strategic signalling, where western-style military structures serve deterrence and alliance management functions that transcend internal effectiveness. Gulf states maintain certain capabilities less for operational utility against likely threats than as instruments of international communication, signalling resolve and alliance worthiness to adversaries like Iran while demonstrating credibility within partnership frameworks. This logic helps explain apparent mismatches between threat environments and force structures, where high-end platforms like fast-jets proliferate functioning at least as much as tangible representations of security partnerships as tactical or operational solutions to regional challenges.

Mimetic Isomorphism: Uncertainty and Prestige-Seeking Emulation

The second mechanism, mimetic isomorphism, emerges under conditions of uncertainty where organizations tend to model themselves after entities perceived as legitimate or successful (Haverman, 1993; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999; Öztürk, 2020). Military organizations face inherent uncertainties; the true test of military effectiveness comes only in conflict, which most militaries experience infrequently, if at all. This fundamental uncertainty about organizational effectiveness creates strong incentives to emulate structures and practices of militaries with perceived success or prestige.

For GCC states, this uncertainty is compounded by historically relatively limited warfighting experience and the complex, rapidly evolving security environment of the Gulf region (Cordesman, 2020). When facing such uncertainty, mimetic processes provide seemingly safe and sensible templates for military development. Western military dominance in conventional warfare, particularly US successes in the 1991 Gulf War and initial phases of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, created powerful models for emulation. These often-spectacular demonstrations of conventional military superiority reinforced perceptions that western military organizational forms represented optimal solutions, regardless of their appropriateness for GCC security contexts. Indeed, even though US and allied forces ultimately struggled and failed in Iraq and Afghanistan, the retort that these were political defeats interspersed with military victories reinforces the sentiment of the continued worthiness of emulation.

Ultimately, as Pretorius suggests, cultural ‘imperialism’ manifests when western military models spread implicitly as a form of ‘military common sense’, regardless of their contextual appropriateness (Farrell, 2005; Kier, 1995; Pretorius, 2008). This process operates as much through such informal channels and associated cultural diffusion to shape perceptions of military legitimacy and modernity. Western military doctrines, operational concepts, and organizational structures become internalized as self-evident ‘best practices’ as much as they are also in place thanks to historically contingent factors. For GCC militaries, where modernization has been a central aspect of broader state-building projects (Ardemagni, 2019a; Cronin, 2013; Jones, 2010), the adoption of western military models becomes intertwined with national narratives of development and progress.

Indeed, the prestige dimension of mimetic isomorphism deserves particular attention in the Gulf context. Military modernization in GCC states serves not only practical security functions but important symbolic ones, demonstrating state capacity, international status, and regime legitimacy (Ardemagni, 2020; Marshall, 2016; Roberts, 2023). Western military models arguably carry particular prestige value, as their adoption signals membership in an exclusive club of the most advanced military powers.

Normative Isomorphism: Professional Socialization and Educational Networks

The third mechanism, normative isomorphism, stems from professionalization, including formal military education and the growth of interpersonal professional networks (Kamrava, 2000; Nemeth, 2022; Samaan, 2019). Professional military education creates powerful socialization experiences that shape officers’ understandings of legitimate military organization and practice (Roberts, 2025). Unlike coercive or mimetic mechanisms, which operate through external pressures and uncertainties, normative isomorphism works through internalized professional standards that military elites adopt as their own values and beliefs.

Beyond formal education, professional networks create powerful channels for normative isomorphism. Foreign Military Training (FMT) programs, staff exchanges, liaison positions, and combined exercises create interpersonal relationships through which professional norms diffuse. This increasing professionalization of GCC officer corps through western military education programs has accelerated normative isomorphism through multiple channels, developing shared professional languages, analytical frameworks, and normative understandings that inevitably shape their approach to military development in their home countries (Samaan, 2019, 2023). The exclusive nature of attendance at these prestigious military institutions creates an elite cadre of western-educated officers who often enjoy accelerated promotion and disproportionate influence on organizational development, further amplifying normative isomorphic effects (Barany, 2019).

Linked to this, Mark Suchman and Dana Eyre take forward these ideas to persuasively argue that weapons procurement stems significantly from such normative cultural pressures as much as any ‘rational’ approach (Suchman & Eyre, 1992). These normative pressures create preferences for certain types of (often western) military technology and organization that align with professional identity rather than necessarily addressing specific strategic needs. Indeed, a professional military officer educated in western traditions develops not just skills but tastes preferences for certain weapon systems, organizational forms, and operational concepts that signal professional identity and competence. These professional preferences arguably drive procurement and organizational decisions that may have little relation to objective strategic requirements.

The creation of indigenous professional military education institutions in GCC states has not necessarily reduced normative isomorphism, as these institutions frequently replicate western educational models (Samaan, 2019). Faculty at Gulf military colleges often receive their advanced education from western institutions, curricula closely mirror western models, and educational materials rely heavily on translated western texts.

Toward Context-Specific Security Approaches

To be sure, there are a few examples of Gulf states breaking out of the proffered and requested templates. The UAE’s Presidential Guard and notably its deployments in Yemen decisively broke with traditions (and expectations) as to how effectively a Gulf military force could operate at distance, jointly, in a hostile, contested, and cluttered context (Michaek & Alex, 2015; Pollack, 2020; Roberts, 2020). Indeed, more broadly, there are, theoretically at least, alternatives to following standardized western templates. This section proposes an alternative framework rooted in contextual realities rather than imported templates. Moving beyond critique, we articulate principles and methodologies for developing security approaches that respond to specific strategic environments, social structures, and resource profiles of Gulf states.

Towards this end, counterfactual analysis remains underutilized in security studies literature on the Gulf region yet offers valuable insights by challenging the perception of historical inevitability. Counterfactuals enable scholars to explore causal relationships by varying key factors while maintaining plausible historical constraints (Fearon, 1991; Mahoney & Barrenechea, 2019). Applied to Gulf states’ security development, this approach allows us to examine how alternative choices might have produced different outcomes while remaining within the bounds of loose historical possibility. By considering how Gulf states might have developed military organizations more attuned to their specific strategic environments, we gain insight into both the constraints and opportunities that exist within isomorphic processes. This approach does not reject the explanatory power of institutional isomorphism but rather seeks to identify spaces for agency and innovation within these powerful structural forces.

Theoretical Foundations: Beyond Isomorphism

The proposed framework below draws inspiration from theoretical traditions that challenge the premises of institutional isomorphism. First, contingency theory in organizational studies argues that no single organizational structure is universally optimal; rather, effective structures must align with specific environmental conditions, technologies, and scales of operation (Donaldson, 2001, 2006). Applied to military organizations, this perspective suggests that optimal security architectures should vary systematically based on threat environments, resource constraints, and sociopolitical contexts, so directly contradicting the homogenizing tendencies of isomorphism.

Second, the framework incorporates insights from Fourth Generation Warfare approaches, which emphasizes that technological superiority and conventional force structures often prove ineffective against asymmetric threats and non-state actors (Echevarria, 2005; Junio, 2009). This is particularly relevant for the Gulf states and their local context, which is comprised of a complex threat landscape including both conventional and significant irregular challenges (Cordesman, 2007, 2020).

Third, the framework draws from strategic culture theory, which emphasizes how historical experiences, cultural values, and geopolitical positions shape distinct approaches to security (Gray, 1999; Johnston, 1995; Klein, 1991). Rather than treating western military models as universal templates, this perspective recognizes the potential value of security approaches emerging from indigenous traditions and historical experiences. The successful defence strategies of small states such as Switzerland, Finland, Singapore, and Israel offer particularly relevant alternative models that demonstrate how context-specific innovation can produce superior security outcomes compared to great power emulation. Building on and borrowing from these theoretical foundations, we propose four core principles for developing locally attuned security architectures in the Gulf context.

Threat-Centric Focus

Military structures and capabilities should derive from comprehensive analysis of actual threat environments rather than imported organizational templates. This principle requires methodical threat assessment across multiple dimensions: analysis that distinguishes between existential threats requiring robust capabilities and peripheral concerns warranting limited investment; reflections on temporal elements judging between immediate challenges and emerging threats requiring long-term capability development; domain-specific threat mapping across conventional, irregular, cyber, economic, and political dimensions; and adversary capability assessment that focuses on actual operational capacities rather than theoretical order-of-battle comparisons.

For Gulf states, threat-centric design could produce radically different force structures than those currently in place. State-on-state threats remain visible, as the Israeli attack on Doha illustrated in September 2025. Moreover, Iran looms large in defence calculations of the Gulf monarchies (Smith, 2007) and, while leaders on the Peninsula increasingly play a conciliatory role vis-à-vis Iranian leaders (Dagres, 2024; Great Expectations: The Future of Iranian-Saudi Détente Crisis Group, 2024), a conflagration at scale remains plausible. The Iranian missiles fired at US forces based in Qatar in June 2025 illustrates the potential Iranian threat. But, given how carefully callibrated an attack this was, this attack highlights how even in a period of extraordinary regional tension, still Iran held back from striking at the Gulf monarchies too firmly.

Indeed, the historical record overall suggests that the kind of threat emerging from Iran is more sub-state than state-on-state; that of subversion and other asymmetric tactics (Boghardt, 2016; Cordesman, 2012; Iran spy cells operate in Gulf states: Kuwaiti MP, 2010; Qatar Considers Ways of Keeping Iranians Off Their Rigs, 2009; Johnston, 2016; Marschall, 2003).

Looking at the broader picture, apart from the ongoing Houthi missile situation (Al Omran & Kerr, 2017), the most significant dangers appear to emerge from unconventional and asymmetric sources, notably domestic instability issues, orchestrated efforts to foment internal division, and digital security weaknesses (Cordesman, 2008, 2020; Roberts, 2023). A security strategy focused on addressing these specific threats would emphasize elements such as elite counterterrorism forces, safeguarding essential infrastructure, sophisticated cybersecurity capabilities, and comprehensive intelligence coordination rather than the reflexive procurement of traditional large military units or necessarily the procurement of vast air forces.

Local Cultural Aculturation

Security approaches must align with and leverage existing social structures, cultural patterns, and institutional realities rather than attempting to override them through imported organizational templates. This principle recognizes that military effectiveness depends substantially on the congruence between security structures and broader sociocultural contexts. At the macro level, this requires alignment between military organizational principles and broader social structures. For Gulf states, this could involve formalizing rather than suppressing the role of tribal affiliations in military organization, potentially creating specialized units organized around existing social groupings with established internal cohesion and trust relationships.

At the operational level, cultural integration involves developing doctrines and tactics that leverage indigenous knowledge systems and practices. Historical Arabian Peninsula defensive approaches emphasized mobility, tribal alliances, and intimate knowledge of local terrain; principles that may retain relevance despite technological evolution (Al Fahad, 2015a; Al-Rasheed, 2014; Kostiner & Khoury, 1991). Rather than wholesale adoption of western doctrines developed for different environments and social contexts, a culturally integrated approach would selectively incorporate external techniques while preserving indigenous strategic artefacts.

At the organizational level, cultural integration requires leadership models and command philosophies compatible with local cultural patterns. Western command structures emphasize decentralized decision-making and mission-type orders, approaches that may clash with more hierarchical Gulf cultural norms (Pollack, 2019). A culturally integrated alternative might develop hybrid command models that provide clear hierarchical authority while creating appropriate space for initiative within culturally comfortable parameters. Lessons can be learned herein from, for example, the Japanese context, where local cultural mores similarly struggle with delegation concerns. Similarly, Oman’s security architecture demonstrates elements of successful cultural integration. Under Sultan Qaboos, Oman developed a security approach that incorporated British organizational elements while preserving traditional Omani leadership patterns and social structures (Allen & Rigsbee II, 2014; Valeri, 2017). This hybrid model proved remarkably effective during the Dhofar Rebellion, where culturally appropriate civil-military integration enabled successful counterinsurgency operations (Hughes, 2009; Ladwig III, 2008).

Resource-Appropriate Forces

The ultimate shape and form of desired military capabilities should be proportional to available human, financial, and technological resources, emphasizing sustainability over prestige. This principle rejects the acquisition-driven approach common in Gulf states, where capabilities are determined by purchasing power rather than long-term sustainability or operational requirements (Soubrier, 2016).

Resource-appropriate scaling requires assessment of multiple resource dimensions. Crucially important in the Gulf picture is attuning military forces to demographic realities including population size and educational profiles; financial sustainability beyond initial acquisition costs; indigenous technological absorption capacity; and maintenance infrastructure requirements. For smaller Gulf states with limited populations but substantial financial resources, this principle suggests prioritizing capital-intensive but personnel-efficient capabilities while avoiding manpower-intensive force structures appropriate for larger nations.

Indigenous Innovation & Adaptation

Local security solutions should be valued and cultivated even when they diverge from international military norms. This principle directly counters the mimetic isomorphism that leads Gulf states to import security solutions rather than developing contextually appropriate alternatives. Such indigenous innovation requires institutional foundations including education systems that foster creative problem-solving rather than rote learning of foreign doctrines; research and development structures focused on context-specific challenges rather than replicating foreign technologies; and organizational cultures that reward rather than penalize divergence from international norms when justified by local conditions.

Operationalizing indigenous innovation involves establishing formal processes for evaluating imported models against local requirements; creating protected spaces for experimental approaches that may initially underperform conventional solutions but offer long-term promise; and developing evaluation criteria that prioritize contextual effectiveness over conformity with international standards. Consequently, foreign models, technologies, and doctrines should be selectively adapted rather than wholesale adopted, with careful evaluation of their appropriateness for local conditions. This principle rejects both widespread adoption and reflexive rejection of foreign approaches, instead advocating thoughtful hybridization that combines external best practices with local requirements.

The Desert Porcupine: Reimagining a Small State Security Architecture

To demonstrate the potential of context-specific security approaches and illustrate alternatives to isomorphic models, this section presents a counterfactual case study examining an alternative security architecture for one of the Gulf’s small states. This thought experiment applies the four principles outlined above, threat-centric focus, local cultural aculturation, resource-appropriate forces, and indigenous innovation & adaptation, to reimagine how security architecture might develop when freed from isomorphic pressures. The exercise is neither intended as a policy prescription nor meant to be a practical approach per se today. Indeed, these concepts would inter alia engender considerable push-back among elites and clash considerably in places with existing modus operandi and force structures given the generations of isomorphic development that have created contemporary defence architectures. Rather, this counterfactual serves as a theoretical exploration highlighting the space of possibilities that becomes visible when we temporarily suspend assumptions about military development that have come to seem natural and inevitable.

Asymmetric Small State Deterrence

The cornerstone of this alternative strategy would be a radical departure from extant acquisition-driven approaches. Rather than investing in prestigious and expensive but demographically unsustainable conventional forces, the Porcupine strategy suggests more of a specialized Distributed Defence Force approach focusing on irregular threats and asymmetric responses.

A Cyber Command would stand as a central pillar rather than an auxiliary capability, exemplifying the threat-centric focus principle through its direct response to the most prevalent security challenges facing small Gulf states. This approach begins with rigorous threat assessment, examining actual rather than theoretical dangers, and builds capabilities in response to these specific challenges rather than following conventional force structure templates. Unlike acquisition-driven approaches that prioritize prestigious platforms regardless of strategic context, this threat-centric design would create deterrence specifically calibrated to the asymmetric and digital vulnerabilities that represent the most significant dangers to small Gulf states.

Certainly, it is not easy for any states to deter by cyber means alone (Pedersen, 2023). While some small Gulf monarchies have ample resource to put towards developing deep cyber retaliatory capabilities, thus potentially overcoming one of Pedersen’s critiques, small states, he argues, still struggle to signal putative deterrence-by-punishment (Domingo, 2018, 2022; Fischerkeller & Harknett, 2017; Pedersen, 2023). Indeed, thus far, much of the literature finds that it remains difficult for small states to achieve meaningful deterrence in this way. Such conclusions are not to be ignored. Equally, no states have yet pursued such a strategy doggedly and with considerable resource.

Leveraging Social Structures

Rather than importing organizational structures that conflict with Gulf social realities, the Desert Porcupine strategy would reflect and harness existing social frameworks into its security architecture. Drawing from Cronin et al.'s work on Gulf military institutions, this approach would recognize tribal and family affiliations as potential strengths rather than obstacles to be overcome (Cronin, 2013; Crystal, 2016; Kostiner & Khoury, 1991). This exemplifies cultural aculturation not merely as tactical accommodation but as strategic advantage – building upon rather than attempting to override deeply embedded social structures that carry their own forms of cohesion and legitimacy. Indeed, the Gulf states are in a process of state formation, where they are actively creating and propagating the national myths (Ardemagni, 2019a; Diwan Smith, 2022), and states are already leveraging armed forces towards this end (Ardemagni, 2019b).

Dividing military forces in some way into tribally delineated groupings cuts against the broader prevailing ‘wisdom’ on this issue. The scholarly gist presently argues that Gulf states remain in a form of competition with tribes as important ‘other’ groupings that have a call upon peoples’ loyalties (Al Fahad, 2015b; Al Sarhan, 2015; Jones, 2010; Roberts, 2023). Equally, it is reasonable to muse whether this particular battle, so to speak, is over, or at least not as salient as it once was. The Gulf states are enormous behemoths, most suffused with hydrocarbon revenues, controlling myriad levers across the economic and social spectrum to control and exert influence. Tribal politics still hits the headlines sporadically, but typically this is precipitated by perceived slights or otherwise having an element of enfranchisement or opportunity taken away (Pyne-Jones, 2019; Qatar : Al-Murrah Return, Seeking Mercy, 2019).

Consequently, leveraging tribal loyalties and sentiment, but employing them in the service of the state is a potential answer to this. Indeed, to a degree, this is what Saudi Arabia did with its ‘White Army’ - formerly a bastion of tribal power - which became incorporated into the state structure and became the country's fourth force, the Saudi Arabia National Guard (SANG). Cognisant (and wary) of its tribal origins and potential latent power, Saudi leaders formalized an institution around these tribal groupings, encasing them in state apparatus, giving them a budget, endowing them with prestige as a core part of national defence, all the while making it quite clear where the power (and subsidy) lay within the relations (Cronin, 2013; Des Roches, 2022; Jones, 2010). Ultimately, there are various critiques to be levelled against the SANG, but it could seldom be said that in its century long history it actively challenged state power.

The Saudi Arabia National Guard (SANG) offers a partial historical parallel to this aspect of our counterfactual, demonstrating how tribal structures can be successfully incorporated into formal security architecture. While the SANG emerged by historical contingency rather than deliberate design, it illustrates how tribal affiliations can be leveraged rather than suppressed in military organization. Our counterfactual extends this principle more comprehensively, envisioning security architecture that consistently aligns with rather than works against social realities, embodying cultural aculturation as a foundational rather than incidental aspect of military development.

Ultimately, there may be risk to such an approach. The logic that trained and armed sub-state groupings (like tribes) might use their power to cut against or challenge the state is, as outlined, not an unreasonable concern. But it must also be noted that conventional received wisdom is often wide of the mark in Gulf politics. For example, for decades on end, the importance of the ‘Sudairi seven’ segment of the Al Saud ruling family was overly reified, as was the so-called fundamental power division in Saudi Arabia between the Al Saud and Al Wahhab politio-communities (Henderson, 2009, 2019; Hubbard, 2020; Niblock, 2006). Both were deemed immutable truths in Saudi and Gulf politics, until they were proven to reflect minimal reality when events showed these ideas to be hollow.

Moreover, a tribally rooted military force might enjoy other benefits. While myriad critiques abound of Arab military force, they also often argue that such forces do enjoy elements of important social cohesion (Pollack, 2019). This would not be surprising. Military forces have historically been rooted in and taken from tightknit communities for precisely these kinds of reasons.

Command structures would adapt traditional consultative processes through a Majlis Command Structure, maintaining clear hierarchical authority while incorporating elements of Gulf consultative traditions. This approach recognizes, as (Kamrava, 2000) noted, that effective military institutions in the Gulf must balance modernization with cultural continuity. Decision-making would follow established hierarchical patterns while creating formalized spaces for input from key stakeholders, similar to traditional majlis gatherings but adapted for military contexts.

A Gulf Legion

The Gulf Legion concept exemplifies both the resource-appropriate forces and indigenous innovation principles of our framework. It addresses the fundamental demographic constraints of smaller Gulf states by formalizing and institutionalizing what is currently an ad hoc approach to manpower challenges. Rather than attempting to create manpower-intensive western-style forces despite population limitations, this counterfactual proposes innovative adaptation of historical Gulf and Islamic practices of military organization to contemporary security needs.

The basic fact of Gulf militaries is that several of the smaller Gulf states, notably Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE, have small native populations that are not numerically adequate to populate full-scale, tri-service military forces alone (Barany, 2019, 2021). Though detail on this issue remains a key gap in the literature, it is evident that a range of foreigners already undertake critical roles across these forces, usually in a training and logistical capacity, though exceptions arise. For example, Australian national Mike Hindmarsh played a key role in the formation and direction of the UAE Presidential Guard, and British officers took senior positions in Oman’s forces into the 1990s.

This reliance on foreign expertise is, then, already the reality of Gulf monarchies’ security architecture. The counterfactual proposal herein would be to, in essence, formalize, institutionalize, and transform what is currently an ad hoc approach into a strategic advantage through the creation of a ‘Gulf Legion’. This concept would draw upon both historical precedents in the Islamic world and successful modern examples of foreign military integration.

The historical precedents discussed here, from Mamluk forces to the Abbasid Caliphate’s military structure, represent indigenous innovation in their original contexts, developing military systems responsive to specific political, demographic and strategic realities rather than importing foreign models. Similarly, the Gulf Legion concept demonstrates how selective adaptation can incorporate elements of contemporary models (like the French Foreign Legion) while maintaining alignment with regional historical traditions and current strategic needs. This approach embodies innovation not through technological novelty but through institutional creativity, reimagining military organization based on specific contextual requirements rather than isomorphic templates.

The concept of employing non-native military forces is deeply rooted in Arab political and military history. The Mamluk Sultanate (1250–1517) represents perhaps the most sophisticated example of such integration. Its elite Royal Mamluk forces comprised various foreign groupings including Turks, Circassians, refugees from Ayyubid armies, Kurdish tribal contingents, Turkoman groups, and various displaced military elements who had fled Mongol expansions (Amitai, 2006; Ayalon, 1953, 1994; Levanoni, 1995). Entrusted with the sultan’s personal protection, these forces formed decisive elements in major campaigns and were rewarded handsomely. Beyond this core, auxiliary forces also of foreign origin played critical strategic and operational roles, with the Turcomans considered most significant among these elements (Amitai, 2006; Ayalon, 1953, 1994; Levanoni, 1995).

Even earlier, the Abbasid Caliphate established patterns of foreign military integration, particularly from the reign of Caliph al-Mu’tasim (r. 833-842), when the influence of Arab forces progressively diminished in favour of non-Arab military elements, including Mawālī [موالي] (non-Arab clients), Turkish military units and specialized forces from Central Asia, including the Farāghina [فراغنة] and Ushrūsiyya [أشروسية] (Ayalon, 1994). The significance of these foreign military elements was such that al-Mu’tasim constructed the city of Samarra explicitly to house and separate Turkish forces from both the general population and other ethnic military contingents, an early example of specialized infrastructure developed to accommodate foreign military personnel.

Modern examples provide equally valuable templates, such as the British Gurkhas or the French Foreign Legion. The former employs a cultural accommodation model preserving distinctive (Gurkha) traditions within the wider British command ethos and mission, while the Foreign Legion approach is about assimilation creating a new identity with the principle of Legio Patria Nostra (the Legion is our Homeland) (Cooper, 2006; Porch, 2010; Rand & Wagner, 2012; Ware, 2012). The French example bears striking similarities to the Mamluk system’s transformation of foreign recruits into a distinct military elite with primary allegiance to the institution rather than their places of origin. The Legion’s legal framework, offering pathways to French citizenship after service, provided structural incentives for loyalty comparable to the economic benefits granted to Mamluks.

A Gulf Legion could build upon these historical and contemporary precedents by establishing a formalized system for recruiting, training, and integrating foreign military personnel into Gulf security forces. Such a system would not represent a radical departure from regional traditions, but rather a contemporary adaptation of established historical governance strategies. Some kind of tiered citizenship could be offered in return for long-term military service, fostering a buy-in and esprit de corps. This could range from initial contractual status through extended residency rights to selective pathways for permanent residency or even limited forms of citizenship for exceptional service. This strives to overcome inevitable concerns of whether or not, when conflicts turn hot and dangerous, foreign nationals will, to put it bluntly, put their life on the line for a pay check.

By institutionalizing what is currently an ad hoc approach to foreign military expertise, the Gulf Legion concept would transform a demographic weakness into a strategic asset while drawing upon a rich tradition of foreign military integration in Islamic history. The sophisticated mechanisms developed by historical Arab rulers to manage, incentivize, and control foreign military forces, from separation policies to exploitation of internal rivalries to economic incentive structures, provide valuable lessons for this contemporary adaptation of established governance strategies.

This counterfactual exploration demonstrates how the four principles of our framework, threat-centric focus, local cultural aculturation, resource-appropriate forces, and indigenous innovation, might combine to produce a radically different security architecture when freed from isomorphic pressures. By beginning with specific threats rather than organizational templates, aligning with rather than overriding social structures, acknowledging demographic realities, and selectively adapting historical and contemporary models, the Desert Porcupine strategy represents not a practical proposal per se but a theoretical demonstration of alternative possibilities in security development. Its value lies not in its immediate applicability but in its illustration of how different organizing principles might generate distinctive security approaches tailored to specific Gulf contexts.

Conclusion

This article has examined the pervasive phenomenon of military isomorphism in the GCC states. When viewed from first principles, there is something inherently curious about the wholesale importation of western military models, developed in distinctly different historical, geographical, and cultural contexts, onto and into the Arabian Peninsula. This observation is not a critique so much as an invitation to pause and reflect on whether military organizations across vastly different societies should necessarily closely resemble one another.

Our examination of the three mechanisms of institutional isomorphism, coercive, mimetic, and normative, has illuminated how these processes unfold in the Gulf context and why they appear so natural as to escape critical examination. Rather than defaulting to models proven elsewhere, security architectures might instead be reimagined through core principles responsive to local conditions: threat-centric design aligned with actual regional challenges; cultural integration that leverages rather than overrides existing social structures; resource-appropriate scaling that acknowledges demographic and sustainability constraints; and selective adaptation that thoughtfully incorporates external practices while preserving valuable indigenous approaches.

The ‘Desert Porcupine’ strategy serves as a thought experiment rather than a policy prescription. Its value lies less in its practical applicability; indeed, generations of isomorphic pressures have created path dependencies that would make such radical departures challenging if not impossible, but in its demonstration that fundamentally different conceptualizations of security are theoretically available. By envisioning an ex-nihilo alternative security architecture, we gain perspective on both the contingency of current arrangements and the theoretical possibility of different paths. The counterfactual helps denaturalize what has come to seem inevitable, revealing the space of possibilities foreclosed by isomorphic tendencies.

This exploration has implications that extend beyond the Gulf to broader questions of military development globally. It invites reflection on the principles that guide security architecture formation and the potential value of approaches that begin with local contexts rather than imported templates. The challenge is not merely technical but intellectual; creating space to imagine security differently while acknowledging the powerful forces that drive institutional convergence. By recognizing both the historical contingency of current arrangements and the theoretical availability of alternatives, we might approach military isomorphism not as an inevitability but as one path among many possible trajectories in security development.

Footnotes

ORCID iD

David B. Roberts

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author Biography

Dr. David B. Roberts is a Reader at King’s College London. He leads the twin-track Arabic and English Master of Research (MRes) programme in the School of Security Studies and serves as Head of Professional Education and Enterprise in the School, leading the King's Institute for Applied Security Studies (KIASS). David is the founder and commissioning editor for Cambridge University Press’s book series Elements in Middle East Politics. Previously, David was the Director of the Gulf office of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies think-tank. His 2023 book Security Politics in the Gulf Monarchies was published by Columbia University Press.

References

Adamsky

(2010). The culture of military innovation: The impact of cultural factors on the revolution in military affairs in Russia. In The US, and Israel: Stanford University Press.

Al Fahad

(2015a). Raiders and traders: A poet’s lament on the end of the Bedouin heroic age. In Haykel

Hegghammer

Lacroix

(Eds.), Saudi Arabia in transition: Insights on social, political, economic and religious change: Cambridge University Press.

Al Fahad

(2015b). Rootless trees: Genealogical politics in Saudi Arabia. In Haykel

Hegghammer

Lacroix

(Eds.), Saudi Arabia in transition : Insights on social, political, economic and religious change: Cambridge University Press.

Allen

C. H.

Rigsbee II

W. L.

(2014). Oman under qaboos: From coup to constitution, 1970-1996. Routledge.

Alley

(2021). Alliance participation, treaty depth, and military spending. International Studies Quarterly, 65(4), 929–943. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqab077

Al Omran

Kerr

(2017). Ballistic missile intercepted near Riyadh airport: Financial Times.

Al-Rasheed

(2014). A history of Saudi Arabia. Cambridge University Press.

Al Sarhan

(2015). The struggle for authority: The shaykhs of jihadi-salafism in Saudi Arabia, 1997-2003. In Haykel

Hegghammer

Lacroix

(Eds.), Saudi Arabia in transition: Insights on social, political, economic and religious change. Cambridge University Press.

Amitai

(2006). The mamlūk institution, or one thousand years of military slavery in the Islamic world. In Brown

C. L.

Morgan

P. D.

(Eds.), Arming slaves: From classical times to the Modern Age, (p. 0). Yale University Press.

10.

Ardemagni

(2019a). Icons of the nation: The military factor in the UAE’s nation-building. LSE Blogs.

11.

Ardemagni

(2019b). “Gulf monarchies’ militarized nationalism”. Sada: Carnegie Endowment. https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2019/02/gulf-monarchies-militarized-nationalism?lang=en (28 Febroary 2019).

12.

Ardemagni

(2020). “Arab Gulf states: Expanding roles for the military”, Oxford research encyclopedia of politics.

13.

Ayalon

(1953). “Studies on the structure of the mamluk army --I”. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 15(2), 203–228. http://www.jstor.org/stable/608548. (November).

14.

Ayalon

(1994). Islam and the abode of war: Military slaves and Islamic adversaries. Taylor & Francis Group.

15.

Barany

(2019). Military officers in the Gulf: Career trajectories and determinants. Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

16.

Barany

(2021). Armies of Arabia: Military politics and effectiveness in the gulf. Oxford University Press.

17.

Benson

B. V.

(2012). Constructing international security: Alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard: Cambridge University Press.

18.

Boghardt

L. P.

(2016), “Gulf fears of Iranian subversion”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

19.

Brooks

(2007). Introduction. In Brooks

Stanley

(Eds.), Creating military power: The sources of military effectiveness. Stanford University Press.

20.

Cooper

N. J.

(2006). The French foreign legion: Forging transnational identities and meanings. French Cultural Studies, 17(3), 269–284. https://doi.org/10.1177/0957155806068092

21.

Cordesman

A. H.

(2007). Gulf military forces in an era of asymmetric wars. Preager.

22.

Cordesman

A. H.

(2008). Security challenges and threats in the Gulf : A net assessment. Centre for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS).

23.

Cordesman

A. H.

(2012). Iran and the Gulf military balance - 1: The conventional and asymmetric dimensions. Centre for Strategic and International Studies.

24.

Cordesman

A. H.

(2020). “Iran and the changing military balance in the Gulf”, net assessment indicators. CSIS.

25.

Cronin

(2013). Armies and state-building in the modern Middle East : Politics, nationalism and military reform. IB Tauris & Co.

26.

Crystal

(2016). Tribes and patronage networks in Qatar. In Rabi

(Ed.), Tribes and states in a changing Middle East. Oxford University Press.

27.

Dagres

(2024). A year ago, beijing brokered an iran-Saudi deal. In How does détente look today? Atlantic Council. Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/iran-saudi-Arabia-china-deal-one-year/ (Accessed 8 May 2025).

28.

Des Roches

(2022). Beyond the glitter factor: Building defence capacity in king salman’s Saudi Arabia. In Thompson

M. C.

Quilliam

(Eds.), Governance and domestic policy-making in Saudi Arabia: Transforming society, economics, politics and culture, (p. 93). IB Tauris.

29.

DiMaggio

P. J.

Powell

W. W.

(1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48(2), 147–160. https://doi.org/10.2307/2095101

30.

Diwan Smith

(2022). Saudi Arabia’s new nationalist foreign policy. Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. Available at: https://agsiw.org/saudi-Arabias-new-nationalist-foreign-policy/ (Accessed 9 May 2025).

31.

Domingo

F. R. C.

(2018). Small states and the strategic utility of cyber capabilities. Nottingham University.

32.

Domingo

F. R. C.

(2022). Making sense of cyber capabilities for small states: Case studies from the Asia-Pacific. Routeldge.

33.

Donaldson

(2001). The contingency theory of organizations. Sage.

34.

Donaldson

(2006). The contingency theory of organizational design: Challenges and opportunities. In Burton

R. M.

Håkonsson

D. D.

Eriksen

Snow

C. C.

(Eds.), Organization design: The evolving state-of-the-art (pp. 19–40): Springer US.

35.

Echevarria

A. J.

(2005). Fourth-generation war and other myths, strategic studies institute. U.S. Army War College.

36.

Farrell

(2005). World culture and military power. Security Studies, 14(3), 448–488. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410500323187

37.

Farrell

Terriff

(2002). The sources of military change: Culture, politics, technology. Lynne Rienner.

38.

Fearon

J. D.

(1991). Counterfactuals and hypothesis testing in political science. World Politics, 43(2), 169–195. https://doi.org/10.2307/2010470

39.

Fischerkeller

M. P.

Harknett

R. J.

(2017). Deterrence is not a credible strategy for cyberspace. Orbis, 61(3), 381–393. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2017.05.003

40.

Gause

I. I. I. G.

(2010). The international relations of the Persian Gulf. Cambridge University Press.

41.

Gray

C. S.

(1999). Strategic culture as context: The first generation of theory strikes back. Review of International Studies, 25(1), 49–69. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210599000492

42.

Great Expectations: The Future of Iranian-Saudi Détente Crisis Group . (2024). Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/Gulf-and-Arabian-peninsula/iran-saudi-Arabia/b92-great-expectations-future (Accessed 8 May 2025).

43.

Greenwood

Meyer

R. E.

(2008). Influencing ideas: A celebration of DiMaggio and powell (1983). Journal of Management Inquiry, 17(4), 258–264. https://doi.org/10.1177/1056492608326693

44.

Haverman

(1993). Follow the leader: Mimetic isomorphism and entry into new markets. Administrative Science Quarterly, 48(4).

45.

Henderson

(2009). After king Abdullah, Washington institute for near east policy. After King Abdullah: Succession in Saudi Arabia. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/after-king-abdullah-succession-saudi-arabia

46.

Henderson

(2019). A fifty-year reign? MBS and the future of Saudi Arabia. In Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

47.

Hubbard

(2020). MBS: The rise to power of mohammed Bin Salman. Willian Collins.

48.

Hughes

(2009). A ‘model campaign’Reappraised: The counter-insurgency war in Dhofar, Oman, 1965–1975. Journal of Strategic Studies, 32(2), 271–305. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390902743357

49.

Hughes

T. P.

(1986). The seamless web: Technology, science, Etcetera, Etcetera. Social Studies of Science, 16(2), 281–292. https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312786016002004

50.

Hughes

T. P.

(2004). American genesis: A century of invention and technological enthusiasm, 1870-1970. University of Chicago Press.

51.

Iran spy cells operate in Gulf states: Kuwaiti MP . (2010), AFP.

52.

Johnston

A. I.

(1995). Thinking about strategic culture. International Security, 19(4), 32–64. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539119

53.

Johnston

(2016), “Analysis: Iran spy ring reports set off Gulf Arab alarm bells”. Reuters.

54.

Jones

(2010). Desert kingdom: How oil and water forged modern Saudi Arabia. Harvard University Press.

55.

Junio

T. J.

(2009). Military history and fourth generation warfare. Journal of Strategic Studies, 32(2), 243–269. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390902743266

56.

Kamrava

(2000). Military professionalization and civil‐military relations in the Middle East. Political Science Quarterly, 115(1), 67–92. https://doi.org/10.2307/2658034

57.

Kegley

C. W.

Raymond

G. A.

(1982). Alliance norms and war: A new piece in an old puzzle. International Studies Quarterly, 26(4), 572–595. https://doi.org/10.2307/3013963

58.

Kier

(1995). Culture and military doctrine: France between the wars. International Security, 19(4), 65–93. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539120

59.

Klein

(1991). A theory of strategic culture. Comparative Strategy, 10(1), 3–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/01495939108402827

60.

Kostiner

Khoury

(1991). Tribes and state formation in the Middle East. University of California Press.

61.

Ladwig III

W. C.

(2008). Supporting allies in counterinsurgency: Britain and the dhofar rebellion. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 19(1), 62–88. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592310801905793

62.

Levanoni

(1995). A turning point in mamluk history. Brill.

63.

Mahoney

Barrenechea

(2019). The logic of counterfactual analysis in case-study explanation. The British Journal of Sociology, 70(1), 306–338. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.12340

64.

Marschall

(2003). Iran’s Persian Gulf policy : From Khomeini to Khatami. RoutledgeCurzon.

65.

Marshall

(2016). Military prestige, defense-industrial production and the rise of the Gulf military activism. In Albrecht

Croissant

Lawson

F. H.

(Eds.), Armies and insurgencies in the Arab spring. University of Pennsylvania Press.

66.

Michaek

Alex

(2015). The Saudi-UAE war effort in Yemen (part 1): Operation golden arrow in Aden (10). The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/saudi-uae-war-effort-yemen-part-2-air-campaign.

67.

Mizruchi

Fein

(1999). The social construction of organizational knowledge: A study of the uses of coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(4), 653–683. https://doi.org/10.2307/2667051

68.

Nemeth

(2022). How to achieve defence cooperation in Europe? The subregional approach. Bristol University Press.

69.

Niblock

(2006). Saudi Arabia : Power, legitimacy and survival. Routledge.

70.

Öztürk

İ.

(2020). A way for organizations to cope with uncertainty: Mimetic isomorphism. In ERÇETİN

Ş. Ş.

AÇIKALIN

Ş. N.

(Eds.), Chaos, complexity and leadership 2018 (pp. 271–283). Springer International Publishing.

71.

Parker

T. B.

Bakir

(2024). Strategic shifts in the Gulf: GCC defence diversification amidst US decline. The International Spectator, 59(4), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2024.2409243

72.

Pedersen

(2023). A small state’s cyber posture: Deterrence by punishment and beyond. Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies, 6(1). https://doi.org/10.31374/sjms.191

73.

Peterson

J. E.

(1986). Defending Arabia, Croom Helm: Routledge.

74.

Pollack

K. M.

(2019). Armies of sand: The past, present and future of Arab military effectiveness. Oxford University Press.

75.

Pollack

K. M.

(2020). Understanding UAE military effectiveness. AEI.

76.

Porch

(2010), The French foreign legion: A complete history of the legendary fighting force, Skyhorse.

77.

Porter

(2009). Military orientalism: Eastern war through Western eyes. Hurst & Co.

78.

Pretorius

(2008). The security imaginary: Explaining military isomorphism. Security Dialogue, 39(1), 99–120. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010607086825

79.

Pyne-Jones

(2019). Thousands of Al Ghofran tribesmen stripped of their Qatari citizenship fight for their rights. International Observatory Human Rights.

80.

Qatar : Al-Murrah return, ‘seeking mercy . (2019). Gulf states newsletter, Vol. 1078.

81.

Qatar Considers Ways of Keeping Iranians Off Their Rigs . (2009). Gulf states newsletter, No. 845.

82.

Rand

Wagner

K. A.

(2012). Recruiting the ‘martial races’: Identities and military service in colonial India. Patterns of Prejudice, 46(3–4), 232–254. https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2012.701495

83.

Roberts

D. B.

(2021). Lifting the ‘protection curse’: The rise of new military powers in the Middle East. Survival, 63(2), 139–154. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2021.1905997

84.

Roberts

D. B.

(2017). Qatar and the UAE: Exploring divergent responses to the Arab spring. The Middle East Journal, 71(4), 544–562. https://doi.org/10.3751/71.4.12

85.

Roberts

D. B.

(2020). Bucking the trend: The UAE and the development of military capabilities in the Arab world. Security Studies, 29(2), 301–334. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2020.1722852

86.

Roberts

D. B.

(2023). Security politics in the Gulf monarchies: Continuity amid change. Columbia University Press.

87.

Roberts

D. B.

(2025). The Gulf’s evolving security mosaic: Balancing the US’s manifest retrenchment and latent influence. International Affairs, (November).

88.

Rossiter

(2014). Britain and the development of professional security forces in the Gulf Arab states, 1921-71: Local forces and informal empire. Exeter University.

89.

Rossiter

(2020). Security in the Gulf: Local militaries before British withdrawal. Cambridge University Press.

90.

Saleh

(2020). GCC-US alliance-making reconsidered: The travails of dependency. The International Spectator, 55(2), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2020.1741269

91.

Samaan

J.-L.

(2019). “The Strategy Behind New Gulf War Colleges”. Sada. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2019/03/the-strategy-behind-new-Gulf-war-colleges?lang=en (Accessed 14 March 2025).

92.

Samaan

J.-L.

(2023). New military strategies in the Gulf. I. B. Tauris.

93.

Smith

(2007). Iran threatens Gulf blitz if U.S. hits nuclear plants. The Sunday Times.

94.

Snyder

(1997). Alliance politics. Cornell University Press.

95.

Soeters

J. L.

(2008). Afghanistan talks. Experiential isomorphism in the military. In Caforio

Kümmel

Purkayastha

(Eds.), Armed forces and conflict resolution: Sociological perspectives. (Vol. 7, pp. 139–156). Emerald Group Publishing Limited. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1572-8323(08)07008-2

96.

Soubrier

(2016). Mirages of power? From sparkly appearances to empowered apparatus, evolving trends and implications of arms trade in Qatar and the UAE. In Des Roches

D. B.

Thafer

(Eds.), The arms trade, military services and the security market in the Gulf. Gerlach Press.

97.

Suchman

M. C.

Eyre

D. P.

(1992). Military procurement as rational myth: Notes on the social construction of weapons proliferation. Vol. 7, presented at the sociological forum (pp. 137–161). Springer.

98.

Valeri

(2017). Oman: Politics and society in the qaboos state: Hurst & Co.

99.

Wachholtz

M. F.

Soeters

(2022). Multinational military cooperation in the global south (p. 0095327X221114928). Armed Forces & Society.

100.

Ware

(2012). Military migrants: Fighting for YOUR country. Springer.

101.

Winner

(1980). Do artifacts have politics? Daedalus, 109(1).

Beyond Mimicry: Military Isomorphism and Context-Specific Security Approaches in the Gulf

Abstract

Keywords

Introduction

Theory & Practice of Military Isomorphism

Coercive Isomorphism: External Pressures and Structural Dependencies

Mimetic Isomorphism: Uncertainty and Prestige-Seeking Emulation

Normative Isomorphism: Professional Socialization and Educational Networks

Toward Context-Specific Security Approaches

Theoretical Foundations: Beyond Isomorphism

Threat-Centric Focus

Local Cultural Aculturation

Resource-Appropriate Forces

Indigenous Innovation & Adaptation

The Desert Porcupine: Reimagining a Small State Security Architecture

Asymmetric Small State Deterrence

Leveraging Social Structures

A Gulf Legion

Conclusion

Footnotes

ORCID iD

Funding

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Author Biography

References