Reimagining Autism

Abstract

Imagination is a fundamental cognitive function linked to perception, learning, and motivation. Among neurodiverse individuals, particularly autistic people, imagination plays a vital role in self-awareness, identity formation, and well-being. However, traditional theories have framed autism as a condition marked by deficits in imagination and communication, often relying on behavioral observations rather than internal cognitive processes. This paper critically examines dominant theories, such as the Theory of Mind hypothesis, and challenges deficit-based perspectives by highlighting the unique and valuable nature of autistic imagination. Through an analysis of imaginative play, artistic expression, and language, this study demonstrates how autistic individuals engage with creativity in ways that differ from but are not inferior to neurotypical norms. Additionally, emerging cognitive neuroscience research suggests that autistic individuals may possess heightened sensory imagination and distinct neural processing mechanisms. Ultimately, this paper advocates for a neurodiversity-affirming perspective that recognizes autistic imaginative competencies, calling for a shift in educational, clinical, and societal approaches to better support and appreciate autistic creativity.

“You can’t depend on your eyes when your imagination is out of focus”.

Mark Twain

However defined, imagination can be considered as grounded in the perception of experience, learning, senses, motivation, and intention (Ruciñsca et al., 2015). It is a crucial component of well-being for neurodiverse individuals, particularly contributing to the development of self-awareness (Agnati et al., 2013), identity formation (Fuist, 2020), and increased well-being (Totterdell & Poerio, 2021). For children diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder (hereafter referred to as autism), a neurodevelopmental condition that influences social communicative skills and presents with very focused and repetitive patterns of behaviour, imaginative skills are centrally featured in academic literature. Figure 1 shows a cursory bibliometric review using a social network analysis of all PUBMED peer-reviewed publications from 1964 to 2025, comprising a total of 568 articles (for method details, see Figure 1 Note).

Figure 1.

Using VOSviewer's create map wizard tool, we selected bibliographic data as the input type and pubMed as the data source. We created a co-occurrence network based on keywords (e.g., “Communication” AND “Autism” AND “Child” AND “Imagination” AND “Consciousness”) for publications between 1964 and 2025. Full counting was applied to include all keyword occurrences, capturing the overall prevalence and connections between themes.

As the clusters depict, the relationships between communication, autism, and imagination in children are vastly complex. While the green cluster (top left of Figure 1)includes variables that are more subjective (i.e., experience and perspective), the blue cluster (bottom left of Figure 1) highlights more objective variables (i.e., score and trait) that may be considered when assessing relationships between imagination, communication and autism in children. Notably, the red cluster (bottom right of Figure 1), which seemingly highlights diagnostic characteristics of autism and communication delays, is linked less frequently with the other two clusters. In summary, the existing literature has a clear focus on assessment of imagination, via subjective and objective measures, while the opportunity to integrate autism-specific characteristics, as opposed to the identity of autism, is lacking.

In essence, the clusters shown in Figure 1 reflects the three general behaviour-based orthodox assumptions about autistic children: (i) autistic children present a deficiency in interest and ability to engage in pretend play; (ii) autistic children fail or underperform in tests that account for theory of mind; and (iii), autistic children generally display less symbolic creative imagination compared to neurotypical control groups. Specifically, Baron-Cohen (1989) identifies that the theory of mind hypothesis is set to explain “autism-specific communicative and imaginative impairments”. These dominant theories of autistic imagination and theory of mind are crucial to consider in the context of historical diagnostic criteria and consequential social perceptions of an autism diagnosis (Holt et al., 2020), and in particular relation to the growing rebuttals towards the underlying deficit framing of autism and neurodiversity by autistic and non-autistic academics and researchers (Bottema-Beutel et al., 2023)

In contrast to the orthodox theory of mind view, this paper reviews convergent exemplary evidence to suggest that not only imaginative abilities are pervasive, but also valuable, and formative to the autistic mind, although they might be different from the neurotypical experience. Specifically, the paper first highlights key research that features autistic imaginative thinking and action in art, play, and social communication. Then, we highlight evidence from neuroscience supporting the neurodiversity social movement framework (Dwyer, 2022). Finally, the practical implications of addressing conceptualizations and perspectives of autistic capacity, competency and motivation for imaginative thinking are discussed. Our focus is translational, mainly concerning the application of a much-needed update of epistemic paradigms to educational and health care contexts, which are now lagging current progress in developmental science and neuroscience research, potentially, with nontrivial consequences.

Imagination and Communication in the Style of Play, art, and Language

Play

Imagination is pervasive in play, often yielding subjectively more enjoyable experiences for children and youth (Göncü & Vadeboncoeur, 2017). Claims of autistic children having difficulty with “free play” or “creative play” consequently imply that the transactional nature of play is not adhered to by autistic children and others who are considered neurodiverse. However, there are significant barriers to understanding how imagination presents itself in play for autistic children.

The Model of Playfulness (Masek, 2024; Waldman-Levi et al., 2022), highlights that three components of the play continuum must be accounted for: (i) motivation; (ii) control; and (iii) suspension of reality. The motivation for an autistic child to play imaginatively could be intrinsic (i.e., they genuinely enjoy the activity), or extrinsic (i.e., they want to play so they can reap the benefits of social play). Children may also use imaginative play to express internal emotions through the proxy of another item or pretend person (Stagnitti & Unsworth, 2000). In a sense, imaginative play may be considered by some as an emotional regulation strategy for autistic children. The emotions are not imaginative, but the item or character expressing them may be. In the same sense, the control component of the Model of Playfulness would be reflected in the decision to play imaginatively and when to stop playing imaginatively. This control may also be reflected in what play components are imaginative while others are not. Finally, imaginative play directly links to the suspension of reality as the autistic child reflects on how far their imaginative perspective takes them from their objective reality. The components of objective reality serve as a base for imaginative play. Still, the subjectively unique constructs used within the play session depend on the intent to play outside of traditionally functional methods of play that are routinely looked for by researchers. These traditionally functional methods of play may be seen within the mental models of how others should act towards one another during a play scenario. This initiation and subsequent transition of thinking in play begins with the setting of internal and external expectations for meaningful socialization. One way a child may do this in a play setting is by practicing framing, the ability of an individual to successfully provide non-verbal and verbal social cues (Bundy, 1997). The ability to frame is crucial for autistic children to have a successful imaginative play session. Children who frame well utilize social cues to lead the structure and content of play with other children.

Considering that autism is a neurodevelopmental condition characterized by social and communication deficits, framing for autistic children is relatively challenging. For some, camouflaging, or the adaptation of presence and rate of social behaviors to blend into social environments, may be beneficial in supporting framing by ensuring that a social experience is as positive as it can be, despite challenges (Denomey, 2022). In doing so, the child may be more successful in compensating for their challenges in successfully navigating social cues by adapting their social behaviors so social cues are effectively addressed. More specifically, deep compensation, a form of camouflaging, is a method that autistic individuals can use to compensate for their challenges in perspective-taking and navigating the mental states of others (Livingston et al., 2019). By learning social expectations, children can develop a “manual” or “decision tree” of how to play socially when the autistic child receives particular social cues. This concept is equivalent to imagined interaction (Honeycutt & McCann 2017), where the child predicts and rehearses possible outcomes of the play session before it has occurred and then carries out actions in the play session that align with the most successful outcome.

The child may utilize imagined play in one of two ways: they may imagine the interaction of play and adapt accordingly to the imagination of others, or they may use previously successful (mental) models of imagination play methods and form a framework of how they can use their imagination to engage in the play without worrying about the processing steps required to do so. Importantly, though, the incentive to play imaginatively must be present. If children are surrounded by individuals who in one way or another do not encourage, model, and reward imaginative play, then playing imaginatively is no longer reinforced and will be reduced, possibly promoting withdrawal and its generalization to most play contexts. In addition, the criticism of imaginative play attempts by autistic children only reduces their motivation to play in that manner (Jarrold, 2003). In such a context, play, however, is grounded on social interaction unfolding because of complex communicative reciprocal dynamics, not unilaterally determined by a uniquely disengaged and demotivated autistic trait.

Critically, the presence and quality of pretend, functional and exploratory play are determined by the subjective perspectives of observers. It is not scientifically or logically plausible to suggest that an observer's (third-person) perception of play is concurrent with the internal (first-person) motivation or experience of the autistic individual. Imagination may be utilized internally but present as non-imaginative. In the case of imagined interaction and deep compensation, imaginative practices are occurring that are not visible in the play session (behaviorally) but are happening, nonetheless, (as part of self-consciousness).

Art

Creativity, a commonality in academic and lay discussions of imagination, is defined as thoughts or actions that are both original and effective (Runco & Jaeger, 2012). The subjectivity of art is an argument that has, and will continue to be, a central tenet of perspective-taking. The originality of imagination is challenging to consider as it assumes that the thought or action is new. Gestalt Principles of perspective can accurately determine what we are looking at, but this would require previous exposure and understanding of the constructs of what is being witnessed (Khatun, 2024). The same applies to perception of the imaginative generativity of autistic children.

Take the Allegory of the Cave (Plato, 2007); an autistic child who has not experienced something may use their imagination to concoct a conclusion of shadows on a cave wall. Their perception of what they are looking at is subjectively creative as it is original to them, even if it is not original to others (what Boden (2012) has called P-creativity, or psychological creativity). Once they can perceive the object or person rather than the shadow, their understanding aligns with the general public. Their previous perception is no longer original as it is now considered incorrect by societal standards due to the objectivity of what they originally tried to decipher and understand. In short, to have an original thought would require knowledge of what has already been discovered. For example, in art class, if a child conjures a picture of a horse with a horn on its head before learning of unicorns, then is this thought not “original"? Kasirer et al. (2020) found that compared to a control group of typically developing children, autistic children are not impaired in figural creativity; instead, they utilize cross-category insertions more often in drawing tasks. The conceptualization of an original thought could be considered achieved in this task. Yet, if another child has created the same combination of cross-category insertions (i.e., putting a horn on the head of a horse), then it would not be considered original. Importantly, this study also showed autistic children had a better grasp than neurotypical peers of novel linguistic metaphors, which strongly supports the frequent use of imaginative style in autistic children.

Furthermore, the participation in art, music and theatre by autistic individuals is significantly beneficial in improving social communication and social awareness, developing a more stable and strong personal identity, and reducing familial stress (López-Escribano & Orío-Aparicio, 2024; Bernier et al., 2022). To be clear, claims of autistic deficiencies in creativity (and for that matter, play as well) which are allegedly due to reduced effectiveness or value are subjective to the observer assigning value. Aristotle, for one, claimed that value is associated with need (Kraut, 2022); yet, as research criticizes the deficiencies in social and communicative skills of autistic individuals, art mediates this divergence from normalcy. Such mediation could be interpreted as a change that is ‘needed’ to align more with neurotypical standards of skill development. Participating in art-based activities is imaginative and creative as it acts as a window of opportunity for autistic children to think abstractly, use creative compensatory methods to communicate, and, even for a brief period, imagine that they are no longer deficient in the perspective of society (Vogel et al., 2023).

To conclude, perhaps, the creativity and imaginative abilities of autistic children in the context of art are not fully comprehensible. Merriam-Webster dictionary defines art as a “skill acquired by experience, study, or observation” and “the conscious use of skill and creative imagination, especially in the production of aesthetic objects.” (Merrian-Webster, n.d.). Allen and Craig (2016) found that autistic children's difficulties in being imaginative in art are likely due, in part, to challenges with executive functioning and planning. To note, this skill of art, particularly imaginative art, is a difficult one, as it requires the artist to determine what they are going to draw, keep it in working memory, create it and then monitor it to ensure that their vision is followed through (Ten Eyck & Müller, 2018). However, in the end, the skill is built on previous perceptions, as referenced through the Allegory of the Cave, but the aesthetic nature of the objects produced is subjective. If one does not view the art product as original or effective, that is one's perspective. This perspective does not reliably indicate the degree of imagination in the art activity. It also most certainly should not be used as a marker of the value the autistic child's use of imagination.

Language

Much of the evidence that suggests that autistic children are deficient in imagination aligns with the notion that autistic individuals lack a theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, 1989). However, the epistemological basis of this theory fails to account for receptive and expressive language (Shahaeian et al., 2023). Spoken and written language intersect and support the development of one another, particularly in populations of those with developmental disorders like autism (Hulme & Snowling, 2013). When conducting tasks that assess the theory of mind skills and capabilities, verbal ability has been shown to support autistic children in overcoming social skill deficiencies (Shahaeian et al., 2023). Likewise, Gernsbacher and Yergeau (2019) find other empirical failures that highlight epistemological misinterpretations of skill acquisition, the presence of already established skills, and the limited reliability and validity of using such tests of the theory of mind with a medical model of disability ingrained in observer perspectives.

Imagination may be an innate skill for some. Still, for most, the work of Vygotsky's zone of proximal development (Vygotsky, 1978, 2004) and Piaget's stages of development (Piaget, 1983) indicate that imaginative skills and language are developed over time and continue to develop as time goes on. As discussed previously, the absence of imaginative skills in writing or communication does not necessarily mean that imaginative skills are not being utilized. For instance, executive functioning, attention, and cognitive flexibility may be a barrier or facilitator to getting imaginative thoughts onto paper (Bourke et al., 2020). Another consideration may be the receptive language skills of the autistic child. In a classroom, it is easy for a teacher to give instructions that encourage the use of imagination, either through written or verbal instruction. However, if the child does not recognize what is being asked of them, then it should be no surprise that imagination is not present in the deliverables for the task (Allen & Craig, 2016). Within most educational pedagogies, the mantra for children, particularly those who may require additional support in the classroom, is to “listen and do what is asked of you.” Opportunities to be imaginative are often prompted in a classroom setting, and since autistic children thrive in routines, it is often challenging to adapt to being imaginative in writing and communication when not told to do so (Odom et al., 2021).

Significantly, these challenges to participating in imaginative tasks and expressing imagination on paper can be mediated via self-regulated strategy development (SRSD), an explicit strategy to teach planning, self-regulation, and task management (Allen & Craig, 2016; Pennington & Delano, 2012). This instructional process can support autistic children in focusing less on the process of imagination and rather focus on using their imagination skills. This method may also be supported via computer assistance, such as prompting or reminders of the strategies to ensure that internal thoughts are effectively disseminated (Pennington & Delano, 2012). Imaginative generativity may also help children express their unique verbal creativity skills, most commonly seen via the creation of novel metaphors (Kasirer et al., 2020). In the end, the intersection between imaginative skills, expressive and receptive skills, and the experience of learning how to communicate effectively may be the disconnect reflected in the literature (i.e., Figure 1) regarding the imaginative abilities of autistic children, and especially in false-belief tasks (see Gernsbacher and Yergeau, 2019).

Imagination and Language Learning: Evidence from the Neuroscience of Imagery

As reviewed so far, in autism research, “Imagination” encompasses various forms of thinking, including pretend play, storytelling, figurative language, and the ability to envision abstract concepts. However, these approaches suffer from unclear and imprecise definitions of which specific neurocognitive mechanisms underlie the observed behaviors or self-report measures or observations. On the other hand, approaches that reduce imagination to only having a sensory mental image suffer the issue of overreduction and low explanatory power and gap (D’Angiulli & Roy, 2024), especially with regards to abstract language acquisition (Molokopoy & D’Angiulli, 2022).

Emerging evidence in cognitive developmental neuroscience shows that autistic individuals have heightened sensory processing skills and superior skills in one component of imagination, that is, manipulating and using sensory mental imagery during thinking (Bled et al., 2024). Specifically, a currently very influential explanation of autistic manifestations (the Trigger-Threshold-Target Model or TTTM) proposes that the protypical phenotypical manifestation of autism is due to an epigenetic variation in non-verbal mental imagery skills (Mottron et al., 2014) which leads to a markedly different and idiosyncratic neural plasticity in autistic individuals. The latter account could explain another emerging literature which suggests that if individuals do not develop a proper executive control of sensory imagery, meaning that the sensory and memory image processes are not sufficiently and efficiently connected with higher-level processes, this can hinder the acquisition of more abstract language comprehension and expression as seen in some of the most complex forms of autism (Vyshedskiy, 2021). Indeed, some forms of autism seem to correlate with thinking in terms of words rather than images (Turnbull et al., 2020). It is possible that one of the processes hypothesized by Soulières et al. (2011), that is, veridical mapping, could apply equally well to words as to images since it is a functional process that works similarly for different mental contents which include multiple sensory modalities (visual and motor for imagery; auditory, visual, and motor for language/words).

Previously, we have proposed an alternative in defining imagination as generation of vivid representation (D’Angiulli & Roy, 2024), where “imagery” is defined as measurable complex informational structure which varies in self-rated detail, relevance and completeness strength (vividness) (Molokopoy & D’Angiulli, 2022). Using the latter vivid representing framework, we could reinterpret the current literature as supporting the following synthetic hypotheses: 1) Imagination, defined as generation and manipulation of vivid imagery (as above) is highly complex and specific in autistic children because is not developed as “in synch with language” as it is in neurotypical children; and 2) developing imagination in autism still retains some communicative aspects that can be used to support complex language development, following classical theories of Piaget (1952) and Vygotsky (1978); finally 3) Imagination in autism shows as suggested by TTTM specific differences in developmental neural plasticity of secondary functional brain lobes and their connectivity to posterior parietal-occipital sensory areas and the frontal lobes. Although speculative, the three propositions are falsifiable and can be empirically tested, therefore, we believe they are a plausible strong alternative to current deficit models of imagination in autism and could propel the field forward in a new direction more in line with current neurodiversity and neurodivergent narrative.

Implications

Based on existing literature, it is clear that the concept of imagination is adaptive, growing, and contingent on individual and group perspectives (Figure 1). In the autistic community, perceptions of imaginative abilities in autistic children have significant implications. An autistic artist spoke to the challenges of being imaginative in a culture that perceives autistic individuals as deficient in imaginative thinking, stating: “I wonder how often my own creativity has been underestimated by people who put me under a microscope and saw only a masked version of me” (Bridge, 2020, para. 4). This profound message highlights the impact that a deficit model of perceiving autistic skills can have. This perception also contributes to a learned helplessness model, where autistic children are told that they are deficient in their ability to use imagination, so their motivation to use imagination or learn to improve it is reduced. This reduction in imagination, due to preconceived notions of imaginative ability, is further emphasized by more research highlighting deficient imaginative abilities Figure 2.

Figure 2.

Model of Imagination and Internal Constructs that Impact it.

Furthermore, the conceptualization of imagination in autism is perplexing in terms of cultural shifts in perceptions of autism as an identity. To think differently is a common theme within the autism community as it is often viewed as a deficit, yet it is valued within the context of imagination. In Cree, autism, or pîtoteyihtam, translates to he/she thinks differently (Maggrah, 2025). This perspective of autism places unwavering value on the diversity attached to autism. For decades, and still in some areas of the world, thinking differently or being divergent from the norm in thinking is considered wrong; stray too far from the norm and your skills are excessive or deficient, respectively. This double bind of either being “normal” or being criticized for being too different is debilitating to the quality of life in autistic communities, as well as diminishing the value of diversity within the world (Lamash et al., 2024). Imaginative thoughts should be celebrated and shared with others to learn new perspectives and work together toward innovation.

Future research and policy interventions should focus on addressing the perspectives of autism skills in a positive, strengths-based model. Notably, Canada's National Autism Strategy advocates for the re-assessment and reflection of how public awareness, understanding and acceptance of autism can be defining factors in lived-experience of autistic children and their families (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2024). By viewing conditions like autism as differences in how the brain connects and uses imagination, we can break down barriers and make it easier for children to navigate daily life, build relationships, and communicate effectively with peers, parents, and caregivers. Moreover, institutions such as schools, healthcare, community centres, government, and research must reflect on the language, intent, and impact that they have attached to the conversations around encouraging autistic children to be imaginative in their lives. In addition, putting a box on the imagination through subjective assessments only creates a further distinction between neurodivergent and neurotypical groups. We cannot afford to condemn neurodiversity with measures of success that were, and are still, built to reflect the achievements of only the “normal.” The constructs assessed in imagination are diverse and must be inclusive of differing abilities of expression despite social barriers to do so. Ultimately, we must practice humility in acknowledging that imagination and creativity are not entirely objective. Perhaps these constructs are as diverse as the population that utilizes them; providing a platform for that diversity to thrive will continue to be challenging but will always be worth the work.