Abstract
The first keyword,
What is the welfare state?
The decision to provide welfare, to whom and under what conditions, is always a political choice. The same can be said about migration control: in the absence of a universal right to migrate, who is allowed entry and under what conditions is a matter of political decision-making. Crucially though, political choices about welfare and migration are made only by people who are formal citizens and within specific institutional settings, informed by national and – in EU member states – increasingly European preferences. Therefore, as Etienne Balibar (2017: 38) notes, the welfare state is more accurately conceptualised as a ‘national social state’ linked to national citizenship.
With this keyword, we seek to problematise the relationship between ‘the welfare state’, understood as a national construct, and migration, which is often construed as a disruptive and destabilising force in the welfare state. Let us start by specifying that there is no widely accepted definition of the welfare state (Degen, 2015; Greve, 2014; Leisering and Leibfried, 1999; Øverbye, 2010; Tabin, 2022). Different definitions overlap and are sometimes in competition, each definition envisaging the object differently and each carrying different implications for migration research and policy. For some scholars, the welfare state is about regulating the market economy (e.g. Briggs, 1961; Marshall, 1970; Polanyi, 1944). For others, it is a political compromise between forces that want to overthrow capitalism and those that aim to perpetuate it (e.g., Castel, 1995; Ewald, 1986; Join-Lambert et al., 1994), while for others it is an instrument of government to protect populations from social risks (e.g., Bonvin and Maeder, 2020; Girod, 2002; Lengwiler, 2015; Merrien, 2006, 2007). The welfare state has also been approached as an apparatus used for the (re-)production of social relations (e.g., gender, class, age, race, ability, and their intersections; see Campbell, 2009; Crenshaw, 2017; Daly, 2020; Goodley, 2014; Jenson, 2015; Lewis, 1992, 1997; Orloff, 2009; Perriard and Tabin, 2017; Tabin and Leresche, 2019; Tabin et al., 2019). We follow this last definition because social relations (re-)produced by welfare states impact migrants (and, more broadly people who are categorised as not-belonging) in particular, and because citizens are globally favoured by welfare states (Tabin, 2021). The terms migrant and foreign nationals in the present text refer to the legal-administrative status (see ‘Introduction’). We consider the welfare state as historically and geographically situated, taking different forms in different countries, and we start from the point of view that these social relations evolve differently according to their context and overlap in unexpected ways.
Gender and race relations are ingrained in welfare states, which have historically played an important role in reproducing and recommodifying the adult male workforce, and in keeping wives and children fed and sheltered when husbands and fathers were unable to play their breadwinner role (e.g., because of death, illness, accident, or old age). The gendered character of welfare states has been partially diluted through the incorporation of women into the formal labour market, a process generally understood to have freed up labour power by shifting the responsibility for the care of children, persons with disabilities, and the elderly to the state. However, this perspective has been unresponsive to race relations and to the fact that race and gender are interdependent with other forms of oppressive constructs. In some countries, care work is largely assigned to migrant women to enable women from the majority population to enter the workforce. Many of those working as domestic or care workers in private (white) households (Horn, 2021; Kofman, 2012; Lutz, 2018) or public institutions (e.g., for the elderly) are women
Tom Bottomore (1992) and Ruth Lister (1990), among others, have shed light on exclusionary mechanisms and inequalities in access to rights due to legal migration status, gender, ethnicity, class as well as their intersections. We can see such exclusionary mechanisms and inequalities at work as well as their intersectional character in the social welfare responses put forward by EU states during the COVID-19 pandemic. EU states adopted various social protection measures for persons who lost their jobs or had a reduced income because they had to quarantine, for example. Research in the Netherlands shows that social measures most often failed to reach migrants because of the effects of intersectional discrimination generally experienced by migrants. As such, undocumented migrant workers (e.g., female domestic workers, workers in construction and hospitality) were by default excluded from compensatory payments and had to rely on informal social support. Documented migrant workers in secondary labour markets were constructed as vulnerable (because of lack of familiarity with Dutch systems) and temporary (because of their employment relations) as well as racialised as Eastern Europeans performing low-skilled and low paid jobs (Berntsen et al., 2023; De Lange et al., 2020). Their access to social rights and protection was shaped by legal, administrative and cultural barriers that have structurally exclusionary effects.
Historically, the fusion between the nation state and social citizenship, as well as between the nation and citizenship (Wicker, 1997), has provided the ideological and material basis for collaboration between social classes based on common membership in a given nation, such that the domestic working class has come to understand their interests as being linked to those of the capitalist class (cf. Turner, 2009; Wicker, 1997), particularly concerning the exclusion of certain migrants from full access to social rights. This helps explain the marginalised position of migrants concerning social citizenship and their marking as a threat to national workers, an issue that also figures in the struggles of national labour movements to ‘internationalise’ and co-opt migrant workers (Doellgast et al., 2018). In her recent work, Inés Valdez (2021) traces the links between race, empire, labour, and capitalism and shows how ‘white workers claimed a right to move and settle while objecting to the mobility of non-white labour, which they saw as threatening’ (Valdez, 2021: 905). This led to segregated labour spaces that fit with racial capitalism's goals of controlling labour through differentiation and separation (Valdez, 2021: 906). Valdez’ argument is that the current migration policies of the Global North, which create the conditions for migrants’ legal vulnerability and exclusion, are best understood in light of ‘the convergence between capital's efforts to regulate mobility for the purpose of exploitation and understandings of popular sovereignty as containing a right to exclude’ (Valdez, 2021: 920).
Welfare chauvinism/nationalism
Mainstream categorisations of different welfare states rely on generalisations about differences between such states. Gøsta Esping-Andersen's (1990) distinction between liberal, conservative and social-democratic welfare states has been used widely, with the consequence of a normative ranking between welfare states based upon the idea of their more or less important degree of decommodification (e.g., the US welfare state with only a selective decommodification, France and Germany with a corporatist decommodification, and Scandinavian countries with a generalised decommodification; Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 1987; see also Esping-Andersen, 1990: 12–29; Rothstein, 2017: 27f). This perspective, however, does not address the situation of migrants in welfare states, and tends to occlude the social relations they (re)produce.
While mainstream perspectives focus on differences between states, we want to highlight that welfare states share commonalities (Tabin and Enescu, 2012) that affect migrants in similar ways. Indeed, if the ideas about social policies are diverse, and if the reasons for developing them are multiple and sometimes contradictory, they have at least three common characteristics. First, in the Global North, social policies are conceived at the national level; that is, they always intend to change the situation inside the borders of states, even if the borders are sometimes regional or local (hence the term welfare
Who exactly are the ‘members’ who should be entitled to welfare state provisions? This is at the crux of discussions about welfare and migration control. Social welfare is provided by the state to citizens and some categories of residents, through various forms of social security systems, to minimise or mitigate risks recognised as social risks (Gusfield, 1980), either through more universal or more selective security systems, such as needs-based benefits and insurances (Walker, 2009). Historically, European nation-states have been both inclusionary and exclusionary, especially in relation to those perceived and/or legally defined as foreigners. For instance, the notion of ‘the social enemy, the poor foreigner’ emerged in tandem with the transition from local (often parish-based) poor relief to national welfare and social security systems (Walters, 2002). Presently in European nation-states, rights are not only based on citizenship, but also on the human rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Social Charter, the European Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, as well as various United Nation conventions. Yet, legal debates about the justiciability and realisation of social rights continue, despite their anchoring in legal instruments (Boyle, 2020), highlighting their intrinsically contested nature, especially when the holder is not a ‘citizen’.
Migrants, as simultaneous holders of social rights and subjects to migration control, are perceived to threaten the national welfare state. Consequently, although international migration contribute substantially to the economies of their host and home countries via employment in formal and informal labour markets, migrant workers are often excluded from social protections (ILO, n.d.) even if they have to contribute to their financing via taxes. The exclusion of this group also has to do with the unwillingness among high-income countries to ratify the UN migrant worker convention – which sets minimum standards for migrant workers and members of their families, including undocumented migrant workers. Various legal, socioeconomic and political arguments have been put forward for explaining why states in the Global South accept this system, while states in the Global North refrain from ratifying the convention without major protest. Antoine Pécoud (2017) stresses that the rejection of the convention is not only linked to cost-benefit analyses that emphasise the difficulty of reconciling migrant rights and market logics, to financial transactions between sending and destination states linked to remittances (Noll, 2010), or to the difficulty of reaching multilevel legal agreements on migrants’ rights. Rather, this rejection is equally rooted in racist political discourses that present migrants as almost ontologically different from citizens and in competition with them for rights, reinforcing their position as outsiders, rather than fellow ‘workers’ (Noll, 2010: 59).
Furthermore, welfare can be understood as conveying strong symbolism concerning a state's self-perception as a political community. Many Scandinavian countries are currently facing the challenges of austerity politics (Kamali and Jönsson, 2018; Scarpa and Schierup, 2016; Therborn, 2020), welfare chauvinism and nationalism (Larsen et al., 2018, also see Careja and Harris, 2022), and growing-right wing populism (Mulinari and Neergaard, 2017). Still, the idea of the welfare state remains relevant in that welfare is still very much part of the national identities of those countries. Nonetheless, research highlights how ideas about, for example, Swedish exceptionalism, informed by perceptions of welfare generosity, fell apart in the winter and spring of 2015–2016, when the Swedish government decided to close its national borders to prevent migrants from entering (Barker, 2018).
Nicholas Barr (2001) has discussed how welfare chauvinism/nationalism relies on and reproduces an imaginary of the (welfare) state as a ‘piggy bank’, a closed circuit of tax contributions and government expenses. This imaginary is central to the welfare chauvinistic idea that national populations are uniquely entitled to welfare while non-nationals may legitimately be excluded. It is also part and parcel of discourses (and theoretical models) that understand ‘immigration’/’immigrants’ first and foremost as a potential burden on the (welfare) state in terms of social expenses (see keywords ‘Solidarity’ and ‘Suspicion and Surveillance’). The problem with the ‘piggy bank’ imaginary is that it disregards the experiences and the claims amongst those who are not included, as well as the history of how the Western and Northern European nation-states accumulated (and continue to accumulate) their wealth, especially the legacy of colonial dispossession and plunder which, by extension, has also fuelled climate change, leading to people being displaced today (see El-Enany, 2020, about British wealth as the ‘spoils of empire’; Hardt and Negri, 2000). Discourses and theoretical models that focus solely on poor immigrants as a burden on the welfare state also overlook their contributions to the funding of welfare states and more generally to the economy, considering them only as disenfranchised and precarious labour without equal rights to benefits.
Scholars problematising the dominant discourse about migration as a problem point to how long-term austerity politics (Scarpa and Schierup, 2016), as well as perceptions about ‘the Other’, increasingly shape how issues are publicly debated (Dahlstedt and Neergaard, 2019). Jef Huysmans (2000) places the political process within the European Union of connecting migration to terror and criminality in a broader politicisation, in which migrants have been portrayed as a challenge to the protection of both national identity and welfare provisions. By inflating the political construction of migration as a security issue, the politics of belonging in Western Europe is produced and reproduced (Waever, 1995; see keywords ‘Suspicion and Surveillance’ and ‘Discipline’). This imagined belonging constitutes an integral part of a wider technocratic and political process – involving the police and migration authorities, as well as certain social movements and political parties – in which bureaucracies negotiate and decide the criteria for legitimate membership in Western European societies (see keywords ‘Suspicion and Surveillance’ and ‘Welfare Governance’). Anouk de Koning and colleagues have shown how, for migrant parents in several European cities, social citizenship is enacted and claimed in welfare landscapes that involve ‘highly personalised, yet unequal encounters between white middle-class female professionals and non-white working-class migrant mothers’ (De Koning et al., 2023: 436). Such encounters reproduced the gendered nature of citizenship and of the welfare state and mobilised ideas concerning ‘good family lives and good futures for children’ as well as the division of responsabilities between parents and the state (De Koning et al., 2023: 437; see also keyword on ‘Welfare governance’ for responsabilisation). Migrant parents experienced the welfare states they engaged with as ‘disjunctive, contradictory and erratic’ leaving them wondering whether it was their migrant and/or ethnoracial difference that explained their encounters (De Koning et al., 2023: 437).
Citizens and migrants in the EU(ropean) welfare state(s)
In the previous section, we showed how migrants often are perceived as posing a challenge to the welfare state, understood as a nationally bounded construct. Below, we explore the development of transnational forms of welfare in the context of the European Union, which allow migrants – EU citizens and third-country nationals – to be included in the welfare systems of their host states. The EU started as an economic integration project among nation-states built around four fundamental freedoms, including the free movement of European workers and an internal market. Although the EU aspires to be a ‘highly competitive social market economy’ (Article 3/3 Treaty on the European Union), its social dimension has always been considered weaker and secondary to achieving economic integration (Scharpf, 2010; see also Dale and El-Enany, 2013; Iossa and Persdotter, 2021; Menz, 2015), because its main objective is to remove barriers to the free movement of European workers. Under criticism is the EU's willingness to sacrifice social considerations in favour of ‘market’ integration – for example by allowing its rules on the free movement of services and posting of workers to take precedence over social policy considerations leading to social dumping (Jacqueson and Pennings, 2019). More recent analyses (Claassen et al., 2019; Crespy, 2022) highlight the many initiatives that the EU has taken to strengthen its social agenda, while equally stressing that the success of such initiatives depends on political choices and efforts to transcend a purely national vision of ‘the social’. Another set of criticisms is that the EU focuses on social policy (the macro level), rather than on social rights as fundamental rights (the individual level) that would, for example, award migrants and mobile EU citizens (and not only workers) social rights in the host EU state as a matter of EU fundamental rights (Alston and Weiler, 1998).
Nonetheless, Maurizio Ferrera (2018) argues that it is possible to speak about the notion of a ‘European social union’ as built on national social spaces, transnational social spaces, the EU mobility space, EU social policy, and the EU's fundamental social principles. Because of the more limited competences that the EU enjoys in the field of social policy as opposed to internal market policy, the EU cannot, for example, harmonise the national welfare states of its member states into an EU welfare state. The EU's ambition is limited to coordinating their social security systems to ensure that the exercise of EU free workers’ movement rights does not lead to loss of social security coverage. The underlying logic of this social security coordination effort is that EU workers would not be willing to move should they fear that such movement would have negative consequences for their entitlement to social benefits. Besides incorporation into the EU citizen's host welfare state, the rules on social security coordination also allow for the limited exportation of some social benefits (such as unemployment benefits, healthcare, or pensions; see Bruzelius et al., 2017), in countries that are not members of the EU, such as Switzerland.
Andrew Geddes and Leila Hadj-Adjou (2016) have described the EU as a ‘radical experiment in open borders’, the consequences of which for European nation-states are essentially contested. This is observable in the partial extension of the social dimension of EU labour mobility to economically inactive EU citizens after the introduction of EU citizenship in 1992, and to the mobility of ‘third-country’ nationals, but never to people who are unable to support themselves. Moreover, EU law allows a derogation from the equal treatment of EU nationals during the first months of residence in another country, as the right to reside in another EU state is granted only if individuals do not become an ‘unreasonable’ burden on the welfare system (Verschueren, 2014). The European Commission, therefore, supports the idea that states must financially support their poor, who are also clearly asked not to leave their national territories (Lhernould, 2017). This has led to frictions that were exacerbated by the 2008 economic crisis and the reform/shrinking of national welfare states, as national authorities sought to exclude economically inactive mobile migrants (EU and ‘third-country’ nationals) from entitlement to social rights (Mantu and Minderhoud, 2019; Minderhoud and Mantu, 2017). Another criticism is that the EU system reifies the exclusionary dimensions of national welfare states without making them more inclusive or generous towards migrants and other vulnerable categories. This is observed with the differentiated inclusion of EU citizens in their host state's welfare system, depending on whether or not they are economically active (Mantu, 2018) and the different rules applicable to third-country nationals in terms of how their legal status regulates access to social rights, with highly skilled migrants having different entitlements than seasonal workers, for example (see keyword ‘Welfare Governance’). Giving preferential treatment to highly skilled migrants and EU workers is linked to ideas about what types of migration are desirable. Social rights are thus stratified depending on the migrant's desirability for the EU economic project which is reflected by their legal status. Generally, while EU states pay lip service to the idea of a ‘social market economy’, they continue to restrict migrants’ access to the welfare state.
The linking of austerity politics and migrants’ exclusion in the EU(ropean) welfare state resembles what in the UK context is known as the creation of a ‘hostile environment’ that cemented the relationship between immigration law and a long history of racism in the British welfare state (Vickers, 2021: 428). Vickers introduces the term ‘racial capitalism’ to describe a system where power is concentrated in the hands of a small minority, while ‘the exploitation of the majority are sustained through processes of categorisation and selection of labour that are heavily racialised’ (Vickers, 2021: 436). His observation that welfare policy and immigration policy are used to enforce ‘racialised relations of exploitation’ is pertinent for European nation-states and the EU more generally.
Conclusion
Departing from the debates on migration and welfare in Europe, Andrew Geddes (2003) argues that while social rights, cohesion and solidarity are often linked to immigration, these are not about whether newcomers should have access to welfare, but about economic change and how to uphold longer-term stability. Migration, he argues, still provides an important lens through which broader changes in welfare states in Europe can be viewed (Geddes, 2003: 152).
In this keyword, we have problematised the relationship between ‘the welfare state’ understood as a national construct and migration as a disruptive force. The starting point was that there are different understandings of the welfare state, such as that it is a reformist process aimed at achieving greater equality through class cooperation, or that it has a symbolic value. National welfare states have a lot in common in terms of (re-)producing social relations and considering the advantages they give to citizens vs non-citizens.
We have shown that political decisions lead to differences in the institutionalisation of welfare and the effects of social policy. As in other wealthy countries, EU member states’ political decisions on migration and social policy are to a large extent marked by a common base. Welfare is organised through national law, the regulation and distribution of which is characterised by a democratic deficit whereby migrants who are most directly subject to the regulations, are excluded from regulative processes. Welfare chauvinistic processes, directly and indirectly, lead to the exclusion from some welfare benefits of migrants and other groups that lack the resources to provide for themselves. While the EU has taken some initiatives to develop a transnational social protection system, access to this system is differentiated and the system continues to discriminate against unskilled labour migrants and citizens, and between EU and non-EU citizens.
Footnotes
Funding
The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was supported by: the nccr – on the move funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation grant 51NF40-182897, and FORTE – Advanced Legal Practices grant 2019-00610.
Author biogrpahies
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