Are administrative adjudicators subject to external influence and pressures? We present the results from a nationwide survey of agency adjudicators, focusing on immigration judges (IJs) and administrative law judges (ALJs) in the Social Security Administration (SSA). ALJs follow decisional procedures spelled out in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and are given substantial legal protections from agency pressures. IJs do not follow APA procedures, nor do they receive its protections. We find IJs give significantly greater deference to the positions of the public, their agency, Congress, and the president, and report more favorable attitudes toward interest groups in adjudications.
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