Becoming an Informed Citizen — the Relationship Between Naturalization Regimes,Language,and Political Knowledge Among Naturalized Citizens

Abstract

Political knowledge is a crucial component of democratic participation. For immigrants in particular, political knowledge plays a key role in political integration. This article investigates how institutional contexts, in the form of naturalization regimes, shape differences in political knowledge among naturalized citizens. Using Germany as a case study, this analysis focuses on two major immigrant groups that were subject to different naturalization regimes, namely individuals of Turkish and Soviet origin. Drawing on data from the 2017 Immigrant German Election Study, mediation analyses reveal a knowledge gap across these groups. However, this gap does not appear to be influenced by individual proficiency in the German language. Naturalized Turkish immigrants demonstrate greater political knowledge than naturalized immigrants of Soviet origin. These results underscore that naturalization regimes do more than grant legal status but also shape the political integration of immigrant citizens.

Keywords

Political knowledge political integration citizenship quantitative methods Germany

Introduction

For democracies to function effectively, some level of political knowledge among citizens is essential (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Political knowledge shapes key aspects of democratic participation, including voter turnout, electoral choices, and political attitudes (Johann 2012; Mondak 2001; Smets and van Ham 2013). However, politics often competes with other areas of life, and individuals are not equally motivated to inform themselves (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Although the choice to inform oneself is part of individual freedom, systematic differences in political knowledge across social groups can result in ineffective voting decisions (Nordin 2014) and, thus, restrict meaningful political participation and representation (de Souza 2022).

Previous research indicates that immigrants generally tend to have lower levels of political knowledge than native-born citizens (Abrajano 2010; Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Caidi, Allard and Quirke 2010; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Yet for immigrants, political knowledge is especially important, as it plays a central role in their political integration and affects their ability to engage with democratic institutions in the host country (Bloemraad 2006; Mayer, Hamidou and Goerres 2020). Despite this, the literature often treats immigrants as a homogeneous group, overlooking variations within immigrant populations and the role of state institutions in shaping these differences.

This study contributes to the growing body of research on immigrant political integration by examining differences in political knowledge across immigrant groups. Specifically, it focuses on how naturalization regimes, that is, the institutional frameworks and requirements that govern access to citizenship, shape these differences. While most existing research compares immigrants to the native-born population, fewer studies examine how variation in naturalization pathways within a single country is linked to political knowledge. This is a critical gap, given that citizenship is not just a legal status but also a socially and politically constructed process that shapes civic norms, expectations, and behaviors.

Germany presents a particularly valuable case for examining these dynamics. Over the past decades, individuals from a wide range of countries have migrated to Germany and have since been able to acquire German citizenship. The two largest groups are immigrants of Turkish and Soviet origin (Hamidou-Schmidt and Mayer 2021). These groups have experienced markedly different naturalization trajectories. Soviet-origin immigrants, many of whom were classified as “ethnic Germans,” were granted citizenship quickly upon arrival. In contrast, immigrants of Turkish origin have generally had to meet more restrictive conditions to naturalize, including longer residence periods and language proficiency requirements (Hailbronner 2006; van Oers 2014). These differing institutional contexts provide an opportunity to examine how naturalization regimes shape political knowledge within a shared national framework. Therefore, this study addresses the following research question:

How Does Political Knowledge Differ Between Naturalized Citizens Who Have Been Subject to Different Naturalization Regimes?

To answer this question, the analysis draws on data from the 2017 Immigrant German Election Study (IMGES), comparing three groups: Soviet-origin immigrants, Turkish immigrants who naturalized before 2008, and Turkish immigrants who naturalized after 2008 (when a standardized citizenship test was introduced in Germany). Mediation analyses are used to assess not only the direct differences in political knowledge but also whether language proficiency mediates the relationship between naturalization regimes and political knowledge.

This study makes three key contributions. First, it highlights that naturalization regimes are not merely legal gateways to citizenship but also function as political institutions that influence patterns of political integration. Second, it moves beyond individual-level explanations by incorporating the role of state institutions and legal frameworks in shaping political knowledge among immigrants. Third, it provides a within-country comparison that reveals significant variation in political knowledge across immigrant groups, emphasizing the need to disaggregate the immigrant population in empirical analyses.

The results highlight that immigrants who faced more demanding naturalization processes, specifically Turkish immigrants, have greater political knowledge than Soviet immigrants, who acquired citizenship through less restrictive procedures. However, this difference does not appear to be mediated by language proficiency, nor is it clearly associated with the introduction of a uniform citizenship test in 2008. These findings suggest self-selection effects and broader institutional dynamics, indicating that the political consequences of naturalization regimes extend beyond legal status. Ultimately, this study underscores the importance of considering how state structures and policies shape not only access to citizenship but also the substantive political integration of immigrant populations. In doing so, the study contributes to broader debates about the role of the state in promoting inclusive democracies and the political consequences of citizenship policies.

Theoretical Background

Political knowledge is widely regarded as a cornerstone of democratic citizenship. Even when political participation is limited to voting, a basic understanding of political institutions, economic structures, as well as the official positions and responsibilities of political actors enables individuals to interpret political developments and navigate electoral choices that reflect their interests and values (Schübel 2018; de Souza 2022; Westle and Tausendpfund 2019). Without such knowledge, political participation risks becoming symbolic rather than substantive, thereby weakening democratic accountability.

Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996, p. 10) define political knowledge as “the range of factual information about politics that is stored in long-term memory.” According to their influential framework, political knowledge encompasses three essential areas of expertise: an understanding of institutions and electoral rules, knowledge of politicians and political parties, and an understanding of current political issues. Of these areas, the understanding of institutions and electoral rules is particularly vital because it enables individuals to meaningfully engage in democratic processes. Understanding how votes are translated into political power is fundamental to assessing the effectiveness of one's participation and ensuring that electoral decisions are based on a basic understanding of the democratic system.

Beyond the overall level of political knowledge, its distribution across society is equally important. Unequal access to political information undermines the democratic principle of political equality by giving some social groups more influence over political outcomes than others (Schübel 2018). This issue is particularly pressing in the context of immigration, as immigrant voters¹ tend to participate at lower rates. This raises concerns about the quality of democratic representation (Bevelander and Hutcheson 2021; Blatter, Schmid and Blättler 2017; Simonsen 2020). These concerns are further compounded when lower political participation coincides with limited political knowledge. Research consistently shows that, on average, immigrants possess lower levels of political knowledge than native-born citizens. For example, Adman and Strömblad (2018) find that Swedish immigrants know less about politics than natives. This knowledge gap can diminish immigrants’ political efficacy, especially regarding confidence in their ability to understand politics, and reduce their likelihood of participating. This contributes to a broader marginalization of immigrant communities within democratic structures (Anduiza and Martín 2011; Chamberlain 2012).

While traditional explanations, such as age and education, help to explain differences in facets of political integration, such as voting behavior (Smets and van Ham 2013), these factors often have less explanatory power for immigrants than for native-born citizens (Heath et al. 2013; Wass et al. 2015). Furthermore, these factors cannot explain differences among various immigrant groups. For example, studies on immigrant youth in Germany indicate that Turkish immigrants have less political knowledge than Italian or Eastern European immigrants (Eck and Weisseno 2009; Goll et al. 2010; Greßer 2016; Stanat and Edele 2011). These differences point to the importance of structural and institutional factors that can either facilitate or hinder immigrants’ political integration (Hainmueller, Hangartner and Pietrantuono 2015, 2017; Kuhlmann 2025).

Naturalization Regimes and the Politics of Membership

Naturalization regimes are central institutional mechanisms through which states define the boundaries of political membership. By establishing the conditions under which immigrants can acquire citizenship, these regimes provide both security in residence status and access to formal political rights, including the right to vote. The inclusiveness of these regimes varies, often requiring several years of residency, language proficiency, and the successful completion of citizenship tests (Bloemraad 2006; Howard 2005; Vink 2017). Thus, beyond merely granting legal status, naturalization regimes signal a broader set of expectations regarding integration. In liberal democracies, naturalization regimes reflect national narratives about belonging and citizenship. As Hollifield and Wong (2023) argue, citizenship laws often reflect founding myths and historical self-conceptions, which can either position immigrants as potential members or label them as permanent outsiders. This symbolic dimension of citizenship is critical because it shapes how immigrants are incorporated socially, economically, and politically. Portes and Rumbaut (2006) conceptualize naturalization as part of a broader adaptation process through which immigrants orient themselves to the host society. Empirical research supports this view, demonstrating that acquiring citizenship can facilitate immigrants’ political, economic, and social integration (Hainmueller, Hangartner and Pietrantuono 2015, 2017). However, these relationships are not uniform across groups. Instead, they depend on the inclusiveness of the regime and the barriers immigrants face in the naturalization process.

In this context, the role of the state is crucial. As Hollifield et al. (2022) and Hollifield and Wong (2023) emphasize, states not only regulate the flow of immigrants but also shape the legal, political, and institutional frameworks that structure their integration. Naturalization regimes shape political integration by determining who is eligible to participate in democratic life. The framework of structured mobilization illustrates how state institutions and policies can either facilitate or hinder immigrants’ access to political participation (Bloemraad 2006). In this sense, naturalization regimes function as gatekeepers by setting criteria for naturalization, such as length of residency, civic knowledge, and language proficiency, as well as rules for birthright citizenship. Beyond legal structures, institutional support linked to naturalization, such as access to language training, can promote successful integration (ibid.). Portes and Rumbaut (2006) view naturalization regimes as dynamic processes of social adaptation rather than static institutional hurdles. Previous research supports this view and emphasizes the impact of citizenship on integration processes in various country settings. For example, Hainmueller, Hangartner and Pietrantuono (2015, 2017) find that naturalization improves integration outcomes, especially for marginalized groups and when it occurs shortly after arrival.

The influence of different naturalization regimes can be observed within and across countries. For the United States, Brown and Bean (2016) show that immigration status significantly affects political knowledge. They conclude that exclusion from membership limits political integration. The case of Cuban immigrants is particularly instructive. Under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Cubans were granted access to legal residency, language support, and federal assistance programs such as Medicare and financial aid. These benefits facilitated a smoother path to citizenship and helped Cuban Americans attain significant political influence compared to other Hispanic groups (Castellanos and Gloria 2018; Morawska 2013; Moreno 1996; Portes and Mozo 1985). In contrast, immigrants applying for citizenship in many countries must fulfill various arbitrary requirements, including language and knowledge tests (Wallace Goodman 2023).

Naturalization Regimes in Germany

Germany is a compelling case study for analyzing how naturalization regimes shape political integration. While comparative studies often examine differences between countries (e.g., Bloemraad 2006), Germany provides an opportunity for within-country comparisons, particularly among immigrant groups with different legal pathways to citizenship. Two of the largest groups, namely Turkish immigrants (approximately 2.7 million) and (late-)resettlers from the former Soviet Union (approximately 2.6 million), differ significantly in how the German state has facilitated their integration (Deger 1997; BMI/BAMF 2022, pp. 166–167).

Until the 1990 Naturalization Act, the German naturalization process was regulated at the discretion of the authorities, and state policy generally discouraged naturalization. Based on the 1913 Reich and Nationality Act (RuStAG), German citizenship law followed the principle of jus sanguinis (citizenship by descent). This reflected the state's reluctance to recognize Germany as a country of immigration (van Oers 2014; Wallace Goodman 2023). Immigrants, particularly labor migrants such as the Turkish “guest workers” who arrived in the 1960s and 1970s, faced significant barriers to naturalization and were not expected to settle permanently (Oltmer 2018; van Oers 2014). Substantial reforms in the 1990s and the 2000 Nationality Act (StAG) marked a shift toward a more inclusive framework. The introduction of jus soli elements (i.e. birthplace principle), the reduction of the residency requirement from 15 to 8 years, and the establishment of a legal right to naturalization signaled a redefinition of German citizenship. Since 2008, applicants have also been required to pass a citizenship test assessing knowledge of German political institutions, history, and culture (§ 10 StAG).² The test consists of 33 multiple-choice questions, and applicants must answer at least 17 correctly. Overall, Michalowski (2011) describes the German citizenship test as quite liberal and similar to that of the United States. It is focused on educating future citizens about democracy, rights, the German political system, and German history. Despite these reforms, Turkish immigrants continue to have relatively low naturalization rates (Diehl and Blohm 2003). One major barrier has been the German state's historical emphasis on avoiding dual nationality. This has required many Turkish nationals to relinquish their original citizenship, which has been a significant deterrent (Federal Foreign Office 2022; van Oers 2014).³

In contrast, (late-)resettlers (in German (Spät-)Aussiedler) from the former Soviet Union have followed a different path. Recognized as ethnic Germans under Article 116 of the Basic Law, upon entering the country, they had the legal right to become German citizens (Anil 2005; Elwert 2015; Hansen and Olsen 2023; Vogelgesang 2018). Their naturalization was primarily shaped by the Federal Expellee Law (BVFG) of 1953, which granted them German citizenship “by law” (§ 4 BVFG), without a separate naturalization process. They usually acquired German citizenship within a few months (Goerres et al. 2018). Although reforms in 1993 introduced stricter criteria for proving German ethnicity, including language and cultural ties, they are generally exempt from the citizenship test and are not typically considered foreigners.

Differentiated Naturalization Paths and Political Knowledge

These divergent legal and institutional pathways may have important consequences for political integration, in particular, political knowledge. While both Turkish and Soviet immigrants may ultimately obtain citizenship, the effort and requirements involved differ substantially. Turkish immigrants are generally required to navigate a longer process in seeking naturalization by fulfilling residency requirements and passing a citizenship test that directly assesses knowledge of the political system. In contrast, resettlers have often acquired citizenship more quickly, without having to pass a citizenship test. As a consequence, although previous studies on immigrant youth in Germany suggest that Turkish immigrants have lower political knowledge than Italian or Eastern European immigrants (Eck and Weisseno 2009; Goll et al. 2010; Greßer 2016; Stanat and Edele 2011), I hypothesize that:

H1: Naturalized Turkish immigrants have more political knowledge than naturalized Soviet immigrants.

This hypothesis is based on the idea that the naturalization process, especially when it includes civic education and language requirements, can lead to the acquisition of political knowledge. Therefore, I expect the results of this study to differ from those of previous studies that investigated immigrant groups as a whole, rather than focusing only on naturalized citizens. Nevertheless, the relationship between naturalization regimes and political knowledge is not expected to be purely direct.

The Mediating Role of Language Proficiency

Language proficiency is a key mechanism through which naturalization regimes may influence immigrants’ political knowledge. Language inequalities can reinforce political exclusion, which can lead to broader social and political inequalities. Immigrants who are not proficient in the host country's language not only face social and economic disadvantages, but they are also less able to exercise political rights and access political information effectively (Adserà and Pytliková 2016; de Schutter and Ypi 2012). As Luskin (1990) argues, an individual's ability to learn about politics depends on both cognitive skills and linguistic ability. Language proficiency shapes immigrants’ capacity to interpret political information, engage with the media, and participate meaningfully in civic life. Previous studies link language proficiency among immigrants to higher rates of electoral participation and civic involvement more broadly (Giugni and Grasso 2020), as well as greater political knowledge specifically (Dalisay 2012). In particular, institutionalized forms of language training appear to play a role in incentivizing immigrants to participate in politics. Notably, Heller and Slungaard Mumma (2023) analyze data from the enrollment records of a publicly funded language training program for adults in Massachusetts and find that attending English training classes more than doubled voter registration rates. Naturalization regimes that impose language requirements may similarly enhance political knowledge indirectly by incentivizing or necessitating language learning as part of the path to citizenship. These more restrictive regimes that tie access to citizenship to demonstrated linguistic competence may promote higher levels of language proficiency among immigrants. Moreover, naturalization regimes function as gatekeepers. Under more restrictive naturalization regimes, individuals who lack the capacity or resources to learn the language are excluded from citizenship altogether. This exclusion denies formal political membership and further reinforces existing inequalities (Adserà and Pytliková 2016; Bonotti and Willoughby 2022; Dronkers and Vink 2012; Khan 2022; Vink et al. 2021). The specific selection of individuals who can fulfill language requirements ultimately leads to a group of naturalized citizens with higher language proficiency compared to naturalization regimes without language requirements. Additionally, more inclusive regimes that do not require language skills may reduce incentives or opportunities for language acquisition. While institutional regulations are by far not the only influence on language acquisition, these regulations, such as formal language testing, can shape access to language learning and, by extension, opportunities for political engagement and the acquisition of political knowledge (Adserà and Pytliková 2016). Thus, I propose the following mediating relationship:

H2: Language proficiency mediates the relationship between naturalization regimes and political knowledge, such that more inclusive naturalization regimes lead to lower language proficiency, which in turn reduces political knowledge (Figure 1).

Figure 1.

Mediation model. Note. Own Illustration.

Methodology and Data

This study draws on data from the 2017 IMGES, a postelection survey conducted through face-to-face interviewing after the 2017 German federal election. The IMGES provides information on the political attitudes and behaviors of first- and second-generation immigrants from Turkey and the former Soviet Union and its successor states. Importantly, the survey focuses solely on eligible voters, that is, immigrants with German citizenship. More information on the IMGES can be found in the appendix (Hamidou-Schmidt and Mayer 2021; Mayer et al. 2021, 2024).

The IMGES data is particularly well-suited to this study for several reasons. Unlike many other comparative datasets, the IMGES allows for within-country comparisons between two distinct immigrant groups. This allows for an analysis of different naturalization experiences while holding the host-country context constant. Furthermore, by focusing only on eligible voters, the IMGES allows for a meaningful analysis of political knowledge in relation to voting rights, which are directly linked to citizenship (Nordin 2014).

Dependent Variables

Political knowledge is assessed through two questions about the German electoral system. Both questions concern important aspects of the German electoral system and are highly relevant to citizens’ ability to use their vote to represent their interests. The first question is a closed question about the importance of the first and second vote in German federal elections (vote-item). Respondents could answer that either the first vote or the second vote is more important, or that both votes are equally important (correct answer: the second vote). The second question is about the 5 percent threshold that parties must reach to definitely secure seats in the national parliament (threshold-item). Respondents could answer with any percentage between 0 and 100 percent (correct answer: 5 percent). Specifically, the two questions are as follows:

“In the Bundestag election you have two votes, a first vote and a second vote. How is it actually, which of the two votes is decisive for the distribution of seats in the Bundestag?” (vote-item)

“Now I would like to know which percentage of votes does a party definitely need to send representatives to the Bundestag?” (threshold-item)

Since these are factual knowledge questions, the answers to these two questions can be either correct, incorrect, or answered with “don’t know.” Incorrect answers and “don’t know” answers are combined and coded as 0, while correct answers are coded as 1.

Independent Variables

Naturalization regimes are operationalized using three categories, based on respondents’ country of origin and year of naturalization. The categories are: naturalized immigrants from the former Soviet Union and its successor states, naturalized immigrants from Turkey who naturalized before 2008, and naturalized immigrants from Turkey who naturalized after 2008. Naturalized immigrants from the former Soviet Union and its successor states serve as the reference category. Unlike with Turkish immigrants, no distinction is made between pre- and post-2008 immigrants from the former Soviet Union because resettlers from this region were not required to pass citizenship tests. Furthermore, additional analyses show no notable differences in language proficiency within this group between those who naturalized before and after 2008. The language proficiency of respondents was assessed by interviewers and is measured on a scale from 0 (very bad) to 4 (very good).

Control Variables

Several control variables are included to account for known predictors of political knowledge. Age is expected to be related to both political knowledge and language proficiency because older individuals have had more opportunities to acquire political knowledge and gain experience in the political process (de Souza 2022; Tausendpfund, 2020). Gender (female = 1) is being controlled for because studies show that men have significantly more political knowledge than women (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Tausendpfund, 2020). In addition, education has been shown to be one of the strongest predictors of individual political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Westle 2005). Educational background is coded as low (less than 10 years of education), medium, or high (university entrance qualifications). Medium education is used as the reference category. Respondents who are still attending school are coded as missing. For respondents who attended school outside of Germany, the German equivalent is calculated based on the years of schooling completed. Respondents with less than 10 years of schooling are categorized as low educated. Those with 10 or 11 years of schooling are categorized as medium educated, and those with more than 11 years of schooling are categorized as highly educated. Hamidou-Schmidt and Mayer (2021) also use this approach with the same data. Income is included in the form of net household income, a categorical variable comprising thirteen income brackets (1 = lowest income group and 13 = highest income group). For the analysis, income was treated as a continuous predictor. As a robustness test, additional models are estimated, separating income into three categories (see Tables A4 and A5 in the appendix). These are low income (first tertile), medium income (second tertile; reference category), and high income (third tertile). The results of these models closely align with those reported in the results chapter.

Since both questions refer to the German electoral system, I also control for whether or not the person voted in the last federal election (did not vote = 0, did vote = 1). In addition, I control for the individuals’ social context. This includes the frequency of political discussions, the composition of their friend group, and their membership in social organizations. The frequency of political discussions ranges from 0 (the respondent did not talk about parties and politics with other people in the past week) to 7 (the respondent talked on 7 days about parties and politics with other people in the past week). Friend composition ranges from 1 (all or most of the respondent's friends are not from Germany) to 4 (almost all of the respondent's friends are from Germany). Organizational membership is dichotomous and coded as 1 if the respondent has participated in at least one organization in the past 12 months, and if less than half of that organization's members or participants are from Turkey or the former Soviet Union or its successor states. A list of these organizations can be found in the appendix. Additionally, political research on German respondents often distinguishes between those in West and East Germany. I control for differences between East (= 1) and West (= 0) Germany by recoding the federal states in which the interview took place. Berlin can only be measured by the whole of the city and is included as an East German state.

Method

This study examines the direct and indirect relationships between naturalization regimes and political knowledge, with a focus on the role of language proficiency as a mediator. To this end, two structural equation models (SEMs) were estimated separately for the two dichotomous political knowledge items. These models were estimated using the lavaan package in R (Rosseel 2012; Rosseel et al. 2025), applying the weighted least squares mean and variance adjusted (WLSMV) estimator. This estimator is suitable for categorical or ordinal dependent variables and yields probit regression coefficients on the latent response scale. Mediation analysis is a statistical approach used to assess whether the effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable is transmitted through an intermediary variable. This method allows for the estimation of direct, indirect (mediated), and total effects, helping to identify the mechanisms linking naturalization regimes to political knowledge (Baron and Kenny 1986). Only cases with a complete set of values for all variables were included (N = 664). All continuous variables were normalized to range between 0 (minimum) and 1 (maximum). IMGES data is weighted using a post-stratification weight (dweight_adj1) accounting for differential selection probabilities and nonresponse bias. Full item wordings are included in the appendix, and the data is available in the GESIS data archive (Goerres et al. 2023).

To contextualize the findings, IMGES data is supplemented with data from the 2017 German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES 2019), which includes measures of political knowledge among Germans without an immigrant background. According to the GLES, 57 percent of Germans without an immigrant background correctly answered the question on the first and second vote, and 69 percent correctly answered the question on the 5 percent threshold. In comparison, the IMGES sample demonstrates significantly lower knowledge on both items.

Results

Figure 2 shows the proportion of correct answers to the two political knowledge questions among different naturalization groups. Overall, 36 percent of respondents correctly answered the voting question, while 48 percent correctly answered the threshold question. However, there are differences between the naturalization groups. Only 27 percent of naturalized Soviet immigrants correctly answered the voting question, compared to 43 and 58 percent of naturalized Turkish immigrants, depending on their timing of naturalization (before or after 2008). The overall group differences are statistically significant (χ²(2) = 30.15, p < 0.001***). Pairwise comparisons indicate that the significant difference is primarily between naturalized Soviet immigrants and both groups of Turkish immigrants. Meanwhile, the difference between Turkish immigrants who naturalized before and after 2008 is significant only at the 90 percent confidence level.

Figure 2.

Share of correct knowledge by naturalization regime. Note. Own calculations based on data from the IMGES (Goerres et al. 2023). Percentage of political knowledge by naturalization category. Values are weighted using the post-stratification weight dweight_adj1. IMGES: Immigrant German Election Study.

For the 5 percent threshold question, 39 percent of naturalized Soviet immigrants answered correctly, while 58 percent of Turkish immigrants answered correctly (both Turkish immigrants who naturalized before and after 2008). The difference between these three proportions is significant (χ²(2) = 23.75, p < 0.001***). Again, the pairwise proportions indicate that this difference lies in the differences between naturalized Soviet immigrants and both groups of Turkish immigrants. No significant difference is found between Turkish immigrants who naturalized before and after 2008. Thus, the results are consistent with Hypothesis 1, which states that naturalized immigrants from Turkey have more political knowledge than those from the former Soviet Union.

Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of language proficiency (as rated by the interviewer) by naturalization regime. Most respondents tend to have at least a medium level of proficiency in German. However, there are differences between the naturalization regimes. In particular, a smaller percentage of naturalized Soviet immigrants were considered to have “very good” language skills than both groups of naturalized immigrants of Turkish origin. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) analysis demonstrates that these differences between naturalization regimes are significant (F(2, 661) = 17.07, p < 0.001***). Once again, this difference lies in the comparison between naturalized Soviet immigrants and both categories of naturalized Turkish immigrants. Meanwhile, there are no significant differences in German language proficiency between Turkish immigrants who naturalized before and after 2008.

Figure 3.

Distribution of language proficiency within the naturalization regimes. Note. Own calculations based on data from the IMGES (Goerres et al. 2023). Percentage of language proficiency (as rated by the interviewer) by naturalization category. Values are weighted using the post-stratification weight dweight_adj1. IMGES: Immigrant German Election Study.

Mediation Analyses

To investigate the relationship between naturalization regimes, language proficiency, and political knowledge, separate binomial mediation regressions are conducted, with the two political knowledge items serving as the dependent variables and German language proficiency as the mediator.

Figure 4 illustrates the mediation results regarding knowledge of the 5 percent threshold, with naturalized Soviet immigrants serving as the reference category for the naturalization regimes. The results are based on the full model, which includes all control variables. Tables with estimates of all variables can be found in the appendix (Table A2). The findings suggest that Turkish immigrants who naturalized before 2008 are significantly more likely than naturalized Soviet immigrants to correctly answer the 5 percent threshold question. However, Turkish immigrants who naturalized after 2008 are not significantly more likely than naturalized Soviet immigrants to correctly answer the 5 percent threshold question. Thus, these results partially support Hypothesis 1, which posits that naturalized Turkish immigrants have higher levels of political knowledge than naturalized Soviet immigrants.

Figure 4.

Mediation results on knowledge of the 5 percent threshold (ref. naturalized Soviet). Note. N = 664, p < 0.05*, p < 0.01**, p < 0.001***. Reference category for naturalization category: Naturalized Soviet. Weighted SEM estimation with robust standard errors in brackets. Models estimated using the WLSMV estimator in lavaan with sampling weights. For the binary outcome variables (vote-item and threshold-item), a probit link was used. Own calculations based on data from the IMGES (Goerres et al. 2023). Full models in Table A2 in the appendix. IMGES: Immigrant German Election Study; SEM: structural equation model; WLSMV: weighted least squares mean and variance.

Meanwhile, Figure 5 illustrates the mediation results regarding knowledge of the first and second vote. Again, naturalized Soviet immigrants serve as the reference category. The results show that only Turkish immigrants who naturalized after 2008 are significantly more likely to answer correctly than naturalized Soviet immigrants. In contrast, Turkish immigrants who naturalized before 2008 do not differ significantly from naturalized Soviets in their knowledge of the meaning of the first and second vote. These findings partially support Hypothesis 1, indicating that Turkish immigrants who naturalized after 2008 are more likely to understand the difference between the first and second vote.

Figure 5.

Mediation results on knowledge of the first and second vote (ref. naturalized Soviet). Note. N = 664, p < 0.05*, p < 0.01**, p < 0.001***. Reference category for naturalization category: naturalized Soviet. Weighted SEM estimation with robust standard errors in brackets. Models estimated using the WLSMV estimator in lavaan with sampling weights. For the binary outcome variables (vote-item and threshold-item), a probit link was used. Own calculations based on data from the IMGES (Goerres et al. 2023). Full models in Table A2 in the appendix. IMGES: Immigrant German Election Study; SEM: structural equation model; WLSMV: weighted least squares mean and variance.

In terms of language proficiency, Turkish immigrants who naturalized before 2008 are reported to have significantly higher German language proficiency than naturalized Soviet immigrants. However, this is not the case for Turkish immigrants who naturalized after 2008. Notably, language proficiency does not predict knowledge of either the 5 percent threshold or the importance of the first and second vote. This suggests that other factors account for differences in political knowledge. Again, the full regression tables, including all control variables, can be found in the appendix. Overall, the tables show that a high level of education (compared to medium education) and having voted in the last election are significantly associated with the likelihood of correctly answering the question about the importance of the first and second vote. Meanwhile, for the 5 percent threshold item, discussing politics more frequently, having more German friends, and living in East Germany are positively associated with the likelihood of answering correctly. Other factors, such as age, gender, and income, are not significantly associated with either knowledge item.

Table 1 presents the direct, indirect, and total effects of the naturalization regime and language proficiency on political knowledge, with naturalized Soviet immigrants serving as the reference category. Turkish immigrants who naturalized before 2008 show a statistically significant direct effect on knowledge of the 5 percent threshold. However, the indirect effect, mediated by German language proficiency, is not significant. For Turkish immigrants who naturalized after 2008, the direct, indirect, and total effects are not statistically significant. Regarding knowledge about the first and second vote, Turkish immigrants who naturalized before 2008 show no significant effect, while Turkish immigrants who naturalized after 2008 show a significant direct effect, again with a statistically insignificant indirect effect. Therefore, Hypothesis 2, which asserts that language proficiency mediates the relationship between naturalization regimes and political knowledge, is not supported for either knowledge question. Overall, the results indicate that, although the naturalization regime is associated with variations in political knowledge, these effects are primarily direct, while language proficiency plays only a minor role. Notably, the significant effects vary by both naturalization group and knowledge item. While Turkish immigrants who naturalized before 2008 are significantly more likely to correctly answer the threshold question, Turkish immigrants who naturalized after 2008 are more likely to correctly answer the vote question than naturalized Soviet immigrants.

Table 1.

Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of the Naturalization Regime and Language Proficiency on Knowledge (ref. Naturalized Soviet).

	Direct	Indirect	Total
Knowledge 5% threshold
Naturalized Turkish before 2008 (ref. naturalized Soviet)	0.40 (0.17)*	0.03 (0.03)	0.43 (0.17)*
Naturalized Turkish after 2008 (ref. naturalized Soviet)	0.41 (0.27)	0.02 (0.02)	0.42 (0.27)
Knowledge first & second vote
Naturalized Turkish before 2008 (ref. naturalized Soviet)	0.23 (0.16)	0.04 (0.03)	0.27 (0.16)
Naturalized Turkish after 2008 (ref. naturalized Soviet)	0.60 (0.27)*	0.02 (0.03)	0.61 (0.28)*

Note. p < 0.05*, p < 0.01**, p < 0.001***. Values in bold indicate statistical significance at p < 0.05. Own calculations based on data from the IMGES (Goerres et al. 2023). Effects represent standardized direct, indirect, and total effects from weighted SEM. Based on the full models in Table A2 in the appendix. IMGES: Immigrant German Election Study; SEM: structural equation model.

Using Turkish immigrants who naturalized after 2008 as the reference category in the models, instead of naturalized Soviet immigrants, allows for a direct comparison of Turkish immigrants who naturalized before and after 2008. The results indicate that there are no significant differences in language proficiency or propensity to correctly answer the 5 percent threshold question between Turkish immigrants who naturalized before and after 2008 (Figure 6). Similarly, there are no significant differences in their propensity to correctly answer the question on the importance of the first and second vote (Figure 7).

Figure 6.

Mediation results on knowledge of the 5 percent threshold (ref. Turkish after 2008). Note. N = 664, p < 0.05*, p < 0.01**, p < 0.001***. Reference category for naturalization category: naturalized Turkish after 2008. Weighted SEM estimation with robust standard errors in brackets. Models estimated using the WLSMV estimator in lavaan with sampling weights. For the binary outcome variables (vote-item and threshold-item), a probit link was used. Own calculations based on data from the IMGES (Goerres et al. 2023). Full models in Table A3 in the appendix. IMGES: Immigrant German Election Study; SEM: structural equation model; WLSMV: weighted least squares mean and variance.

Figure 7.

Mediation results on knowledge of the first and second vote (ref. Turkish after 2008).

The results in Table 2 reveal no significant differences in political knowledge between Turkish immigrants who naturalized before and after 2008. There are no differences in political knowledge regarding the propensity to correctly answer either the 5 percent threshold item or the item on the first and second vote. Therefore, for the group of Turkish immigrants, there appears to be no significant association between their timing of naturalization (before vs. after 2008) and their political knowledge. Consequently, the observed differences in political knowledge between Soviet and Turkish immigrants do not appear to be driven by the introduction of standardized civic knowledge tests in Germany.

Table 2.

Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of the Naturalization Regime and Language Proficiency on Knowledge (ref. Naturalized Turkish After 2008).

	Direct	Indirect	Total
Knowledge 5% threshold
Naturalized Soviet (ref. nat. Turkish after 2008)	−0.41 (0.27)	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.42 (0.27)
Naturalized Turkish before 2008 (ref. nat. Turkish after 2008)	−0.01 (0.27)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.27)
Knowledge first & second vote
Naturalized Soviet (ref. nat. Turkish after 2008)	−0.60 (0.27)*	−0.02 (0.03)	−0.61 (0.28)*
Naturalized Turkish before 2008 (ref. nat. Turkish after 2008)	−0.37 (0.27)	0.02 (0.03)	−0.35 (0.28)

Note. p < 0.05*, p < 0.01**, p < 0.001***. Values in bold indicate statistical significance at p < 0.05. Own calculations based on data from the IMGES (Goerres et al. 2023). Effects represent standardized direct, indirect, and total effects from weighted SEM. Based on the full models in Table A3 in the appendix. IMGES: Immigrant German Election Study; SEM: structural equation model.

Taken together, the mediation analyses highlight the differences in political knowledge among immigrant groups. However, these differences do not appear to be indirectly shaped by variations in language proficiency. While Turkish immigrants tend to have higher levels of political knowledge than naturalized Soviet immigrants, these differences depend on the timing of naturalization for Turkish immigrants and the knowledge item examined. In the case of the 5 percent threshold item, the direct effect of being a naturalized Turkish immigrant who naturalized after 2008 (compared to naturalized Soviet immigrants) is not statistically significant, despite being similar in magnitude to the significant effect observed for the group of naturalized Turkish immigrants who naturalized before 2008. This may reflect higher uncertainty due to a smaller sample size in the group of Turkish immigrants who naturalized after 2008. For the vote item, however, the difference between the Turkish subgroups is more pronounced. Furthermore, these differences cannot be explained by the variation in language proficiency. Thus, these findings challenge the assumption that language acts as a key mechanism linking naturalization policies and political knowledge.

Discussion and Conclusion

Although previous studies have examined the political knowledge of immigrants and native-born citizens, less attention has been paid to differences within immigrant groups. In particular, the role of the state in shaping political integration through naturalization regimes, and whether language proficiency mediates this relationship, remains understudied. This study addresses this gap by comparing the political knowledge of naturalized Germans from different backgrounds: Soviet-origin immigrants, Turkish immigrants who naturalized before 2008, and Turkish immigrants who naturalized after 2008.

The findings show that naturalized Germans generally have low levels of knowledge when it comes to either the importance of the first and second vote or the 5 percent threshold. Only about one-third answered correctly when asked about the difference between the first and the second vote in German federal elections. This is roughly the level expected by chance. Knowledge of the 5 percent threshold is higher, at around 48 percent. This difference may be explained by the fact that the 5 percent threshold tends to receive greater public and media attention during German federal elections. The 5 percent threshold poses a significant challenge for parties seeking representation in the Bundestag. It often takes center stage in political debates, especially when new or small parties approach it. For example, this was evident with the rise of parties like the Alternative for Germany (AfD) (Gschwend 2007; Shikano et al. 2009). Meanwhile, the technicalities of the two votes are less prominent in political debates. Yet, even for the 5 percent threshold question, more than half of the respondents did not answer correctly. These results highlight a broader issue of limited political knowledge, even among those with formal political membership.

However, significant differences emerge between the groups. Turkish immigrants, both those who naturalized before and after 2008, demonstrate higher political knowledge than naturalized Soviet immigrants. Regarding the 5 percent threshold question, Turkish immigrants who naturalized before 2008 were more likely to answer correctly than Soviet immigrants. Regarding the question on the first and second vote, Turkish immigrants who naturalized after 2008 were more likely to answer correctly. These patterns suggest that the naturalization process itself may promote political knowledge. Turkish immigrants typically had to meet stricter criteria for naturalization, including language proficiency, a stable income, and several years of residence. In contrast, many Soviet immigrants acquired citizenship automatically under resettlement laws, without passing through formal civic tests. This difference in naturalization pathways may help explain the variation in political knowledge observed between the two groups. Yet, the findings also show no significant difference in the political knowledge of Turkish immigrants who naturalized before or after the formal introduction of a more uniform citizenship test in 2008. This calls into question the effectiveness of the test in actually enhancing political knowledge.

Regarding the role of language proficiency, Turkish immigrants (particularly those who naturalized before 2008) were reported by interviewers to have better German language skills than Soviet immigrants. However, language proficiency was not significantly associated with either knowledge of the 5 percent threshold or the difference in the first and second vote. This finding challenges common assumptions that language proficiency is a key mechanism for political learning. Although language can facilitate access to information, it may be insufficient on its own without active exposure to political discourse and opportunities for civic engagement. Consistent with this idea, Bonotti and Willoughby (2022) argue that language proficiency is not necessarily a pre-requisite for political participation if institutions exist to facilitate participation for individuals with low proficiency. Meanwhile, McNamara and Shohamy (2008) suggest that immigrants are able to acquire necessary skills as needed and use other languages to be able to participate in society through actions such as voting and expressing opinions. Thus, the results suggest that a functional understanding of the electoral system is not restricted to individuals with high language proficiency. Rather, having actually voted in the last federal election is associated with knowing the difference between the first and second vote. Meanwhile, discussing politics more frequently and having native friends increases the likelihood of correctly answering the question about the 5 percent threshold. These findings imply that unequal language proficiency does not necessarily result in an unequal ability to effectively exercise one's political voice and that the opportunity to discuss politics may be more important.

Overall, these findings support the broader theoretical argument that naturalization regimes are not just legal procedures, but political institutions that structure access to political participation and shape civic norms. While the requirement to demonstrate political knowledge and language skills may foster political awareness, this may occur only under certain conditions. Turkish immigrants, who had to overcome significant hurdles to naturalize, demonstrate higher political knowledge, which suggests self-selection effects: the most engaged individuals may pursue and achieve naturalization under restrictive regimes. However, while these findings suggest a link between more restrictive naturalization regimes and political knowledge, they should not be interpreted as an endorsement of such regimes. Rather, they underscore the need to consider how institutional frameworks can promote political knowledge without excluding less advantaged groups.

Nevertheless, limitations must be considered. First, this study relies on only two items of political knowledge. While these items are important for using one's vote correctly in the German electoral system (Maier 2000), they do not capture the full scope of political knowledge or political integration more broadly (Kuhlmann 2025; Schübel 2018). Future research should expand the range of political indicators examined. Second, although the analysis distinguishes between immigrant groups, it cannot determine whether the observed differences are due to premigration experiences, political socialization, or postmigration institutional exposure. Although all respondents are naturalized citizens, they are nevertheless a heterogeneous group, varying in their socioeconomic status and political attitudes. In particular, panel data would allow for a more precise tracking of these pathways. Furthermore, the analysis cannot account for discretionary naturalization exceptions, though they are relatively rare (Lämmermann 2009; van Oers 2014). Future research should also consider qualitative approaches to understand how immigrants interpret and navigate the naturalization process. Exploring how civic education is experienced in practice, or how individuals perceive their political rights, could provide important insights into how naturalization affects political learning.

Despite these limitations, this study makes several important contributions. First, it emphasizes the importance of disaggregating immigrant groups in research on political integration. Political knowledge varies not only between immigrants and natives but also within immigrant populations, shaped by their legal and institutional contexts. Second, the study challenges the assumption that Turkish immigrants are uniformly less politically informed. It shows instead that naturalized Turkish immigrants actually demonstrate higher levels of political knowledge than naturalized Germans with Soviet backgrounds. This finding contrasts with earlier studies focusing on immigrant youth (Eck and Weisseno 2009; Goll et al. 2010; Greßer 2016) and suggests that the mechanisms behind the political knowledge of young individuals and adults differ. Third, the findings emphasize the role of the state in shaping political integration. Institutional factors, particularly the structure and demands of naturalization, can shape not only legal status but also political knowledge.

Although this research focuses on Germany, its implications extend beyond national borders. In many European countries, descendants of emigrants can access citizenship through jus sanguinis, while residency-based naturalization remains restrictive. These unequal pathways to citizenship can result in disparities in political integration. In sum, the study emphasizes that the manner in which citizenship is granted is important. Naturalization regimes are not merely administrative hurdles. Instead, they have consequences for immigrants’ political voices.

Footnotes

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the editor and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. Versions of this paper were presented at the annual meeting of the Arbeitskreis Wahlen und politische Einstellungen and at the International Meeting on Experimental and Behavioural Social Sciences. I am grateful to the participations for their helpful feedback on earlier versions of the paper. I would also like to thank Kathrin Ackermann for her guidance.

ORCID iD

Jessica Kuhlmann

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Data Availability

All data used is available at the GESIS repository: GLES (2019) and .

Notes

Appendix

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