Why do some states largely comply with their self-reporting obligations in international institutions, while others fulfil them only irregularly? In this article, I conduct the first large-N analysis of self-reporting that comprises several important areas of international cooperation. This analysis relies on an original and large dataset that covers self-reporting within 25 universal arms control, environmental and human rights agreements. The empirical results find little evidence for an intuitive view that the support of states for the respective treaties and the conformity of state policies with the general goals of those treaties drive compliance with self-reporting obligations. Instead, the article reveals that this compliance is mainly influenced by the reporting behaviour of the country’s regional peers and by national economic and administrative capacities.
BaileyMichael AStrezhnevAntonVoetenErik (2017) Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data. Journal of Conflict Resolution61(2): 430–456.
2.
BernauerThomasKalbhennAnnaKoubiVallySpilkerGabriele (2013) Is There a ‘Depth Versus Participation’ Dilemma in International Cooperation?Review of International Organizations8(1): 477–497.
3.
ChayesAbramAntonia HChayes (1995) The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
4.
ChoiratChristineGandrudChristopherHonakerJamesImaiKosukeKingGaryLauOlivia (2017) Zelig: Everyone’s Statistical Software, Version 5.0-15. Available at: http://ZeligProject.org
ColeWade M (2015) Mind the Gap: State capacity and the implementation of human rights treaties. International Organization69(2): 405–441.
7.
CreamerCosette DSimmonsBeth A (2015) Ratification, Reporting, and Rights: Quality of participation in the convention against torture. Human Rights Quarterly37(3): 579–608.
8.
CreamerCosette DSimmonsBeth A (2019) Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter? Evidence from the convention against torture. International Studies Quarterly63(4): 1051–1064.
9.
DownsGeorge WM RockeDavidBarsoomPeter N (1996) Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?International Organization50(3): 379–406.
10.
FinnemoreMarthaSikkinkKathryn (1998) International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International Organization52(4): 887–917.
11.
FranckThomas M (1990) The Power of Legitimacy among Nations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
GuzmanAndrew T (2008) How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
15.
HathawayOona A (2007) Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?Journal of Conflict Resolution51(4): 588–621.
16.
JacobsonHarold KBrown WeissEdith (2000) Assessing the Record and Designing Strategies to Engage Countries. In Brown WeissEdithJacobsonHarold K (eds) Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 511–554.
17.
KarlasJanParízekMichal (2020) Supply of Policy Information in the World Trade Organization: Cross-national compliance with one-time and regular notification obligations, 1995-2014. World Trade Review19(1): 30–50.
KeohaneRobert O (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
20.
KohHarold H (1998) Why Do Nations Obey International Law?Yale Law Journal106(8): 2599–2659.
21.
KolievFaradjSommererThomasTallbergJonas (2020) Compliance Without Coercion: Effects of reporting on international labor rights. Journal of Peace Research. Epub ahead of print 8 June 2020. DOI: 10.1177/0022343320910254.
22.
LeblancLawrence JHuibregtseAdaMeisterTimothy (2010) Compliance with the Reporting Requirements of Human Rights Conventions. International Journal of Human Rights14(5): 789–807.
23.
LebovicJames H (2006) Democracies and Transparency: Country reports to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, 1992–2001. Journal of Peace Research43(5): 543–562.
24.
MansfieldEdward DMilnerHelen VRosendorffB Peter (2002) Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral control and international trade agreements. International Organization56(3): 477–513.
25.
MitchellRonald B (1998) Sources of Transparency: Information systems in international regimes. International Studies Quarterly42(1): 109–130.
26.
NeumayerEric (2002) Do Democracies Exhibit Stronger Environmental Commitment? A cross-country analysis. Journal of Peace Research39(2): 139–164.
27.
PevehouseJohn CWNordstronTimothyMacManusRoseanne WJamisonAnne Spencer (2019) Tracking Organizations in the World: The Correlates of War IGO Version 3.0 datasets. Journal of Peace Research21: 101–119.
28.
SimmonsBeth A (2009) Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
29.
SprinzDetlefVaahtorantaTapani (1994) The Interest-Based Explanation of International Environmental Policy. International Organization48(1): 77–105.
WendlingZAEmersonJWDe SherbininAEtsyDCLevyMASherbininA De (2020) Environmental Performance Index 2020. New Haven, CT: Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy. Available at: https://epi.yale.edu/
WotipkaChristine MTsutsuiKioteru (2008) Global Human Rights and Sovereignty: State ratification of international human rights treaties, 1965–2011. Sociological Forum23(4): 724–754.
