Protecting Agency Judges in an Age of Politicization: Evaluating Judicial Independence and Decisional Confidence in Administrative Adjudications

Abstract

Administrative judges, who serve in state and federal agencies, as opposed to a separate branch of government, are an understudied, and occasionally controversial, type of public administrator. Many who find themselves in administrative courts protest the agency judge’s lack of independence. According to critics, because agency judges are members of—and often evaluated by—the very agency with a vested interest in the case, they are subject to political influence and cannot possibly be an impartial arbitrator. In the United States, various approaches to addressing this concern have been employed. At the federal level, Congress grants some administrative judges statutory protections from agency evaluation. Most states have utilized an organizational independence approach by placing administrative judges in separate agencies dedicated to administrative adjudications. Via a national survey returned by 250 agency judges, this study compares perceptions of judicial independence and decisional confidence. It finds that administrative judges serving in independent agencies (known as central panels) report higher levels of judicial independence and more confidence their rulings will not be overturned. The theoretical implications are significant for public administration and administrative law scholars, especially those concerned about the politicization of administrative duties.