Elite domination by design? Comparing the rules of the game within Parliamentary Party Groups

Abstract

While there is a vibrant debate on decision-making and the degree of democracy within party organizations, scant attention has been paid to the power relations within the parties inside parliaments. This article remedies that neglect by providing the first comparative analysis of how Parliamentary Party Groups (PPGs) distribute decision-making authority. Focusing on their internal rules of procedure, we develop a multifaceted index to capture the extent to which leaders and the rank-and-file can influence group decisions. The index was subjected to an empirical examination by drawing on an original data set that includes more than 100 groups from 17 polities. We show that PPGs heavily differ in their institutional design within and across countries. Moreover, elite domination is related to a lower level of regulation, indicating that institutionalizing power counteracts elite politics. In line with party research, we found variation across party families with left-leaning groups exhibiting more participation-friendly rulebooks.