Preferences are crucial to the analysis of many key questions regarding international institutions. This article analyzes the key predictors of states’ preferences over universal treaties. It does so by using a spatial-modeling approach that conceptualizes a treaty commitment preference space that includes agreements across multiple policy areas. I analyze the treaty commitment preference space in order to better understand the key dimensions of these preferences. I find that economics, and particularly trade, is the clearest and most consistent predictor of treaty commitment preferences, including with respect to many treaties in noneconomic policy areas.
AbbottKenneth W.KeohaneRobert O.MoravcsikAndrewSlaughterAnne-MarieSnidalDuncan. 2000. “The Concept of Legalization.” International Organization54 (3): 401–19.
2.
AlkerHaywardJrRussettBruce M.. 1965. World Politics in the United Nations General Assembly. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
3.
AltfeldMichael F.de MesquitaBruce Bueno. 1979. “Choosing Sides in Wars.” International Studies Quarterly23 (1): 87–112.
4.
BagwellKyleStaigerRobert W.. 1997a. “Multilateral Tariff Cooperation during the Formation of Customs Unions.” Journal of International Economics4:91–123.
5.
BagwellKyleStaigerRobert W.. 1997b. “Multilateral Tariff Cooperation during the Formation of Regional Free Trade Areas.” International Economic Review28:291–319.
BearceDavid H.BondanellaStacy. 2007. “Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-state Interest Convergence.” International Organization61:703.
8.
BeckfieldJohn. 2003. “Inequality in the World Polity: The Structure of International Organization.” American Sociological Review68 (3): 401–24.
9.
BennettD. ScottStamAllan C.. 1999. “A Universal Test of an Expected Utility Theory of War.” International Studies Quarterly44 (3): 451–80.
10.
BoehmerCharlesNordstromTimothy. 2008. “Intergovernmental Organization Memberships: Examining Political Community and the Attributes of International Organizations.” International Interactions34 (3): 282–309.
11.
BrozJ. LawrenceHawesMichael Brewster. 2006. “Congressional Politics of Financing the International Monetary Fund.” International Organization60 (2): 367–99.
12.
CheckelJeffrey T.2005. “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework.” International Organization59 (4): 801–26.
13.
ClintonJoshuaJackmanSimonRiversDouglas. 2004. “The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data: A United Approach.” American Political Science Review98:355–70.
14.
de MesquitaBruce Bueno. 1975. “Measuring Systemic Polarity.” Journal of Conflict Resolution19 (2): 187–216.
15.
DesposatoScott. 2006. “Parties for Rent? Ambition, Ideology, and Party Switching in Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies.” American Journal of Political Science50:62–80.
16.
DesposatoScott. 2008. “The Impact of Electoral Rules on Legislative Parties: Lessons from the Brazilian Senate and Chamber of Deputies.” Journal of Politics68:1018–30.
17.
DownsGeorge W.RockeDavid M.BarsoomPeter N.. 1996. “Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?” International Organization50:397–406.
18.
DownsGeorge W.RockeDavid M.BarsoomPeter N.. 1998. “Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism.” International Organization52 (2): 397–419.
19.
DoyleMichael W.1986. Empires. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
20.
DreherAxelJensenNathan M.. 2007. “Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of US Interests on International Monetary Fund Conditions.” Journal of Law and Economics50 (1): 105–24.
21.
EnelowJames M.HinichMelvin J.. 1984. The Spatial Theory of Voting. New York: Cambridge University Press
22.
FriedenJeffry A.1999. “Actors and Preferences in International Relations.” In Strategic Choice and International Relations, edited by LakeDavid A.PowellRobert, 39–76. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
23.
GartzkeErik. 1998. “Kant We All Just Get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins of the Democratic Peace.” American Journal of Political Science42 (1): 1–27.
GartzkeErik. 2007. “The Capitalist Peace.” American Journal of Political Science51 (1): 166–91.
26.
GartzkeErikLiQuanBoehmerCharles. 2001. “Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict.” International Organization55 (2): 391–438.
27.
GleditschKristian. 2002. “Expanded Trade and GDP Data.” Journal of Conflict Resolution46 (2): 712–24.
28.
GreenhillBrian. 2010. “Norm Transmission in Networks of Intergovernmental Organizations.”PhD Thesis, University of Washington, Seattle, WA.
29.
HaftelYoram Z.2007. “Designing for Peace: Regional Integration Arrangements, Institutional Variation, and Militarized Interstate Disputes.” International Organization61:217–37.
30.
HallerbergMark. 2002. “Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions.” International Organization56 (4): 775–802.
31.
HeniszWitold J.2002. “The Institutional Environment for Infrastructure Investment.” Industrial and Corporate Change11 (2): 355–89.
32.
HillDaniel W.2010. “Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State Behavior.” Journal of Politics72:1161–74.
33.
HixSimon. 2001. “Legislative Behaviour and Party Competition in the European Parliament: An Application of Nominate to the EU.” Journal of Common Market Studies29:663–88.
34.
HoogheLiesbet. 2005. “Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission.” International Organization59 (4): 861.
35.
HowellWiliam G.LewisDavid E.. 2002. “Agencies by Presidential Design.” Journal of Politics64:1095–114.
36.
HuntingtonSamuel P.1997. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. London, UK: Pocket Books.
37.
IidaKeisuke. 1988. “Third World Solidarity: The Group of 77 in the United Nations General Assembly.” International Organization42 (2): 375–95.
38.
JenkinsJeffrey. 1999. “Examining the Bonding Effects of Party: A Comparative Analysis of Roll-call Voting in the U.S. and Confederate Houses.” American Journal of Political Science43:1144–65.
39.
JohnstonAlastair Iain. 2005. “Conclusions and Extensions: Toward Mid-range Theorizing and beyond Europe.” International Organization59 (4): 1013.
40.
KastnerScott L.RectorChad. 2003. “International Regimes, Domestic Veto-players, and Capital Controls Policy Stability.” International Studies Quarterly47:1–22.
41.
KeeferPhilipStasavageDavid. 2003. “The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy.” American Political Science Review97 (3): 407–23.
42.
KeohaneRobert O.MoravcsikAndrewSlaughterAnne-Marie. 2000. “Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational.” International Organization54 (3): 457–88.
43.
KimSoo YeonRussettBruce. 1996. “The New Politics of Voting Alignments in the United Nations General Assembly.” International Organization50 (4): 629–52.
44.
KoremenosBarbaraLipsonCharlesSnidalDuncan. 2001. “The Rational Design of International Institutions.” International Organization55 (4): 761–99.
45.
KrasnerStephen D.1995. Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global Liberalism. Berkeley: University of California Press.
46.
KyddAndrew. 2001. “Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement.” International Organization55:801.
47.
LemkeDouglas. 2002. Regions of War and Peace. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
48.
LipsonCharles. 2005. Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
49.
LondreganJohn. 2000. Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
50.
LupuYonatan. 2013a. “The Informative Power of Treaty Commitment: Using the Spatial Model to Address Selection Effects.” American Journal of Political Science57 (4): 912–25.
51.
LupuYonatan. 2013b. “Best Evidence: The Role of Information in Domestic Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights Agreements.” International Organization67 (3): 469–503.
52.
LupuYonatan. 2015. “Legislative Veto Players and the Effects of International Human Rights Agreements.” American Journal of Political Science59 (3): 578–594.
53.
MansfieldEdward D.MilnerHelen V.. 2012. Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
54.
MansfieldEdward D.MilnerHelen V.PevehouseJon C.. 2007. “Vetoing Co-operation: The Impact of Veto Players on Preferential Trading Arrangements.” British Journal of Political Science37 (3): 403–32.
55.
MaozZeevRussettBruce. 1993. “Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace, 1946-1986.” American Political Science Review87 (3): 624–38.
56.
MarshallMontyJaggersKeith. 2002. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002. College Park: University of Maryland.
57.
MartinLisa L.2000. Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
58.
McDonaldPatrick J.2007. “The Purse Strings of Peace.” American Journal of Political Science51 (3): 569–82.
59.
MilnerHelen V.1997. Interests, Institutions, and Information. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
60.
MilnerHelen V.Peter RosendorffB.. 1997. “Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution41 (1): 117–46.
61.
MoravcsikAndrew. 1997. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics.” International Organization51 (4): 513–53.
62.
MorgensternScott. 2003. Patterns of Legislative Politics: Roll-call Voting in Latin America and the United States. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
63.
MorrowJames D.1991. “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances.” American Journal of Political Science35:904–33.
64.
MorrowJames D.2001. “The Institutional Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties.” International Organization55:971.
65.
NeumayerEric. 2007. “Qualified Ratification: Explaining Reservations to International Human Rights Treaties.” Journal of Legal Studies36:397–430.
66.
NeumayerEric. 2008. “Distance, Power and Ideology: Diplomatic Representation in a World of Nation-states.” Area40 (2): 228–36.
67.
NouryAbdul G.2001. “Ideology, Nationality and Euro-parliamentarians.” European Union Politics3:33–58.
68.
OnealJohnRussettBruce. 1997. “The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985.” International Studies Quarterly41 (2): 267–93.
69.
O’ReillyRobert F.2005. “Veto Points, Veto Players, and International Trade Policy.” Comparative Political Studies38 (6): 652–75.
70.
PerkinsRichardNeumayerEric. 2007. “Implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements: An Analysis of EU Directives.” Global Environmental Politics7 (3): 13–41.
71.
PooleKeith T.2005. Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting. New York: Cambridge University Press.
72.
PooleKeith T.RosenthalHoward. 1997. Congress: A Political-economic History of Roll Call Voting. New York: Oxford University Press.
73.
ReedWilliamClarkDavid H.NordstromTimothyHwangWonjae. 2008. “War, Power, and Bargaining.” Journal of Politics70:1203–16.
74.
ReiterDanStamAllan C.. 2002. Democracies at War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
75.
RothenbergLawrence S.SandersMitchell S.. 2000. “Legislator Turnout and the Calculus of Voting: The Determinants of Abstention in the U.S. Congress.” Public Choice103:259–70.
76.
SavunBurcuTironeDaniel C.. 2011. “Foreign Aid, Democratization, and Civil Conflict: How Does Democracy Aid affect Civil Conflict?” American Journal of Political Science55 (2): 233–46.
77.
Schonhardt-BaileyCheryl. 2003. “Ideology, Party and Interests in the British Parliament of 1841-1847.” British Journal of Political Science33:581–605.
78.
ShanksC.JacobsonH. K.KaplanJ. H.. 1996. “Inertia and Change in the Constellation of International Governmental Organizations, 1981-1992.” International Organization50 (4): 593–627.
79.
SignorinoCurtis S.RitterJeffrey M.. 1999. “Tau-b or Not Tau-b: Measuring the Similarity of Foreign Policy Positions.” International Studies Quarterly43 (1): 115–44.
80.
SimmonsBeth A.2000. “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs.” American Political Science Review94:819–34.
81.
SimmonsBeth A.2009. Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
82.
SimmonsBeth A.DannerAllison. 2010. “Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court.” International Organization64:225–56.
83.
SweeneyKevin J.2003. “The Severity of Interstate Dispute: Are Dyadic Capability Preponderances Really More Pacific?” Journal of Conflict Resolution47 (6): 728–50.
84.
TsebelisGeorge. 1995. “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentalism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism.” British Journal of Political Science25:289–326.
85.
VoetenErik. 2000. “Clashes in the Assembly.” International Organization54:185–215.
86.
von SteinJana.2005. “Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance.” American Political Science Review99:611–22.
87.
von SteinJana.2008. “The International Law and Politics of Climate Change: Ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol.” Journal of Conflict Resolution52:243–68.
88.
VreelandJames R.2008. “Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention against Torture.” International Organization62 (1): 65–101.
89.
WaltzKenneth W.1993. “The Emerging Structure of International Politics.” International Security18 (2): 44–79.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
